Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Xie Yi
dblp:70/2724
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
2 papers |
Reinforcement learning · 65% Multi-agent systems · 35% | |
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100% |
Topics — the 9 heaviest of 9, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning
hierarchical reinforcement learning |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | From Debate to Equilibrium: Belief‑Driven Multi‑Agent LLM Reasoning via Bayesian Nash Equilibrium · ICML 2025 |
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Multi-agent systems
multi-agent coordination |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | From Debate to Equilibrium: Belief‑Driven Multi‑Agent LLM Reasoning via Bayesian Nash Equilibrium · ICML 2025 |
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Multi-agent systems › multi-agent reasoning
multi-agent LLM reasoning |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | From Debate to Equilibrium: Belief‑Driven Multi‑Agent LLM Reasoning via Bayesian Nash Equilibrium · ICML 2025 |
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning
multi-agent reinforcement learning |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | From Debate to Equilibrium: Belief‑Driven Multi‑Agent LLM Reasoning via Bayesian Nash Equilibrium · ICML 2025 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › incomplete information
bayesian game |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | From Debate to Equilibrium: Belief‑Driven Multi‑Agent LLM Reasoning via Bayesian Nash Equilibrium · ICML 2025 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › solution concepts in games › equilibrium concepts
bayes-nash equilibrium |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | From Debate to Equilibrium: Belief‑Driven Multi‑Agent LLM Reasoning via Bayesian Nash Equilibrium · ICML 2025 |
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning › deep reinforcement learning › visual reinforcement learning
generalization in visual reinforcement learning |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Improving Generalization in Visual Reinforcement Learning via Conflict-aware Gradient Agreement Augmentation · ICCV 2023 |
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning › deep reinforcement learning
visual reinforcement learning |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Improving Generalization in Visual Reinforcement Learning via Conflict-aware Gradient Agreement Augmentation · ICCV 2023 |
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning › policy optimization
policy gradient |
0.2 | 1 | 2023 | Improving Generalization in Visual Reinforcement Learning via Conflict-aware Gradient Agreement Augmentation · ICCV 2023 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
regret analysis · 1.7hierarchical reinforcement learning · 1.7bayesian nash equilibrium · 1.7gradient surgery · 0.7gradient agreement · 0.7data augmentation · 0.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | From Debate to Equilibrium: Belief‑Driven Multi‑Agent LLM Reasoning via Bayesian Nash EquilibriumabstractMulti-agent frameworks can substantially boost the reasoning power of large language models (LLMs), but they typically incur heavy computational costs and lack convergence guarantees. To overcome these challenges, we recast multi-LLM coordination as an incomplete-information game and seek a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE), in which each agent optimally responds to its probabilistic beliefs about the strategies of others. We introduce Efficient Coordination via Nash Equilibrium (ECON), a hierarchical reinforcement-learning paradigm that marries distributed reasoning with centralized final output. Under ECON, each LLM independently selects responses that maximize its expected reward, conditioned on its beliefs about co-agents, without requiring costly inter-agent exchanges. We mathematically prove that ECON attains a markedly tighter regret bound than non-equilibrium multi-agent schemes. Empirically, ECON outperforms existing multi-LLM approaches by 11.2% on average across six benchmarks spanning complex reasoning and planning tasks. Further experiments demonstrate ECON’s ability to flexibly incorporate additional models, confirming its scalability and paving the way toward larger, more powerful multi-LLM ensembles. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/tmlr-group/ECON. Xie Yi, Zhanke Zhou, Chentao Cao, Qiyu Niu, Tongliang Liu, Bo Han 0003 |
ICML | 1 |
| 2023 | Improving Generalization in Visual Reinforcement Learning via Conflict-aware Gradient Agreement AugmentationabstractLearning a policy with great generalization to unseen environments remains challenging but critical in visual reinforcement learning. Despite the success of augmentation combination in the supervised learning generalization, naively applying it to visual RL algorithms may damage the training efficiency, suffering from serve performance degradation. In this paper, we first conduct qualitative analysis and illuminate the main causes: (i) high-variance gradient magnitudes and (ii) gradient conflicts existed in various augmentation methods. To alleviate these issues, we propose a general policy gradient optimization framework, named Conflict-aware Gradient Agreement Augmentation (CG2A), and better integrate augmentation combination into visual RL algorithms to address the generalization bias. In particular, CG2A develops a Gradient Agreement Solver to adaptively balance the varying gradient magnitudes, and introduces a Soft Gradient Surgery strategy to alleviate the gradient conflicts. Extensive experiments demonstrate that CG2A significantly improves the generalization performance and sample efficiency of visual RL algorithms. Siao Liu, Zhaoyu Chen 0001, Yang Liu 0246, Dingkang Yang, Zhile Zhao, Ziqing Zhou, Xie Yi, Wei Li 0055, Zhongxue Gan 0001 |
ICCV | 8 |