Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Joseph Herring
dblp:68/1324
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2011
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 2Systems, architecture and hardware · 1Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
2 papers |
Storage systems · 74% Cloud and datacenter computing · 26% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Cloud and datacenter computing › cloud storage
provable data possession |
0.1 | 1 | 2007 | Provable data possession at untrusted stores · CCS 2007 |
Storage systems
storage reliability |
0.1 | 1 | 2007 | Provable data possession at untrusted stores · CCS 2007 |
Storage systems › secure storage
secure deletion |
0.1 | 1 | 2005 | Secure Deletion for a Versioning File System · FAST 2005 |
Storage systems › file systems › versioning
versioning file system |
0.1 | 1 | 2005 | Secure Deletion for a Versioning File System · FAST 2005 |
Storage systems
untrusted storage |
0.0 | 1 | 2007 | Provable data possession at untrusted stores · CCS 2007 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
probabilistic sampling · 0.1challenge-response protocol · 0.1cryptographic erasure · 0.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | Remote data checking using provable data possessionabstractWe introduce a model for provable data possession (PDP) that can be used for remote data checking: A client that has stored data at an untrusted server can verify that the server possesses the original data without retrieving it. The model generates probabilistic proofs of possession by sampling random sets of blocks from the server, which drastically reduces I/O costs. The client maintains a constant amount of metadata to verify the proof. The challenge/response protocol transmits a small, constant amount of data, which minimizes network communication. Thus, the PDP model for remote data checking is lightweight and supports large data sets in distributed storage systems. The model is also robust in that it incorporates mechanisms for mitigating arbitrary amounts of data corruption. We present two provably-secure PDP schemes that are more efficient than previous solutions. In particular, the overhead at the server is low (or even constant), as opposed to linear in the size of the data. We then propose a generic transformation that adds robustness to any remote data checking scheme based on spot checking. Experiments using our implementation verify the practicality of PDP and reveal that the performance of PDP is bounded by disk I/O and not by cryptographic computation. Finally, we conduct an in-depth experimental evaluation to study the tradeoffs in performance, security, and space overheads when adding robustness to a remote data checking scheme. Giuseppe Ateniese, Randal C. Burns, Reza Curtmola, Joseph Herring, Lea Kissner, Zachary N. J. Peterson, Dawn Song |
ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. | 4 |
| 2007 | Provable data possession at untrusted storesabstractWe introduce a model for provable data possession (PDP) that allows a client that has stored data at an untrusted server to verify that the server possesses the original data without retrieving it. The model generates probabilistic proofs of possession by sampling random sets of blocks from the server, which drastically reduces I/O costs. The client maintains a constant amount of metadata to verify the proof. The challenge/response protocol transmits a small, constant amount of data, which minimizes network communication. Thus, the PDP model for remote data checking supports large data sets in widely-distributed storage system. Giuseppe Ateniese, Randal C. Burns, Reza Curtmola, Joseph Herring, Lea Kissner, Zachary N. J. Peterson, Dawn Song |
CCS | 4 |
| 2005 | Secure Deletion for a Versioning File System
Zachary N. J. Peterson, Randal C. Burns, Joseph Herring, Adam Stubblefield, Aviel D. Rubin |
FAST | 3 |