The domain name system plays a vital role in the dependability and security of modern network. Unfortunately, it has also been widely misused for nefarious activities. Recently, attackers have turned their attention to the use of algorithmically generated domain names (AGDs) in an effort to circumvent network defenses. However, because such domain names are increasingly being used in benign applications, this transition has significant implications for techniques that classify AGDs based solely on the format of a domain name. To highlight the challenges they face, we examine contemporary approaches and demonstrate their limitations. We address these shortcomings by proposing an online form of sequential hypothesis testing that classifies clients based solely on the non-existent (NX) responses they elicit. Our evaluations on real-world data show that we outperform existing approaches, and for the vast majority of cases, we detect malware before they are able to successfully rendezvous with their command and control centers.

Forensic analysis of computer systems requires that one first identify suspicious objects or events, and then examine them in enough detail to form a hypothesis as to their cause and effect. Sadly, while our ability to gather vast amounts of data has improved significantly over the past two decades, it is all too often the case that we lack detailed information just when we need it the most. In this paper, we attempt to improve on the state of the art by providing a forensic platform that transparently monitors and records data access events within a virtualized environment using only the abstractions exposed by the hypervisor. Our approach monitors accesses to objects on disk and follows the causal chain of these accesses across processes, even after the objects are copied into memory. Our forensic layer records these transactions in a tamper evident version-based audit log that allows for faithful, and efficient, reconstruction of the recorded events and the changes they induced. To demonstrate the utility of our approach, we provide an extensive empirical evaluation, including a real-world case study demonstrating how our platform can be used to reconstruct valuable information about the what, when, and how, after a compromise has been detected. We also extend our earlier work by providing a tracking mechanism that can monitor data exfiltration attempts across multiple disks and also block attempts to copy data over the network.

An increasingly popular technique for decreasing user-perceived latency while browsing the Web is to optimistically pre-resolve (or prefetch) domain name resolutions. In this paper, we present a large-scale evaluation of this practice using data collected over the span of several months, and show that it leads to noticeable increases in load on name servers-with questionable caching benefits. Furthermore, to assess the impact that prefetching can have on the deployment of security extensions to DNS (DNSSEC), we use a custom-built cache simulator to perform trace-based simulations using millions of DNS requests and responses collected campus-wide. We also show that the adoption of domain name prefetching raises privacy issues. Specifically, we examine how prefetching amplifies information disclosure attacks to the point where it is possible to infer the context of searches issued by clients.

For the most part, forensic analysis of computer systems requires that one first identify suspicious objects or events, and then examine them in enough detail to form a hypothesis as to their cause and effect. Sadly, while our ability to gather vast amounts of data has improved significantly over the past two decades, it is all too often the case that we tend to lack detailed information just when we need it the most. Simply put, the current state of computer forensics leaves much to be desired. In this paper, we attempt to improve on the state of the art by providing a forensic platform that transparently monitors and records data access events within a virtualized environment using only the abstractions exposed by the hypervisor. Our approach monitors accesses to objects on disk and follows the causal chain of these accesses across processes, even after the objects are copied into memory. Our forensic layer records these transactions in a version-based audit log that allows for faithful, and efficient, reconstruction of the recorded events and the changes they induced. To demonstrate the utility of our approach, we provide an extensive empirical evaluation, including a real-world case study demonstrating how our platform can be used to reconstruct valuable information about the what, when, and how, after a compromised has been detected.

We present a framework for multidimensional utility-driven adaptation for multi-stream video applications. A notable driving application is 3D tele-immersion. Our framework directly models the utility of video frames as well as representation dependencies that arise from differential encoding. The problem of evaluating past and future data utility in the presence of packet loss is specifically addressed and two possible approaches are described. One relies on reliability semantics of the underlying transport-level protocol in order to optimize encoding relationships. The other folds the decision to retransmit packets known to be lost into the utility framework. We quantitatively demonstrate the ability of both approaches to increase performance of a prototype application and show that the second approach is generally superior.