Abstract By the theory TT is meant the higher order predicate logic with the following recursively defined types: (1) 1 is the type of individuals and [] is the type of the truth values: (2) [τ1…..τn] is the type of the predicates with arguments of the types τ1…..τn. The theory ITT described in this paper is an intensional version of TT. The types of ITT are the same as the types of TT, but the membership of the type 1 of individuals in ITT is an extension of the membership in TT. The extension consists of allowing any higher order term, in which only variables of type 1 have a free occurrence, to be a term of type 1. This feature of ITT is motivated by a nominalist interpretation of higher order predication. In ITT both well-founded and non-well-founded recursive predicates can be defined as abstraction terms from which all the properties of the predicates can be derived without the use of non-logical axioms. The elementary syntax, semantics, and proof theory for ITT are defined. A semantic consistency proof for ITT is provided and the completeness proof of Takahashi and Prawitz for a version of TT without cut is adapted for ITT: a consequence is the redundancy of cut.

Abstract The comprehension principle of set theory asserts that a set can be formed from the objects satisfying any given property. The principle leads to immediate contradictions if it is formalized as an axiom scheme within classical first order logic. A resolution of the set paradoxes results if the principle is formalized instead as two rules of deduction in a natural deduction presentation of logic. This presentation of the comprehension principle for sets as semantic rules, instead of as a comprehension axiom scheme, can be viewed as an extension of classical logic, in contrast to the assertion of extra-logical axioms expressing truths about a pre-existing or constructed universe of sets. The paradoxes are disarmed in the extended classical semantics because truth values are only assigned to those sentences that can be grounded in atomic sentences.

By a theory is meant an applied first-order predicate calculus with at least one predicate symbol and perhaps some individual constants and function symbols and a specified set of axioms. In addition to the terms defined by means of the individual variables, constants, and function symbols a theory may also include among its terms those constructed by means of operators such as the epsilon or iota operators; that is, expressions like (εχΡ) or (οχΡ), where P is a well formed formula (wff) of the theory, may also be terms. A constant term of a theory F is then a term in which no variable occurs free. We are interested only in theories which have at least one constant term so that if a theory doesn't have any individual constants it must necessarily admit as terms expressions constructed by means of operators. A sentence of a theory F is a closed wff.