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Michele Budinich

dblp:55/8468 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2011
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-authorTheory of computation · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
limited randomness
0.112011
Repeated matching pennies with limited randomness · EC 2011
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › solution concepts in games › equilibrium concepts
nash equilibrium
0.112011
Repeated matching pennies with limited randomness · EC 2011
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
repeated games
0.112011
Repeated matching pennies with limited randomness · EC 2011

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

game theory · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2011 Repeated matching pennies with limited randomness
abstract
We consider a repeated Matching Pennies game in which players have limited access to randomness. Playing the (unique) Nash equilibrium in this n-stage game requires n random bits. Can there be Nash equilibria (or epsilon-Nash equilibria) that use less than n random coins?
Michele Budinich, Lance Fortnow
EC1