Li Wang 0120

dblp:58/6810-120 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
1as first author
4since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0003-1289-5457ORCID · conflict

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Security and privacy · 4 · 1 first-author · 4 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Safe Driving Adversarial Trajectory Can Mislead: Toward More Stealthy Adversarial Attack Against Autonomous Driving Prediction Module
abstract
The prediction module, powered by deep learning models, constitutes a fundamental component of high-level Autonomous Vehicles (AVs). Given the direct influence of the module’s prediction accuracy on AV driving behavior, ensuring its security is paramount. However, limited studies have explored the adversarial robustness of the prediction modules. Furthermore, existing methods still generate adversarial trajectories that deviate significantly from human driving behavior. These deviations can be easily identified as hazardous by AVs’ anomaly detection models and thus cannot effectively evaluate and reflect the robustness of the prediction modules. To bridge this gap, we propose a stealthy and more effective optimization-based attack method. Specifically, we reformulate the optimization problem using Lagrangian relaxation and design a Frenet-based objective function along with a distinct constraint space. We conduct extensive evaluations on 2 popular prediction models and 2 benchmark datasets. Our results show that our attack is highly effective, with over 87% attack success rates, outperforming all baseline attacks. Moreover, our attack method significantly improves the stealthiness of adversarial trajectories while guaranteeing adherence to physical constraints. Our attack is also found robust to noise from upstream modules, transferable across trajectory prediction models, and high realizability. Lastly, to verify its effectiveness in real-world applications, we conduct further simulation evaluations using a production-grade simulator. These simulations reveal that the adversarial trajectory we created could convincingly induce autonomous vehicles (AVs) to initiate hard braking.
Yingkai Dong, Li Wang 0120, Zheng Li 0023, Hao Li 0092, Peng Tang 0002, Chengyu Hu 0001, Shanqing Guo
ACM Trans. Priv. Secur.2
2024 AVA: Inconspicuous Attribute Variation-based Adversarial Attack bypassing DeepFake Detection
abstract
While DeepFake applications are becoming popular in recent years, their abuses pose a serious privacy threat. Unfortunately, most related detection algorithms to mitigate the abuse issues are inherently vulnerable to adversarial attacks because they are built atop DNN-based classification models, and the literature has demonstrated that they could be bypassed by introducing pixel-level perturbations. Though corresponding mitigation has been proposed, we have identified a new attribute-variation-based adversarial attack (AVA) that perturbs the latent space via a combination of Gaussian prior and semantic discriminator to bypass such mitigation. It perturbs the semantics in the attribute space of DeepFake images, which are inconspicuous to human beings (e.g., mouth open) but can result in substantial differences in DeepFake detection. We evaluate our proposed AVA attack on nine state-of-the-art DeepFake detection algorithms and applications. The empirical results demonstrate that AVA attack defeats the state-of-the-art black box attacks against DeepFake detectors and achieves more than a 95% success rate on two commercial DeepFake detectors. Moreover, our human study indicates that AVA-generated DeepFake images are often imperceptible to humans, which presents huge security and privacy concerns.
Xiangtao Meng, Li Wang 0120, Shanqing Guo, Lei Ju 0001, Qingchuan Zhao
SP2
2024 DEEPFAKER: A Unified Evaluation Platform for Facial Deepfake and Detection Models
abstract
Deepfake data contains realistically manipulated faces—its abuses pose a huge threat to the security and privacy-critical applications. Intensive research from academia and industry has produced many deepfake/detection models, leading to a constant race of attack and defense. However, due to the lack of a unified evaluation platform, many critical questions on this subject remain largely unexplored. How is the anti-detection ability of the existing deepfake models? How generalizable are existing detection models against different deepfake samples? How effective are the detection APIs provided by the cloud-based vendors? How evasive and transferable are adversarial deepfakes in the lab and real-world environment? How do various factors impact the performance of deepfake and detection models? To bridge the gap, we design and implement DEEPFAKER 1 a unified and comprehensive deepfake detection evaluation platform. Specifically, DEEPFAKER has integrated 10 state-of-the-art deepfake methods and 9 representative detection methods, while providing a user-friendly interface and modular design that allows for easy integration of new methods. Leveraging DEEPFAKER , we conduct a large-scale empirical study of facial deepfake/detection models and draw a set of key findings: (i) the detection methods have poor generalization on samples generated by different deepfake methods; (ii) there is no significant correlation between anti-detection ability and visual quality of deepfake samples; (iii) the current detection APIs have poor detection performance and adversarial deepfakes can achieve about 70% attack success rate on all cloud-based vendors, calling for an urgent need to deploy effective and robust detection APIs; (iv) the detection methods in the lab are more robust against transfer attacks than the detection APIs in the real-world environment; and (v) deepfake videos may not always be more difficult to detect after video compression. We envision that DEEPFAKER will benefit future research on facial deepfake and detection.
Li Wang 0120, Xiangtao Meng, Xuhong Zhang 0002, Shouling Ji, Shanqing Guo
ACM Trans. Priv. Secur.1
2022 Seeing is Living? Rethinking the Security of Facial Liveness Verification in the Deepfake Era
Changjiang Li, Li Wang 0120, Shouling Ji, Xuhong Zhang 0002, Zhaohan Xi, Shanqing Guo, Ting Wang 0006
USENIX Security Symposium2