A Bitcoin miner who owns a sufficient amount of mining power can perform selfish mining to increase its relative revenue. Studies have demonstrated that the time-averaged profit of a selfish miner starts to rise once the mining difficulty level gets adjusted in favor of the attacker. Selfish mining profitability lies in the fact that orphan blocks are not incorporated into the current version of Bitcoin’s difficulty adjustment mechanism (DAM). Therefore, it is believed that considering the count of orphan blocks in the DAM can result in complete unprofitability for selfish mining. In this paper, we disprove this belief by providing a formal analysis of the selfish mining time-averaged profit. We present a precise definition of the orphan blocks that can be incorporated into calculating the next epoch’s target and then introduce two modified versions of DAM in which both main-chain blocks and orphan blocks are incorporated. We propose two versions of smart intermittent selfish mining, where the first one dominates the normal intermittent selfish mining, and the second one results in selfish mining profitability under the modified DAMs. Moreover, we present the orphan exclusion attack with the help of which the attacker can stop honest miners from reporting the orphan blocks. Using combinatorial tools, we analyze the profitability of selfish mining accompanied by the orphan exclusion attack under the modified DAMs. Our results show that even when considering orphan blocks in the DAM, selfish mining can still be profitable. However, the level of profitability under the modified DAMs is significantly lower than that observed under the current version of Bitcoin DAM, suggesting that orphan reporting can be an effective countermeasure against a payoff-maximizing selfish miner.

Researchers have discovered a series of theoretical attacks against Bitcoin's Nakamoto consensus; the most damaging ones are selfish mining, double-spending, and consistency delay attacks. These attacks have one common cause: block withholding. This paper proposes Crystal, which leverages quorum certificates to resist block withholding misbehavior. Crystal continuously elects committees from miners and requires each block to have a quorum certificate, i.e., a set of signatures issued by members of its committee. Consequently, an attacker has to publish its blocks to obtain quorum certificates, rendering block withholding impossible. To build Crystal, we design a novel two-round committee election in a Sybil-resistant, unpredictable and non-interactive way, and a reward mechanism to incentivize miners to follow the protocol. Our analysis and evaluations show that Crystal can significantly mitigate selfish mining and double-spending attacks. For example, in Bitcoin, an attacker with 30% of the total computation power will succeed in double-spending attacks with a probability of 15.6% to break the 6-confirmation rule; however, in Crystal, the success probability for the same attacker falls to 0.62%. We provide formal end-to-end safety proofs for Crystal, ensuring no unknown attacks will be introduced. To the best of our knowledge, Crystal is the first protocol that prevents selfish mining and double-spending attacks while providing safety proof.

Sharding is a promising approach to scale permissionless blockchains. In a sharded blockchain, participants are split into groups, called shards, and each shard only executes part of the workloads. Despite its wide adoption in permissioned systems, transferring such success to permissionless blockchains is still an open problem. In permissionless networks, participants may join and leave the system at any time, making load balancing challenging. In addition, the adversary in such networks can launch the single-shard takeover attack by compromising a single shard's consensus. To address these issues, participants should be securely and dynamically allocated into different shards. However, the protocol capturing such functionality - which we call shard allocation - is overlooked.

The design of zkSNARKs is increasingly complicated and requires familiarity with a broad class of cryptographic and algebraic tools. This complexity in zkSNARK design also increases the difficulty in zkSNARK implementation, analysis, and optimization. To address this complexity, we develop a new workflow for designing and implementing zkSNARKs, called VOProof. In VOProof, the designer only needs to construct a Vector Oracle (VO) protocol that is intuitive and straightforward to design, and then feeds this protocol to our VO compiler to transform it into a fully functional zkSNARK. This new workflow conceals most algebraic and cryptographic operations inside the compiler, so that the designer is no longer required to understand these cumbersome and error prone procedures. Moreover, our compiler can be fine-tuned to compile one VO protocol into multiple zkSNARKs with different tradeoffs.

Binder, the main mechanism for Android applications to access system services, adopts a client-server role model in its design, assuming the system service as the server and the application as the client. However, a growing number of scenarios require the system service to act as a Binder client and to send queries to a Binder server possibly instantiated by the application. Departing from this role-reversal possibility, this paper proposes the Binder Transaction Redirection (BiTRe) attacks, where the attacker induces the system service to transact with a customized Binder server and then attacks from the Binder server---an often unprotected direction. We demonstrate the scale of the attack surface by enumerating the utilizable Binder interfaces in BiTRe, and discover that the attack surface grows with the Android release version. In Android 11, more than 70% of the Binder interfaces are affected by or can be utilized in BiTRe. We prove the attacks' feasibility by (1) constructing a prototype system that can automatically generate executable programs to reach a substantial part of the attack surface, and (2) identifying a series of vulnerabilities, which are acknowledged by Google and assigned ten CVEs.

This paper presents an efficient solution for the booking and payments functionality of a car sharing system that allows individuals to share their personal, underused cars in a completely decentralized manner, annulling the need of an intermediary. Our solution, named SC2Share, leverages smart contracts and uses them to carry out secure and private car booking and payments. Our experiments on SC2Share on the Ethereum testnet guarantee high security and privacy to its users and confirm that our system is cost-efficient and ready for practical use.

Following Bitcoin's Nakamoto Consensus protocol (NC), hundreds of cryptocurrencies utilize proofs of work (PoW) to maintain their ledgers. However, research shows that NC fails to achieve perfect chain quality, allowing malicious miners to alter the public ledger in order to launch several attacks, i.e., selfish mining, double-spending and feather-forking. Some later designs, represented by Ethereum, Bitcoin-NG, DECOR+, Byzcoin and Publish or Perish, aim to solve the problem by raising the chain quality; other designs, represented by Fruitchains, DECOR+ and Subchains, claim to successfully defend against the attacks in the absence of perfect chain quality. As their effectiveness remains self-claimed, the community is divided on whether a secure PoW protocol is possible. In order to resolve this ambiguity and to lay down the foundation of a common body of knowledge, this paper introduces a multi-metric evaluation framework to quantitatively analyze PoW protocols' chain quality and attack resistance. Subsequently we use this framework to evaluate the security of these improved designs through Markov decision processes. We conclude that to date, no PoW protocol achieves ideal chain quality or is resistant against all three attacks. We attribute existing PoW protocols' imperfect chain quality to their unrealistic security assumptions, and their unsatisfactory attack resistance to a dilemma between "rewarding the bad" and "punishing the good". Moreover, our analysis reveals various new protocol-specific attack strategies. Based on our analysis, we propose future directions toward more secure PoW protocols and indicate several common pitfalls in PoW security analyses.

Bitcoin has not only attracted many users but also been considered as a technical breakthrough by academia. However, the expanding potential of Bitcoin is largely untapped due to its limited throughput. The Bitcoin community is now facing its biggest crisis in history as the community splits on how to increase the throughput. Among various proposals, Bitcoin Unlimited recently became the most popular candidate, as it allows miners to collectively decide the block size limit according to the real network capacity. However, the security of BU is heatedly debated and no consensus has been reached as the issue is discussed in different miner incentive models. In this paper, we systematically evaluate BU's security with three incentive models via testing the two major arguments of BU supporters: the block validity consensus is not necessary for BU's security; such consensus would emerge in BU out of economic incentives. Our results invalidate both arguments and therefore disprove BU's security claims. Our paper further contributes to the field by addressing the necessity of a prescribed block validity consensus for cryptocurrencies.

The vast majority of Internet users are relying on centralized search engine providers to conduct their web searches. However, search results can be censored and search queries can be recorded by these providers without the user's knowledge. Distributed web search engines based on peer-to-peer networks have been proposed to mitigate these threats. In this paper we analyze the three most popular real-world distributed web search engines: Faroo, Seeks and Yacy, with respect to their censorship resistance and privacy protection. We show that none of them provides an adequate level of protection against an adversary with modest resources. Recognizing these flaws, we identify security properties a censorship-resistant and privacy-preserving distributed web search engine should provide. We propose two novel defense mechanisms called node density protocol and webpage verification protocol to achieve censorship resistance and show their effectiveness and feasibility with simulations. Finally, we elaborate on how state-of-the-art defense mechanisms achieve privacy protection in distributed web search engines.

The security aspect of Distributed Hash Tables (DHT-s), the principal model for structured P2P networks, has received considerable attention from research community, and the eclipse attack is one of the most severe threats targeting DHTs. Most of currently effective defense mechanisms suffer from significant communication cost. In this paper we present a novel approach to address eclipse attacks - making such attacks computationally infeasible. The backbone of our approach is a scheme for generating node IDs, which requires a user to solve a computational puzzle generated by her network parameters together with time-related information, in order for him to obtain a valid ID. Such procedure normally should be completed within a couple seconds of CPU time, and an ID can be easily verified for its validity. However, carrying out an eclipse attack on a specific key demands massive computing resources. We have evaluated our method by analyzing the cost of an attacker, using real-world data from BitTorrent, and the result is that it takes thousands of processors running day and night to find sufficient number of IDs. We also have simulated the computing cost of both benign users and attackers, and the outcome also supports the above claim. Unlike most existing defense mechanisms, for our method the induced communication cost and churn is negligible, and no centralized service is required.