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Aditya V. Sunderam

dblp:68/3795 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2003
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-authorTheory of computation · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design		 0.012003
Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions · EC 2003
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › auction design
multi-attribute auction		 0.012003
Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions · EC 2003
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
preference elicitation		 0.012003
Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions · EC 2003
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory › bidding strategy
proxy bidding		 0.012003
Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions · EC 2003

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

proxy bidding agents · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2003 Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions
abstract
We consider the problem of minimizing preference elicitation in efficient multiattribute auctions, that support dynamic negotiation over non-price based attributes such as quality, time-of-delivery, and processor speed. We introduce asynchronous price-based multiattribute auctions, with proxy bidding agents that sit between the auctioneer and the participants. Empirical results demonstrate the preference elicitation savings that are provided with minimal price spaces, asynchronous updates, and proxy agents.
Aditya V. Sunderam, David C. Parkes
 EC1