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Chiachih Wu

dblp:58/11189 · DBLP profile ↗
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5ranked-venue papers
2as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0009-6006-3306ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 3 · 2 first-authorSystems, architecture and hardware · 1Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
4 papers
Web and mobile security · 45% Systems and software security · 34% Malware analysis · 21%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Operating systems · 100%

Topics — the 9 heaviest of 10, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Web and mobile security
mobile security
0.422014
AirBag: Boosting Smartphone Resistance to Malware Infection · NDSS 2014
The impact of vendor customizations on android security · CCS 2013
Systems and software security
operating system security
0.222013
Isolating commodity hosted hypervisors with HyperLock · EuroSys 2012
The impact of vendor customizations on android security · CCS 2013
Malware analysis
malware defense
0.212014
AirBag: Boosting Smartphone Resistance to Malware Infection · NDSS 2014
Web and mobile security › mobile security
android security
0.212013
The impact of vendor customizations on android security · CCS 2013
Operating systems › virtualization
hypervisor security
0.212013
Taming Hosted Hypervisors with (Mostly) Deprivileged Execution · NDSS 2013
Operating systems
virtualization
0.212013
Taming Hosted Hypervisors with (Mostly) Deprivileged Execution · NDSS 2013
Systems and software security › isolation
hypervisor-based isolation
0.112012
Isolating commodity hosted hypervisors with HyperLock · EuroSys 2012
Malware analysis
mobile malware
0.112014
AirBag: Boosting Smartphone Resistance to Malware Infection · NDSS 2014
Cloud and datacenter computing
virtualization
0.012012
Isolating commodity hosted hypervisors with HyperLock · EuroSys 2012

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

deprivileged execution · 0.3hyperlock · 0.3empirical measurement · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 When Specifications Meet Reality: Uncovering API Inconsistencies in Ethereum Infrastructure
abstract
The Ethereum ecosystem, which secures over $381 billion in assets, fundamentally relies on client APIs as the sole interface between users and the blockchain. However, these critical APIs suffer from widespread implementation inconsistencies, which can lead to financial discrepancies, degraded user experiences, and threats to network reliability. Despite this criticality, existing testing approaches remain manual and incomplete: they require extensive domain expertise, struggle to keep pace with Ethereum’s rapid evolution, and fail to distinguish genuine bugs from acceptable implementation variations. We present APIDiffer , the first specification-guided differential testing framework designed to automatically detect API inconsistencies across Ethereum’s diverse client ecosystem. APIDiffer transforms API specifications into comprehensive test suites through two key innovations: (1) specification-guided test input generation that creates both syntactically valid and invalid requests enriched with real-time blockchain data, and (2) specification-aware false positive filtering that leverages large language models to distinguish genuine bugs from acceptable variations. Our evaluation across all 11 major Ethereum clients reveals the pervasiveness of API bugs in production systems. APIDiffer uncovered 72 bugs, with 90.28% already confirmed or fixed by developers, including one critical error in the official specifications themselves. Beyond these raw numbers, APIDiffer achieves up to 89.67% higher code coverage than existing tools and reduces false positive rates by 37.38%. The Ethereum community’s response validates our impact: developers have integrated our test cases, expressed interest in adopting our methodology, and escalated one bug to the official Ethereum Project Management meeting. By making APIDiffer open-source, we enable continuous validation of Ethereum client API implementations, thereby strengthening the foundational integrity of the entire Ethereum ecosystem.
Ningyu He, Jinwen Xi, Mingzhe Xing, Liangxin Liu, Jiushenzi Luo, Xiaopeng Fu, Chiachih Wu, Haoyu Wang 0001, Ying Gao 0006, Yinliang Yue
Proc. ACM Program. Lang.8
2014 AirBag: Boosting Smartphone Resistance to Malware Infection
Chiachih Wu, Yajin Zhou, Kunal Patel, Zhenkai Liang, Xuxian Jiang
NDSS1
2013 The impact of vendor customizations on android security
abstract
The smartphone market has grown explosively in recent years, as more and more consumers are attracted to the sensor-studded multipurpose devices. Android is particularly ascendant; as an open platform, smartphone manufacturers are free to extend and modify it, allowing them to differentiate themselves from their competitors. However, vendor customizations will inherently impact overall Android security and such impact is still largely unknown.
Lei Wu 0012, Michael C. Grace, Yajin Zhou, Chiachih Wu, Xuxian Jiang
CCS4
2013 Taming Hosted Hypervisors with (Mostly) Deprivileged Execution
Chiachih Wu, Zhi Wang 0004, Xuxian Jiang
NDSS1
2012 Isolating commodity hosted hypervisors with HyperLock
abstract
Hosted hypervisors (e.g., KVM) are being widely deployed. One key reason is that they can effectively take advantage of the mature features and broad user bases of commodity operating systems. However, they are not immune to exploitable software bugs. Particularly, due to the close integration with the host and the unique presence underneath guest virtual machines, a hosted hypervisor -- if compromised -- can also jeopardize the host system and completely take over all guests in the same physical machine.
Zhi Wang 0004, Chiachih Wu, Michael C. Grace, Xuxian Jiang
EuroSys2