EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Michael Walter 0001
dblp:66/2288-1
· DBLP profile ↗
19ranked-venue papers
1as first author
9since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0003-3186-2482ORCID · verified
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 15 · 1 first-author · 8 since 2021Theory of computation · 4 · 3 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 2
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Towards Verifiable FHE in Practice: Proving Correct Execution of TFHE's Bootstrapping using plonky2abstractIn this work we demonstrate for the first time that a full FHE bootstrapping operation can be proven using a SNARK in practice. We do so by designing an arithmetic circuit for the bootstrapping operation and prove it using plonky2. We are able to prove the circuit on an AWS Hpc7a instance in under 20 minutes. Proof size is about 200 kB and verification takes less than 10 ms. As the basis of our bootstrapping operation we use TFHE's programmable bootstrapping and modify it in a few places to more efficiently represent it as an arithmetic circuit (while maintaining full functionality and security). In order to achieve our results in a memory-efficient way, we take advantage of the structure of the computation and plonky2's ability to efficiently prove its own verification circuit to implement a recursion-based IVC scheme. Lastly, we present a security proof in the UC model that captures active attacks in real world applications of verifiable FHE and augment our prototype to fit such applications. Louis Tremblay Thibault, Michael Walter 0001 |
CCS | 2 |
| 2025 | Drifting Towards Better Error Probabilities in Fully Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
Olivier Bernard 0002, Marc Joye, Nigel P. Smart, Michael Walter 0001 |
EUROCRYPT (8) | 4 |
| 2023 | Improving convergence and practicality of slide-type reductions
Michael Walter 0001 |
Inf. Comput. | 2 |
| 2022 | CoCoA: Concurrent Continuous Group Key Agreement
Joël Alwen, Benedikt Auerbach, Miguel Cueto Noval, Karen Azari, Guillermo Pascual-Perez, Krzysztof Pietrzak, Michael Walter 0001 |
EUROCRYPT (2) | 7 |
| 2021 | Inverse-Sybil Attacks in Automated Contact Tracing
Benedikt Auerbach, Suvradip Chakraborty, Karen Azari, Guillermo Pascual-Perez, Krzysztof Pietrzak, Michael Walter 0001, Michelle Yeo |
CT-RSA | 6 |
| 2021 | Dual Lattice Attacks for Closest Vector Problems (with Preprocessing)
Thijs Laarhoven, Michael Walter 0001 |
CT-RSA | 2 |
| 2021 | Keep the Dirt: Tainted TreeKEM, Adaptively and Actively Secure Continuous Group Key AgreementabstractWhile messaging systems with strong security guarantees are widely used in practice, designing a protocol that scales efficiently to large groups and enjoys similar security guarantees remains largely open. The two existing proposals to date are ART (Cohn-Gordon et al., CCS18) and TreeKEM (IETF, The Messaging Layer Security Protocol, draft). TreeKEM is the currently considered candidate by the IETF MLS working group, but dynamic group operations (i.e. adding and removing users) can cause efficiency issues. In this paper we formalize and analyze a variant of TreeKEM which we term Tainted TreeKEM (TTKEM for short). The basic idea underlying TTKEM was suggested by Millican (MLS mailing list, February 2018). This version is more efficient than TreeKEM for some natural distributions of group operations, we quantify this through simulations.Our second contribution is two security proofs for TTKEM which establish post compromise and forward secrecy even against adaptive attackers. The security loss (to the underlying PKE) in the Random Oracle Model is a polynomial factor, and a quasipolynomial one in the Standard Model. Our proofs can be adapted to TreeKEM as well. Before our work no security proof for any TreeKEM-like protocol establishing tight security against an adversary who can adaptively choose the sequence of operations was known. We also are the first to prove (or even formalize) active security where the server can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol specification. Proving fully active security – where also the users can arbitrarily deviate – remains open. Karen Azari, Guillermo Pascual-Perez, Michael Walter 0001, Chethan Kamath, Margarita Capretto, Miguel Cueto Noval, Ilia Markov, Michelle Yeo, Joël Alwen, Krzysztof Pietrzak |
SP | 3 |
| 2021 | Grafting Key Trees: Efficient Key Management for Overlapping Groups
Joël Alwen, Benedikt Auerbach, Mirza Ahad Baig, Miguel Cueto Noval, Karen Azari, Guillermo Pascual-Perez, Krzysztof Pietrzak, Michael Walter 0001 |
TCC (3) | 8 |
| 2021 | The Cost of Adaptivity in Security Games on Graphs
Chethan Kamath, Karen Azari, Krzysztof Pietrzak, Michael Walter 0001 |
TCC (2) | 4 |
| 2019 | Reversible Proofs of Sequential Work
Hamza Abusalah, Chethan Kamath, Karen Azari, Krzysztof Pietrzak, Michael Walter 0001 |
EUROCRYPT (2) | 5 |
| 2018 | On the Bit Security of Cryptographic Primitives
Daniele Micciancio, Michael Walter 0001 |
EUROCRYPT (1) | 2 |
| 2017 | Gaussian Sampling over the Integers: Efficient, Generic, Constant-Time
Daniele Micciancio, Michael Walter 0001 |
CRYPTO (2) | 2 |
| 2016 | Practical, Predictable Lattice Basis Reduction
Daniele Micciancio, Michael Walter 0001 |
EUROCRYPT (1) | 2 |
| 2015 | Fast Lattice Point Enumeration with Minimal OverheadabstractEnumeration algorithms are the best currently known methods to solve lattice problems, both in theory (within the class of polynomial space algorithms), and in practice (where they are routinely used to evaluate the concrete security of lattice cryptography). However, there is an uncomfortable gap between our theoretical understanding and practical performance of lattice point enumeration algorithms. The algorithms typically used in practice have worst-case asymptotic running time 2O·(n2), but perform extremely well in practice, at least for all values of the lattice dimension for which experimentation is feasible. At the same time, theoretical algorithms (Kannan, Mathematics of Operation Research 12(3):415–440, 1987) are asymptotically superior (achieving 2O(n log n) running time), but they are never used in practice because they incur a substantial overhead that makes them uncompetitive for all reasonable values of the lattice dimension n. This gap is especially troublesome when algorithms are run in practice to evaluate the concrete security of a cryptosystem, and then experimental results are extrapolated to much larger dimension where solving lattice problems is computationally infeasible. We introduce a new class of (polynomial space) lattice enumeration algorithms that simultaneously achieve asymptotic efficiency (meeting the theoretical nO(n) = 2O(n log n) time bound) and practicality, matching or surpassing the performance of practical algorithms already in moderately low dimension. Key technical contributions that allow us to achieve this result are a new analysis technique that allows us to greatly reduce the number of recursive calls performed during preprocessing (from super exponential in n to single exponential, or even polynomial in n), a new enumeration technique that can be directly applied to projected lattice (basis) vectors, without the need to remove linear dependencies, and a modified block basis reduction method with fast (logarithmic) convergence properties. The last technique is used to obtain a new SVP enumeration procedure with Õ(nn/2e) running time, matching (even in the constant in the exponent) the optimal worst-case analysis (Hanrot and Stehlé, CRYPTO 2007) of Kannan's theoretical algorithm, but with far superior performance in practice. We complement our theoretical analysis with a preliminary set of experiments that not only support our practicality claims, but also allow to estimate the crossover point between different versions of enumeration algorithms, as well as asymptotically faster (but not quite practical) algorithms running in single exponential 2O(n) time and space. Daniele Micciancio, Michael Walter 0001 |
SODA | 2 |
| 2014 | Full analysis of PRINTcipher with respect to invariant subspace attack: efficient key recovery and countermeasures
Stanislav Bulygin, Michael Walter 0001, Johannes Buchmann 0001 |
Des. Codes Cryptogr. | 2 |
| 2013 | Many Weak Keys for PRINTcipher: Fast Key Recovery and Countermeasures
Stanislav Bulygin, Michael Walter 0001, Johannes Buchmann 0001 |
CT-RSA | 2 |
| 2012 | Optimizing Guessing Strategies for Algebraic Cryptanalysis with Applications to EPCBC
Michael Walter 0001, Stanislav Bulygin, Johannes Buchmann 0001 |
Inscrypt | 1 |
| 2012 | Graph-based combinations of fragment descriptors for improved 3D Object Retrievalabstract3D Object Retrieval is an important field of research with many application possibilities. One of the main goals in this research is the development of discriminative methods for similarity search. The descriptor-based approach to date has seen a lot of research attention, with many different extraction algorithms proposed. In previous work, we have introduced a simple but effective scheme for 3D model retrieval based on a spatially fixed combination of 3D object fragment descriptors. In this work, we propose a novel flexible combination scheme based on finding the best matching fragment descriptors to use in the combination. By an exhaustive experimental evaluation on established benchmark data we show the capability of the new combination scheme to provide improved retrieval effectiveness. The method is proposed as a versatile and inexpensive method to enhance the effectiveness of a given global 3D descriptor approach. Tobias Schreck, Maximilian Scherer, Michael Walter 0001, Benjamin Bustos, Sang Min Yoon, Arjan Kuijper |
MMSys | 3 |
| 2012 | Improving 3D similarity search by enhancing and combining 3D descriptors
Benjamin Bustos, Tobias Schreck, Michael Walter 0001, Juan Manuel Barrios, Matthias Schäfer 0001, Daniel A. Keim |
Multim. Tools Appl. | 3 |