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Michael Malkin

dblp:66/5904 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2006
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 4 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 57% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 17% Authentication and access control · 13%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Distributed systems · 100%

Topics — the 11 heaviest of 13, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key management
group key management
0.012002
Self-Healing Key Distribution with Revocation · S&P 2002
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key management
key distribution
0.012002
Self-Healing Key Distribution with Revocation · S&P 2002
Authentication and access control › revocation
key revocation
0.012002
Self-Healing Key Distribution with Revocation · S&P 2002
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key management › key distribution › group key distribution
self-healing key distribution
0.012002
Self-Healing Key Distribution with Revocation · S&P 2002
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key management › distributed key generation
distributed RSA key generation
0.011999
Experimenting with Shared Generation of RSA Keys · NDSS 1999
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
public-key cryptography
0.011999
Experimenting with Shared Generation of RSA Keys · NDSS 1999
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography
RSA
0.011999
Experimenting with Shared Generation of RSA Keys · NDSS 1999
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
threshold cryptography
0.011999
Experimenting with Shared Generation of RSA Keys · NDSS 1999
Distributed systems
fault tolerance
0.011999
Building Intrusion-Tolerant Applications · USENIX Security Symposium 1999
Distributed systems › fault tolerance
intrusion tolerance
0.011999
Building Intrusion-Tolerant Applications · USENIX Security Symposium 1999
Network security › secure communication
secure group communication
0.012002
Self-Healing Key Distribution with Revocation · S&P 2002

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

intrusion tolerance · 0.0self-healing key distribution · 0.0secret sharing · 0.0distributed key generation · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2006 Secure Quantization Index Modulation Watermark Detection
Ton Kalker, Michael Malkin
IWDW2
2002 Self-Healing Key Distribution with Revocation
abstract
We address the problem of establishing a group key amongst a dynamic group of users over an unreliable, or lossy, network. We term our key distribution mechanisms self-healing because users are capable of recovering lost group keys on their own, without requesting additional transmissions from the group manager thus cutting back on network traffic, decreasing the load on the group manager and reducing the risk of user exposure through traffic analysis. A user must be a member both before and after the session in which a particular key is sent in order to be able to recover the key through self-healing. Binding the ability to recover keys to membership status enables the group manager to use short broadcasts to establish group keys, independent of the group size. In addition, the self-healing approach to key distribution is stateless, meaning that a group member who has been off-line for some time is able to recover new session keys immediately after coming back on-line.
Jessica Staddon, Sara Miner More, Matthew K. Franklin, Dirk Balfanz, Michael Malkin, Drew Dean
S&P5
1999 Experimenting with Shared Generation of RSA Keys
Michael Malkin, Thomas D. Wu, Dan Boneh
NDSS1
1999 Building Intrusion-Tolerant Applications
Thomas D. Wu, Michael Malkin, Dan Boneh
USENIX Security Symposium2