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Carla Bulford

dblp:57/2724 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2010
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 77% Usable security · 23%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security
insider threat
0.112010
Insiders behaving badly: addressing bad actors and their actions · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2010
Usable security › security operations
insider threat mitigation
0.012010
Insiders behaving badly: addressing bad actors and their actions · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2010
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2010 Insiders behaving badly: addressing bad actors and their actions
abstract
We present a framework for describing insiders and their actions based on the organization, the environment, the system, and the individual. Using several real examples of unwelcome insider action (hard drive removal, stolen intellectual property, tax fraud, and proliferation of e-mail responses), we show how the taxonomy helps in understanding how each situation arose and could have been addressed. The differentiation among types of threats suggests how effective responses to insider threats might be shaped, what choices exist for each type of threat, and the implications of each. Future work will consider appropriate strategies to address each type of insider threat in terms of detection, prevention, mitigation, remediation, and punishment.
Shari Lawrence Pfleeger, Joel B. Predd, Jeffrey Hunker, Carla Bulford
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.4