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Yuhan Wang 0015

dblp:60/6089-15 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
1as first author
4since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0003-5139-1267ORCID · conflict

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
3 papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%
Human-computer interaction and pervasive computing
1 paper
Health and well-being technologies · 44% Human-AI interaction · 44% Ubiquitous computing and smart environments · 13%
Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
3 papers
Information retrieval · 100%

Topics — the 8 heaviest of 11, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design
1.922026
IMPACTNet: Unifying Auto-bidding in End-to-End Merged Auctions · KDD (1) 2026
Hybrid Advertising in the Sponsored Search · SIGIR 2025
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › algorithmic mechanism design
automated mechanism design
1.012026
IMPACTNet: Unifying Auto-bidding in End-to-End Merged Auctions · KDD (1) 2026
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory › advertising auctions
ad auction design
0.912025
On Designing the Optimal Integrated Ad Auction in E-commerce Platforms · AAAI 2025
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
incentive compatibility
0.912025
On Designing the Optimal Integrated Ad Auction in E-commerce Platforms · AAAI 2025
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
mechanism design
0.912025
On Designing the Optimal Integrated Ad Auction in E-commerce Platforms · AAAI 2025
Information retrieval
online advertising
0.622026
IMPACTNet: Unifying Auto-bidding in End-to-End Merged Auctions · KDD (1) 2026
Hybrid Advertising in the Sponsored Search · SIGIR 2025
Information retrieval
ranking
0.312025
On Designing the Optimal Integrated Ad Auction in E-commerce Platforms · AAAI 2025
Information retrieval › online advertising
sponsored search
0.312025
Hybrid Advertising in the Sponsored Search · SIGIR 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

neural network · 3.5transformer · 2.0incentive compatibility · 2.0constrained optimization · 2.0reinforcement learning · 1.7regret minimization · 1.7wizard-of-oz study · 0.8large language model · 0.8field experiment · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 IMPACTNet: Unifying Auto-bidding in End-to-End Merged Auctions
abstract
Merging mechanisms, as a mature business model in the field of online advertising, refers to the practice where platforms sort and display sponsored ads provided by advertisers alongside organic results to users according to specific rules. However, in real-world industrial scenarios, advertisers are gradually adopting autobidding instead of manual bidding—they only need to provide high-level constraints like target Return-on-Spend (tROS) to the agent, which then bids on their behalf to maximize multi-round value. Existing studies often overlook this actual business form, resulting in suboptimal outcomes. Meanwhile, the coexistence of the same item in both ad and organic result forms within merging mechanisms further increases the complexity of the context. In terms of interests, advertisers aim to maximize conversion value, while platforms seek to increase the revenue while ensuring user experience, thereby enhancing reputation. Nevertheless, existing works often fail to address this multi-stakeholder challenge in the modern auto-bidding era. To address these issues, we introduce IMPACTNet, an end-to-end framework based on automated mechanism design that learns a unified allocation and pricing mechanism. IMPACTNet directly incorporates advertisers' tROS constraints, models complex contextual information using a transformer-based architecture, and introduces a learnable, state-aware de-duplication strategy. By formulating the design as a constrained optimization problem, our framework learns a mechanism that ensures Auto-bidding Incentive Compatibility (AIC), ensuring truthfully reporting tROS a dominant strategy. Extensive experiments on synthetic and large-scale industrial datasets demonstrate that IMPACTNet significantly outperforms established baselines, achieving a better balance of platform objectives, user experience, and advertiser tROS satisfaction.
Yuhan Wang 0015, Yuchao Ma 0002, Zhiyuan Su, Qi Qi 0003, Yuyao Liu, Pengjie Wang 0002, Jian Xu 0015, Bo Zheng 0007
KDD (1)1
2025 On Designing the Optimal Integrated Ad Auction in E-commerce Platforms
abstract
Currently, e-commerce platforms integrate ads and organic content into a mixed list for users. While platforms seek to maximize profit from advertisers, organic items enhance user experience. To ensure long-term development, platforms aim to design mechanisms that optimize both revenue and user satisfaction. Current methods rank ads and organic items separately before integrating them. Even if each part is locally optimal, the combined result may not be globally optimal. In this paper, we come up with the Joint Integrated Regret Network (JINTER Net). Unlike traditional methods, which pre-order ads and organic items separately, JINTER Net directly selects from the combined set of candidate ads and organic items to generate an optimal list. This approach aims to optimally balance platform revenue and user experience while satisfying approximate dominant strategy incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We validate the effectiveness of JINTER Net using both synthetic data and real dataset, and our experimental results show that it significantly outperforms baseline models across multiple metrics.
Yuchao Ma 0002, Weian Li, Yuhan Wang 0015, Zitian Guo, Yuejia Dou, Qi Qi 0003, Changyuan Yu
AAAI3
2025 Hybrid Advertising in the Sponsored Search
abstract
Online advertisements are a primary revenue source for e-commerce platforms. Traditional advertising models are store-centric, selecting winning stores through auction mechanisms. Recently, a new approach known as joint advertising has emerged, which presents sponsored bundles combining one store and one brand in ad slots. Unlike traditional models, joint advertising allows platforms to collect payments from both brands and stores. However, each of these two advertising models appeals to distinct user groups, leading to low click-through rates when users encounter an undesirable advertising model. To address this limitation and enhance generality, we propose a novel advertising model called ''Hybrid Advertising''. In this model, each ad slot can be allocated to either an independent store or a bundle. To find the optimal auction mechanisms in hybrid advertising, while ensuring nearly dominant strategy incentive compatibility and individual rationality, we introduce the Hybrid Regret Network (HRegNet), a neural network architecture designed for this purpose. Extensive experiments on both synthetic and real-world data demonstrate that the mechanisms generated by HRegNet significantly improve platform revenue compared to established baseline methods.
Zhen Zhang 0053, Weian Li, Yuhan Wang 0015, Qi Qi 0003
SIGIR3
2024 MindShift: Leveraging Large Language Models for Mental-States-Based Problematic Smartphone Use Intervention
abstract
Problematic smartphone use negatively affects physical and mental health. Despite the wide range of prior research, existing persuasive techniques are not flexible enough to provide dynamic persuasion content based on users’ physical contexts and mental states. We first conducted a Wizard-of-Oz study (N=12) and an interview study (N=10) to summarize the mental states behind problematic smartphone use: boredom, stress, and inertia. This informs our design of four persuasion strategies: understanding, comforting, evoking, and scaffolding habits. We leveraged large language models (LLMs) to enable the automatic and dynamic generation of effective persuasion content. We developed MindShift, a novel LLM-powered problematic smartphone use intervention technique. MindShift takes users’ in-the-moment app usage behaviors, physical contexts, mental states, goals & habits as input, and generates personalized and dynamic persuasive content with appropriate persuasion strategies. We conducted a 5-week field experiment (N=25) to compare MindShift with its simplified version (remove mental states) and baseline techniques (fixed reminder). The results show that MindShift improves intervention acceptance rates by 4.7-22.5% and reduces smartphone usage duration by 7.4-9.8%. Moreover, users have a significant drop in smartphone addiction scale scores and a rise in self-efficacy scale scores. Our study sheds light on the potential of leveraging LLMs for context-aware persuasion in other behavior change domains.
Ruolan Wu, Chun Yu, Xiaole Pan, Yujia Liu 0004, Ningning Zhang, Yuhan Wang 0015, Qiaolei Jiang, Xuhai Xu, Yuanchun Shi
CHI7