The electrical grid has significantly evolved over the years, thus creating a smart paradigm, which is well known as the smart electrical grid. However, this evolution creates critical cybersecurity risks due to the vulnerable nature of the industrial systems and the involvement of new technologies. Therefore, in this paper, the ELECTRON architecture is presented as an integrated platform to detect, mitigate and prevent potential cyberthreats timely. ELECTRON combines both cybersecurity and energy defence mechanisms in a collaborative way. The key aspects of ELECTRON are (a) dynamic risk assessment, (b) asset certification, (c) federated intrusion detection and correlation, (d) Software Defined Networking (SDN) mitigation, (e) proactive islanding and (f) cybersecurity training and certification.

The digitisation of the typical electrical grid introduces valuable services, such as pervasive control, remote monitoring and self-healing. However, despite the benefits, cybersecurity and privacy issues can result in devastating effects or even fatal accidents, given the interdependence between the energy sector and other critical infrastructures. Large-scale cyber attacks, such as Indostroyer and DragonFly have already demonstrated the weaknesses of the current electrical grid with disastrous consequences. Based on the aforementioned remarks, both academia and industry have already designed various cybersecurity standards, such as IEC 62351. However, dynamic risk assessment and certification remain crucial aspects, given the sensitive nature of the electrical grid. On the one hand, dynamic risk assessment intends to re-compute the risk value of the affected assets and their relationships in a dynamic manner based on the relevant security events and alarms. On the other hand, based on the certification process, new approach for the dynamic management of the security need to be defined in order to provide adaptive reaction to new threats. This paper presents a combined approach, showing how both aspects can be applied in a collaborative manner in the smart electrical grid.

The Internet of Things (IoT) is rapidly evolving, while introducing several new challenges regarding security, resilience and operational assurance. In the face of an increasing attack landscape, it is necessary to cater for the provision of efficient mechanisms to collectively verify software- and device-integrity in order to detect run-time modifications. Towards this direction, remote attestation has been proposed as a promising defense mechanism. It allows a third party, the verifier, to ensure the integrity of a remote device, the prover. However, this family of solutions do not capture the real-time requirements of industrial IoT applications and suffer from scalability and efficiency issues. In this paper, we present a lightweight dynamic control-flow property-based attestation architecture (CFPA) that can be applied on both resource-constrained edge and cloud devices and services. It is a first step towards a new line of security mechanisms that enables the provision of control-flow attestation of only those specific, critical software components that are comparatively small, simple and limited in function, thus, allowing for a much more efficient verification. Our goal is to enhance run-time software integrity and trustworthiness with a scalable and decentralized solution eliminating the need for federated infrastructure trust. Based on our findings, we posit open issues and challenges, and discuss possible ways to address them, so that security do not hinder the deployment of intelligent edge computing systems.

Key management is considered to be a challenging task in delay tolerant networks (DTNs) operating in environments with adverse communication conditions such as space, due to the practical limitations and constraints prohibiting effective closed-loop communications. In this paper, we propose opportunistic key management as a more suitable solution for key management in networks requiring opportunistic behaviour. We show that opportunistic key management is better exploited and utilised when used in conjunction with routing decisions by security aware DTN nodes.

ABSTRACT Mobile devices have evolved and experienced an immense popularity over the last few years. This growth however has exposed mobile devices to an increasing number of security threats. Despite the variety of peripheral protection mechanisms described in the literature, authentication and access control cannot provide integral protection against intrusions. Thus, a need for more intelligent and sophisticated security controls such as intrusion detection systems (IDSs) is necessary. Whilst much work has been devoted to mobile device IDSs, research on anomaly‐based or behaviour‐based IDS for such devices has been limited leaving several problems unsolved. Motivated by this fact, in this paper, we focus on anomaly‐based IDS for modern mobile devices. A dataset consisting of iPhone users data logs has been created, and various classification and validation methods have been evaluated to assess their effectiveness in detecting misuses. Specifically, the experimental procedure includes and cross‐evaluates four machine learning algorithms (i.e. Bayesian networks, radial basis function,K‐nearest neighbours and random Forest), which classify the behaviour of the end‐user in terms of telephone calls, SMS and Web browsing history. In order to detect illegitimate use of service by a potential malware or a thief, the experimental procedure examines the aforementioned services independently as well as in combination in a multimodal fashion. The results are very promising showing the ability of at least one classifier to detect intrusions with a high true positive rate of 99.8%. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.