Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Ben Roberts
dblp:70/2430
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2013
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-authorSystems, architecture and hardware · 1Theory of computation · 1 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 80% Algorithms and data structures · 20% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctions · EC 2013 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
equilibrium analysis |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctions · EC 2013 |
Algorithms and data structures › ranking
ranking algorithm |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctions · EC 2013 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › auction design
sponsored search auction |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctions · EC 2013 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › solution concepts in games › equilibrium concepts › nash equilibrium
symmetric nash equilibrium |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctions · EC 2013 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
simulation · 0.2revenue-optimal auction analysis · 0.2
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctionsabstractIn a sponsored search auction, decisions about how to rank ads impose tradeoffs between objectives such as revenue and welfare. In this paper, we examine how these tradeoffs should be made. We begin by arguing that the most natural solution concept to evaluate these tradeoffs is the lowest symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE). As part of this argument, we generalise the well known connection between the lowest SNE and the VCG outcome. We then propose a new ranking algorithm, loosely based on the revenue-optimal auction, that uses a reserve price to order the ads (not just to filter them) and give conditions under which it raises more revenue than simply applying that reserve price. Finally, we conduct extensive simulations examining the tradeoffs enabled by different ranking algorithms and show that our proposed algorithm enables superior operating points by a variety of metrics. Ben Roberts, Dinan Gunawardena, Ian A. Kash, Peter B. Key |
EC | 1 |
| 1989 | High performance circuits for the i486TM processorabstractThree high-performance circuit blocks of the i486 processor are described: a large, on-chip cache; a 1* clock generator; and a high-speed, 32-b adder. In addition, a summary of the methodology used to design these circuits are given. The circuit used to regulate the clock duty cycle used a feedback technique to adjust timer delays, preventing clock overlap. The timer circuit uses current mirror transistors and capacitors to create a delay interval controlled by the reference voltages. The 1* clock circuit on the i486 processor eases board design requirements by eliminating the need for double frequency clocks with tight timing.> Ben Roberts, Paul Madland |
ICCD | 2 |