Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page
Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert

Jee Hea An

dblp:58/4716 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
6ranked-venue papers
3as first author
0since 2021 · last 2008
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 5 · 3 first-authorTheory of computation · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
6 papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 65% Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 23% Authentication and access control · 12%

Topics — the 8 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography
digital signatures		 0.132008
From Identification to Signatures Via the Fiat-Shamir Transform: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Security and Forward-Security · IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 2008
From Identification to Signatures via the Fiat-Shamir Transform: Minimizing Assumptions for Security and Forward-Security · EUROCRYPT 2002
On the Security of Joint Signature and Encryption · EUROCRYPT 2002
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
fiat-shamir transform		 0.122008
From Identification to Signatures Via the Fiat-Shamir Transform: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Security and Forward-Security · IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 2008
From Identification to Signatures via the Fiat-Shamir Transform: Minimizing Assumptions for Security and Forward-Security · EUROCRYPT 2002
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
authenticated encryption		 0.122003
Concealment and Its Applications to Authenticated Encryption · EUROCRYPT 2003
Does Encryption with Redundancy Provide Authenticity? · EUROCRYPT 2001
Authentication and access control › authentication › authentication protocols
identification schemes		 0.122008
From Identification to Signatures via the Fiat-Shamir Transform: Minimizing Assumptions for Security and Forward-Security · EUROCRYPT 2002
From Identification to Signatures Via the Fiat-Shamir Transform: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Security and Forward-Security · IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 2008
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography › digital signatures
forward-secure signature		 0.012002
From Identification to Signatures via the Fiat-Shamir Transform: Minimizing Assumptions for Security and Forward-Security · EUROCRYPT 2002
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography
signcryption		 0.012002
On the Security of Joint Signature and Encryption · EUROCRYPT 2002
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
encryption		 0.012001
Does Encryption with Redundancy Provide Authenticity? · EUROCRYPT 2001
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
message authentication codes		 0.011999
Constructing VIL-MACsfrom FIL-MACs: Message Authentication under Weakened Assumptions · CRYPTO 1999

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

random oracle model · 0.1forward security · 0.1provable security · 0.1fiat-shamir transform · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2008 From Identification to Signatures Via the Fiat-Shamir Transform: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Security and Forward-Security
abstract
The Fiat-Shamir paradigm for transforming identification schemes into signature schemes has been popular since its introduction because it yields efficient signature schemes, and has been receiving renewed interest of late as the main tool in deriving forward-secure signature schemes. In this paper, minimal (meaning necessary and sufficient) conditions on the identification scheme to ensure security of the signature scheme in the random oracle model are determined, both in the usual and in the forward-secure cases. Specifically, it is shown that the signature scheme is secure (respectively, forward-secure) against chosen-message attacks in the random oracle modelifandonlyifthe underlying identification scheme is secure (respectively, forward-secure) against impersonation underpassive(i.e., eavesdropping only) attacks, and has its commitments drawn at random from a large space. An extension is proven incorporating a random seed into the Fiat-Shamir transform so that the commitment space assumption may be removed.
Michel Abdalla, Jee Hea An, Mihir Bellare, Chanathip Namprempre
 IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory2
2003 Concealment and Its Applications to Authenticated Encryption
Yevgeniy Dodis, Jee Hea An
 EUROCRYPT2
2002 From Identification to Signatures via the Fiat-Shamir Transform: Minimizing Assumptions for Security and Forward-Security
Michel Abdalla, Jee Hea An, Mihir Bellare, Chanathip Namprempre
 EUROCRYPT2
2002 On the Security of Joint Signature and Encryption
Jee Hea An, Yevgeniy Dodis, Tal Rabin
 EUROCRYPT1
2001 Does Encryption with Redundancy Provide Authenticity?
Jee Hea An, Mihir Bellare
 EUROCRYPT1
1999 Constructing VIL-MACsfrom FIL-MACs: Message Authentication under Weakened Assumptions
Jee Hea An, Mihir Bellare
 CRYPTO1