Anonymizing networks such as Tor allow users to access Internet services privately by using a series of routers to hide the client's IP address from the server. The success of such networks, however, has been limited by users employing this anonymity for abusive purposes such as defacing popular Web sites. Web site administrators routinely rely on IP-address blocking for disabling access to misbehaving users, but blocking IP addresses is not practical if the abuser routes through an anonymizing network. As a result, administrators block all known exit nodes of anonymizing networks, denying anonymous access to misbehaving and behaving users alike. To address this problem, we present Nymble, a system in which servers can “blacklist” misbehaving users, thereby blocking users without compromising their anonymity. Our system is thus agnostic to different servers' definitions of misbehavior-servers can blacklist users for whatever reason, and the privacy of blacklisted users is maintained.

Several anonymous authentication schemes allow servers to revoke a misbehaving user's ability to make future accesses. Traditionally, these schemes have relied on powerful Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) capable of deanonymizing (or linking) users' connections. Such TTPs are undesirable because users' anonymity is not guaranteed, and users must trust them to judge misbehaviors fairly. Recent schemes such as Blacklistable Anonymous Credentials (BLAC) and Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) support “privacy-enhanced revocation”— servers can revoke misbehaving users without a TTP's involvement, and without learning the revoked users' identities. In BLAC and EPID, however, the computation required for authentication at the server is linear in the size (L) of the revocation list , which is impractical as the size approaches thousands of entries. We propose PEREA, a new anonymous authentication scheme for which this bottleneck computation is independent of the size of the revocation list . Instead, the time complexity of authentication is linear in the size of a revocation window K ≪ L , the number of subsequent authentications before which a user's misbehavior must be recognized if the user is to be revoked. We extend PEREA to support more complex revocation policies that take the severity of misbehaviors into account. Users can authenticate anonymously if their naughtiness , i.e., the sum of the severities of their blacklisted misbehaviors, is below a certain naughtiness threshold. We call our extension PEREA-Naughtiness. We prove the security of our constructions, and validate their efficiency as compared to BLAC analytically and quantitatively.

Several credential systems have been proposed in which users can authenticate to service providers anonymously. Since anonymity can give users the license to misbehave, some variants allow the selective deanonymization (or linking) of misbehaving users upon a complaint to a Trusted Third Party (TTP). The ability of the TTP to revoke a user’s privacy at any time, however, is too strong a punishment for misbehavior. To limit the scope of deanonymization, some systems have been proposed in which users can be deanonymized only if they authenticate “too many times,” such as “double spending” with electronic cash. While useful in some applications, such techniques cannot be generalized to more subjective definitions of misbehavior, for example, using such schemes it is not possible to block anonymous users who “deface too many Web pages” on a Web site. We present BLAC, the first anonymous credential system in which service providers can revoke the credentials of misbehaving users without relying on a TTP . Since revoked users remain anonymous, misbehaviors can be judged subjectively without users fearing arbitrary deanonymization by a TTP . Additionally, our construction supports a d-strikes-out revocation policy, whereby users who have been subjectively judged to have repeatedly misbehaved at least d times are revoked from the system. Thus, for the first time, it is indeed possible to block anonymous users who have “defaced too many Web pages” using our scheme.

In people-centric opportunistic sensing, people offer their mobile nodes (such as smart phones) as platforms for collecting sensor data. A sensing application distributes sensing 'tasks', which specify what sensor data to collect and under what conditions to report the data back to the application. To perform a task, mobile nodes may use on-board sensors, a body-area network of personal sensors, or sensors from neighboring nodes that volunteer to contribute their sensing resources. In all three cases, continuous sensor monitoring can drain a node's battery. We propose DEAMON (Distributed Energy-Aware MONitoring), an energy-efficient distributed algorithm for long-term sensor monitoring. Our approach assumes only that mobile nodes are tasked to report sensor data under conditions specified by a Boolean expression, and that a network of nearby sensor nodes contribute to monitoring subsets of the task's sensors. Our algorithm to select sensor nodes and to monitor the sensing condition conserves energy of all nodes by limiting sensing and communication operations. We evaluate DEAMON with a stochastic analysis and with simulation results, and show that it should significantly reduce energy consumption.

Several anonymous authentication schemes allow servers to revoke a misbehaving user's ability to make future accesses. Traditionally, these schemes have relied on powerful TTPs capable of deanonymizing (or linking) users' connections. Recent schemes such as Blacklistable Anonymous Credentials (BLAC) and Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) support privacy-enhanced -- servers can revoke misbehaving users without a TTP's involvement, and without learning the revoked users' identities.In BLAC and EPID, however, the computation required for authentication at the server is linear in the size (L) of the revocation list. We propose PEREA, a new anonymous authentication scheme for which this bottleneck computation is independent of the size of the revocation list. Instead, the time complexity of authentication is linear in the size (K

Several credential systems have been proposed in which users can authenticate to services anonymously. Since anonymity can give users the license to misbehave, some variants allow the selective deanonymization (or linking) of misbehaving users upon a complaint to a trusted third party (TTP). The ability of the TTP to revoke a user's privacy at any time, however, is too strong a punishment for misbehavior. To limit the scope of deanonymization, systems such as "e-cash" have been proposed in which users are deanonymized under only certain types of well-defined misbehavior such as "double spending." While useful in some applications, it is not possible to generalize such techniques to more subjective definitions of misbehavior.