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Ezzat A. Dabbish

dblp:65/4182 · also Ezzy A. Dabbish · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2003
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2Systems, architecture and hardware · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Hardware security and side channels · 93% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 7%

Topics — the 7 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel attack
power analysis
0.122002
Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks · IEEE Trans. Computers 2002
Power Analysis Attacks of Modular Exponentiation in Smartcards · CHES 1999
Hardware security and side channels
side-channel attack
0.122002
Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks · IEEE Trans. Computers 2002
Power Analysis Attacks of Modular Exponentiation in Smartcards · CHES 1999
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel attack › power analysis
differential power analysis
0.012002
Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks · IEEE Trans. Computers 2002
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel countermeasures
power analysis countermeasure
0.012002
Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks · IEEE Trans. Computers 2002
Hardware security and side channels
side-channel countermeasures
0.012002
Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks · IEEE Trans. Computers 2002
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › cryptographic implementation
block cipher implementation
0.012002
Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks · IEEE Trans. Computers 2002
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography
modular exponentiation
0.011999
Power Analysis Attacks of Modular Exponentiation in Smartcards · CHES 1999

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

signal-to-noise ratio modeling · 0.0multiple-bit attack · 0.0power analysis · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2003 Digital rights management in a 3G mobile phone and beyond
abstract
In this paper we examine how copyright protection of digital items can be securely managed in a 3G mobile phone and other devices. First, the basic concepts, strategies, and requirements for digital rights management are reviewed. Next, a framework for protecting digital content in the embedded environment of a mobile phone is proposed and the elements in this system are defined. The means to enforce security in this system are described and a novel "Family Domain" approach to content management is introduced. Our new approach uses key sharing to help alleviate bad user experiences that are associated with some rights management systems. Examples outlining the enrollment of devices and the acquisition, rendering, and superdistribution of content are shown. Our proposed system is not only applicable to a mobile phone system, but may also be extended to other embedded systems, such as personal digital assistants, set-top boxes, or personal computers.
Thomas S. Messerges, Ezzat A. Dabbish
Digital Rights Management Workshop2
2002 Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks
abstract
This paper examines how monitoring power consumption signals might breach smart-card security. Both simple power analysis and differential power analysis attacks are investigated. The theory behind these attacks is reviewed. Then, we concentrate on showing how power analysis theory can be applied to attack an actual smart card. We examine the noise characteristics of the power signals and develop an approach to model the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). We show how this SNR can be significantly improved using a multiple-bit attack. Experimental results against a smart-card implementation of the Data Encryption Standard demonstrate the effectiveness of our multiple-bit attack. Potential countermeasures to these attacks are also discussed.
Thomas S. Messerges, Ezzat A. Dabbish, Robert H. Sloan
IEEE Trans. Computers2
1999 Power Analysis Attacks of Modular Exponentiation in Smartcards
Thomas S. Messerges, Ezzat A. Dabbish, Robert H. Sloan
CHES2