Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Chiachih Wu
dblp:58/11189
· DBLP profile ↗
5ranked-venue papers
2as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0009-6006-3306ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 3 · 2 first-authorSystems, architecture and hardware · 1Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
4 papers |
Web and mobile security · 45% Systems and software security · 34% Malware analysis · 21% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Operating systems · 100% |
Topics — the 9 heaviest of 10, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Web and mobile security
mobile security |
0.4 | 2 | 2014 | AirBag: Boosting Smartphone Resistance to Malware Infection · NDSS 2014 The impact of vendor customizations on android security · CCS 2013 |
Systems and software security
operating system security |
0.2 | 2 | 2013 | Isolating commodity hosted hypervisors with HyperLock · EuroSys 2012 The impact of vendor customizations on android security · CCS 2013 |
Malware analysis
malware defense |
0.2 | 1 | 2014 | AirBag: Boosting Smartphone Resistance to Malware Infection · NDSS 2014 |
Web and mobile security › mobile security
android security |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | The impact of vendor customizations on android security · CCS 2013 |
Operating systems › virtualization
hypervisor security |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | Taming Hosted Hypervisors with (Mostly) Deprivileged Execution · NDSS 2013 |
Operating systems
virtualization |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | Taming Hosted Hypervisors with (Mostly) Deprivileged Execution · NDSS 2013 |
Systems and software security › isolation
hypervisor-based isolation |
0.1 | 1 | 2012 | Isolating commodity hosted hypervisors with HyperLock · EuroSys 2012 |
Malware analysis
mobile malware |
0.1 | 1 | 2014 | AirBag: Boosting Smartphone Resistance to Malware Infection · NDSS 2014 |
Cloud and datacenter computing
virtualization |
0.0 | 1 | 2012 | Isolating commodity hosted hypervisors with HyperLock · EuroSys 2012 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
deprivileged execution · 0.3hyperlock · 0.3empirical measurement · 0.2
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | When Specifications Meet Reality: Uncovering API Inconsistencies in Ethereum InfrastructureabstractThe Ethereum ecosystem, which secures over $381 billion in assets, fundamentally relies on client APIs as the sole interface between users and the blockchain. However, these critical APIs suffer from widespread implementation inconsistencies, which can lead to financial discrepancies, degraded user experiences, and threats to network reliability. Despite this criticality, existing testing approaches remain manual and incomplete: they require extensive domain expertise, struggle to keep pace with Ethereum’s rapid evolution, and fail to distinguish genuine bugs from acceptable implementation variations. We present APIDiffer , the first specification-guided differential testing framework designed to automatically detect API inconsistencies across Ethereum’s diverse client ecosystem. APIDiffer transforms API specifications into comprehensive test suites through two key innovations: (1) specification-guided test input generation that creates both syntactically valid and invalid requests enriched with real-time blockchain data, and (2) specification-aware false positive filtering that leverages large language models to distinguish genuine bugs from acceptable variations. Our evaluation across all 11 major Ethereum clients reveals the pervasiveness of API bugs in production systems. APIDiffer uncovered 72 bugs, with 90.28% already confirmed or fixed by developers, including one critical error in the official specifications themselves. Beyond these raw numbers, APIDiffer achieves up to 89.67% higher code coverage than existing tools and reduces false positive rates by 37.38%. The Ethereum community’s response validates our impact: developers have integrated our test cases, expressed interest in adopting our methodology, and escalated one bug to the official Ethereum Project Management meeting. By making APIDiffer open-source, we enable continuous validation of Ethereum client API implementations, thereby strengthening the foundational integrity of the entire Ethereum ecosystem. Ningyu He, Jinwen Xi, Mingzhe Xing, Liangxin Liu, Jiushenzi Luo, Xiaopeng Fu, Chiachih Wu, Haoyu Wang 0001, Ying Gao 0006, Yinliang Yue |
Proc. ACM Program. Lang. | 8 |
| 2014 | AirBag: Boosting Smartphone Resistance to Malware Infection
Chiachih Wu, Yajin Zhou, Kunal Patel, Zhenkai Liang, Xuxian Jiang |
NDSS | 1 |
| 2013 | The impact of vendor customizations on android securityabstractThe smartphone market has grown explosively in recent years, as more and more consumers are attracted to the sensor-studded multipurpose devices. Android is particularly ascendant; as an open platform, smartphone manufacturers are free to extend and modify it, allowing them to differentiate themselves from their competitors. However, vendor customizations will inherently impact overall Android security and such impact is still largely unknown. Lei Wu 0012, Michael C. Grace, Yajin Zhou, Chiachih Wu, Xuxian Jiang |
CCS | 4 |
| 2013 | Taming Hosted Hypervisors with (Mostly) Deprivileged Execution
Chiachih Wu, Zhi Wang 0004, Xuxian Jiang |
NDSS | 1 |
| 2012 | Isolating commodity hosted hypervisors with HyperLockabstractHosted hypervisors (e.g., KVM) are being widely deployed. One key reason is that they can effectively take advantage of the mature features and broad user bases of commodity operating systems. However, they are not immune to exploitable software bugs. Particularly, due to the close integration with the host and the unique presence underneath guest virtual machines, a hosted hypervisor -- if compromised -- can also jeopardize the host system and completely take over all guests in the same physical machine. Zhi Wang 0004, Chiachih Wu, Michael C. Grace, Xuxian Jiang |
EuroSys | 2 |