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Eric Northup

dblp:60/2960 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2022
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 65% Hardware security and side channels · 32% Systems and software security · 3%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Memory systems · 100%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › secret sharing › linear secret sharing
arithmetic secret sharing
0.612022
SecNDP: Secure Near-Data Processing with Untrusted Memory · HPCA 2022
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure multiparty computation
0.612022
SecNDP: Secure Near-Data Processing with Untrusted Memory · HPCA 2022
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments
0.612022
SecNDP: Secure Near-Data Processing with Untrusted Memory · HPCA 2022
Memory systems › processing-in-memory
near-data processing
0.612022
SecNDP: Secure Near-Data Processing with Untrusted Memory · HPCA 2022
Memory systems
processing-in-memory
0.612022
SecNDP: Secure Near-Data Processing with Untrusted Memory · HPCA 2022
Systems and software security
operating system security
0.012004
Design of the EROS Trusted Window System · USENIX Security Symposium 2004

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

counter-mode encryption · 1.1block cipher encryption · 1.1trusted computing · 0.1capability-based security · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2022 SecNDP: Secure Near-Data Processing with Untrusted Memory
abstract
Today’s data-intensive applications increasingly suffer from significant performance bottlenecks due to the limited memory bandwidth of the classical von Neumann architecture. Near-Data Processing (NDP) has been proposed to perform computation near memory or data storage to reduce data movement for improving performance and energy consumption. However, the untrusted NDP processing units (PUs) bring in new threats to workloads that are private and sensitive, such as private database queries and private machine learning inferences. Meanwhile, most existing secure hardware designs do not consider off-chip components trustworthy. Once data leaving the processor, they must be protected, e.g., via block cipher encryption. Unfortunately, current encryption schemes do not support computation over encrypted data stored in memory or storage, hindering the adoption of NDP techniques for sensitive workloads.In this paper, we propose SecNDP, a lightweight encryption and verification scheme for untrusted NDP devices to perform computation over ciphertext and verify the correctness of linear operations. Our encryption scheme leverages arithmetic secret sharing in secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) to support operations over ciphertext, and uses counter-mode encryption to reduce the decryption latency. The security of the encryption and verification algorithm is formally proven. Compared with a non-NDP baseline, secure computation with SecNDP significantly reduces the memory bandwidth usage while providing security guarantees. We evaluate SecNDP for two workloads of distinct memory access patterns. In the setting of eight NDP units, we show a speedup up to 7.46× and energy savings of 18% over an unprotected non-NDP baseline, approaching the performance gain attained by native NDP without protection. Furthermore, SecNDP does not require any security assumption on NDP to hold, thus, using the same threat model as existing secure processors. SecNDP can be implemented without changing the NDP protocols and their inherent hardware design.
Wenjie Xiong 0001, Liu Ke 0001, Dimitrije Jankov, Michael E. Kounavis, Eric Northup, Jie Amy Yang, Bilge Acun, Carole-Jean Wu, Ping Tak Peter Tang, G. Edward Suh, Xuan Zhang 0001, Hsien-Hsin S. Lee
HPCA6
2004 Design of the EROS Trusted Window System
Jonathan S. Shapiro, John Vanderburgh, Eric Northup, David Chizmadia
USENIX Security Symposium3