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R. A. Carlson

dblp:67/317 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 1986
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Requirements engineering and software design · 100%

Topics — the 1 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Requirements engineering and software design › software architecture › architectural design
security architecture		 0.011986
The Trusted Domain Machine: A Secure Communication Device for Security Guard Applications · S&P 1986

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

physical domain isolation · 0.0execution domain separation · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
1986 The Trusted Domain Machine: A Secure Communication Device for Security Guard Applications
abstract
The Trusted Domain Machine (TDM) is a secure communication device for security guard applications. Its design isolates the security-critical functions into a physically isolated processing domain. This trusted physical domain includes a layer of core software that allows applications that are implemented on the TDM to control interdomain communication. The security-relevant application software is further separated into execution domains within the trusted domain to simplify its verification.
R. A. Carlson, Teresa F. Lunt
 S&P1