Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Ezzat A. Dabbish
dblp:65/4182 · also Ezzy A. Dabbish
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2003
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 2Systems, architecture and hardware · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Hardware security and side channels · 93% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 7% |
Topics — the 7 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel attack
power analysis |
0.1 | 2 | 2002 | Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks · IEEE Trans. Computers 2002 Power Analysis Attacks of Modular Exponentiation in Smartcards · CHES 1999 |
Hardware security and side channels
side-channel attack |
0.1 | 2 | 2002 | Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks · IEEE Trans. Computers 2002 Power Analysis Attacks of Modular Exponentiation in Smartcards · CHES 1999 |
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel attack › power analysis
differential power analysis |
0.0 | 1 | 2002 | Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks · IEEE Trans. Computers 2002 |
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel countermeasures
power analysis countermeasure |
0.0 | 1 | 2002 | Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks · IEEE Trans. Computers 2002 |
Hardware security and side channels
side-channel countermeasures |
0.0 | 1 | 2002 | Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks · IEEE Trans. Computers 2002 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › cryptographic implementation
block cipher implementation |
0.0 | 1 | 2002 | Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks · IEEE Trans. Computers 2002 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography
modular exponentiation |
0.0 | 1 | 1999 | Power Analysis Attacks of Modular Exponentiation in Smartcards · CHES 1999 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
signal-to-noise ratio modeling · 0.0multiple-bit attack · 0.0power analysis · 0.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2003 | Digital rights management in a 3G mobile phone and beyondabstractIn this paper we examine how copyright protection of digital items can be securely managed in a 3G mobile phone and other devices. First, the basic concepts, strategies, and requirements for digital rights management are reviewed. Next, a framework for protecting digital content in the embedded environment of a mobile phone is proposed and the elements in this system are defined. The means to enforce security in this system are described and a novel "Family Domain" approach to content management is introduced. Our new approach uses key sharing to help alleviate bad user experiences that are associated with some rights management systems. Examples outlining the enrollment of devices and the acquisition, rendering, and superdistribution of content are shown. Our proposed system is not only applicable to a mobile phone system, but may also be extended to other embedded systems, such as personal digital assistants, set-top boxes, or personal computers. Thomas S. Messerges, Ezzat A. Dabbish |
Digital Rights Management Workshop | 2 |
| 2002 | Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis AttacksabstractThis paper examines how monitoring power consumption signals might breach smart-card security. Both simple power analysis and differential power analysis attacks are investigated. The theory behind these attacks is reviewed. Then, we concentrate on showing how power analysis theory can be applied to attack an actual smart card. We examine the noise characteristics of the power signals and develop an approach to model the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). We show how this SNR can be significantly improved using a multiple-bit attack. Experimental results against a smart-card implementation of the Data Encryption Standard demonstrate the effectiveness of our multiple-bit attack. Potential countermeasures to these attacks are also discussed. Thomas S. Messerges, Ezzat A. Dabbish, Robert H. Sloan |
IEEE Trans. Computers | 2 |
| 1999 | Power Analysis Attacks of Modular Exponentiation in Smartcards
Thomas S. Messerges, Ezzat A. Dabbish, Robert H. Sloan |
CHES | 2 |