Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Yiyi Chen 0002
dblp:71/1-2
· DBLP profile ↗
8ranked-venue papers
3as first author
8since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0001-9977-8960ORCID · verified
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 7 · 3 first-author · 7 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
4 papers |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 66% Privacy and data protection · 34% | |
| Artificial intelligence
3 papers |
Language models and text generation · 61% Transfer learning and domain adaptation · 39% | |
| Human-computer interaction and pervasive computing
1 paper |
Collaborative and social computing · 100% |
Topics — the 10 heaviest of 12, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Security and privacy of machine learning › privacy attack
embedding inversion attack |
1.7 | 2 | 2025 | ALGEN: Few-shot Inversion Attacks on Textual Embeddings via Cross-Model Alignment and Generation · ACL (1) 2025 Against All Odds: Overcoming Typology, Script, and Language Confusion in Multilingual Embedding Inversion Attacks · AAAI 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
membership inference |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Do LLMs Really Memorize Personally Identifiable Information? Revisiting PII Leakage with a Cue-Controlled Memorization Framework · ACL (1) 2026 |
Privacy and data protection
personally identifiable information |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Do LLMs Really Memorize Personally Identifiable Information? Revisiting PII Leakage with a Cue-Controlled Memorization Framework · ACL (1) 2026 |
Privacy and data protection › information leakage
personally identifiable information leakage |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Do LLMs Really Memorize Personally Identifiable Information? Revisiting PII Leakage with a Cue-Controlled Memorization Framework · ACL (1) 2026 |
Machine learning › Transfer learning and domain adaptation
cross-lingual transfer |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Shared Path: Unraveling Memorization in Multilingual LLMs through Language Similarities · EMNLP 2025 |
Collaborative and social computing › creative collaboration
hackathon |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | How Do Hackathons Foster Creativity? Towards Automated Evaluation of Creativity at Scale · CHI 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › model privacy
language model privacy |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Against All Odds: Overcoming Typology, Script, and Language Confusion in Multilingual Embedding Inversion Attacks · AAAI 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
model stealing |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | ALGEN: Few-shot Inversion Attacks on Textual Embeddings via Cross-Model Alignment and Generation · ACL (1) 2025 |
Privacy and data protection › inference attack
embedding inversion |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Text Embedding Inversion Security for Multilingual Language Models · ACL (1) 2024 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
multilingual language models |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Text Embedding Inversion Security for Multilingual Language Models · ACL (1) 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
large language model · 1.7computational analysis · 1.7masking defense · 1.5black-box inversion attack · 1.5cue-controlled evaluation · 1.0language similarity analysis · 0.9graph-based correlation metric · 0.9generative model · 0.9few-shot learning · 0.9embedding inversion · 0.9cross-model alignment · 0.9cross-lingual analysis · 0.9
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Do LLMs Really Memorize Personally Identifiable Information? Revisiting PII Leakage with a Cue-Controlled Memorization FrameworkabstractLarge Language Models (LLMs) have been reported to "leak" Personally Identifiable Information (PII), with successful PII reconstruction often interpreted as evidence of memorization.We propose a principled revision of memorization evaluation for LLMs, arguing that PII leakage should be evaluated under low lexical cue conditions, where target PII cannot be reconstructed through prompt-induced generalization or pattern completion.We formalize Cue-Resistant Memorization (CRM) as a cue-controlled evaluation framework and a necessary condition for valid memorization evaluation, explicitly conditioning on prompt-target overlap cues.Using CRM, we conduct a largescale multilingual re-evaluation of PII leakage across 32 languages and multiple memorization paradigms.Revisiting reconstruction-based settings, including verbatim prefix-suffix completion and associative reconstruction, we find that their apparent effectiveness is driven primarily by direct surface-form cues rather than by true memorization.When such cues are controlled for, reconstruction success diminishes substantially.We further examine cue-free generation and membership inference, both of which exhibit extremely low true positive rates.Overall, our results suggest that previously reported PII leakage is better explained by cue-driven behavior than by genuine memorization, highlighting the importance of cue-controlled evaluation for reliably quantifying privacy-relevant memorization in LLMs 1 . Yiyi Chen 0002, Qiongxiu Li, Johannes Bjerva |
ACL (1) | 2 |
| 2025 | Against All Odds: Overcoming Typology, Script, and Language Confusion in Multilingual Embedding Inversion AttacksabstractLarge Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to malicious influence by cyber attackers through intrusions such as adversarial, backdoor, and embedding inversion attacks. In response, the burgeoning field of LLM Security aims to study and defend against such threats. Thus far, the majority of works in this area have focused on monolingual English models; however, emerging research suggests that multilingual LLMs may be more vulnerable to various attacks than their monolingual counterparts. While previous work has investigated embedding inversion over a small subset of European languages, it is challenging to extrapolate these findings to languages from different linguistic families and with differing scripts. To this end, we explore the security of multilingual LLMs in the context of embedding inversion attacks and investigate cross-lingual and cross-script inversion across 20 languages, spanning over 8 language families and 12 scripts. Our findings indicate that languages written in Arabic and Cyrillic scripts are particularly vulnerable to embedding inversion, as are languages within the Indo-Aryan language family. We further observe that inversion models tend to suffer from language confusion, sometimes significantly reducing the efficacy of an attack. Accordingly, we systematically explore this bottleneck for inversion models, uncovering predictable patterns attackers could leverage. Ultimately, this study aims to further the field's understanding of the outstanding security vulnerabilities facing multilingual LLMs and raise awareness for the languages most at risk of negative impact from these attacks. Yiyi Chen 0002, Russa Biswas, Heather C. Lent, Johannes Bjerva |
AAAI | 1 |
| 2025 | ALGEN: Few-shot Inversion Attacks on Textual Embeddings via Cross-Model Alignment and GenerationabstractWith the growing popularity of Large Language Models (LLMs) and vector databases, private textual data is increasingly processed and stored as numerical embeddings. However, recent studies have proven that such embeddings are vulnerable to inversion attacks, where original text is reconstructed to reveal sensitive information. Previous research has largely assumed access to millions of sentences to train attack models, e.g., through data leakage or nearly unrestricted API access. With our method, a single data point is sufficient for a partially successful inversion attack. With as little as 1k data samples, performance reaches an optimum across a range of black-box encoders, without training on leaked data. We present a Few-shot Textual Embedding Inversion Attack using Cross-Model ALignment and GENeration (ALGEN), by aligning victim embeddings to the attack space and using a generative model to reconstruct text. We find that ALGEN attacks can be effectively transferred across domains and languages, revealing key information. We further examine a variety of defense mechanisms against ALGEN, and find that none are effective, highlighting the vulnerabilities posed by inversion attacks. By significantly lowering the cost of inversion and proving that embedding spaces can be aligned through one-step optimization, we establish a new textual embedding inversion paradigm with broader applications for embedding alignment in NLP. Yiyi Chen 0002, Qiongkai Xu, Johannes Bjerva |
ACL (1) | 1 |
| 2025 | How Do Hackathons Foster Creativity? Towards Automated Evaluation of Creativity at ScaleabstractHackathons have become popular collaborative events for accelerating the development of creative ideas and prototypes. There are several case studies showcasing creative outcomes across domains such as industry, education, and research. However, there are no large-scale studies on creativity in hackathons which can advance theory on how hackathon formats lead to creative outcomes. We conducted a computational analysis of 193,353 hackathon projects. By operationalizing creativity through usefulness and novelty, we refined our dataset to 10,363 projects, allowing us to analyze how participant characteristics, collaboration patterns, and hackathon setups influence the development of creative projects. The contribution of our paper is twofold: We identified means for organizers to foster creativity in hackathons. We also explore the use of large language models (LLMs) to augment the evaluation of creative outcomes and discuss challenges and opportunities of doing this, which has implications for creativity research at large. Jeanette Falk, Yiyi Chen 0002, Janet Rafner, Mike Zhang, Johannes Bjerva, Alexander Nolte |
CHI | 2 |
| 2025 | Shared Path: Unraveling Memorization in Multilingual LLMs through Language SimilaritiesabstractWe present the first comprehensive study of Memorization in Multilingual Large Language Models (MLLMs), analyzing 95 languages using models across diverse model scales, architectures, and memorization definitions.As MLLMs are increasingly deployed, understanding their memorization behavior has become critical.Yet prior work has focused primarily on monolingual models, leaving multilingual memorization underexplored, despite the inherently long-tailed nature of training corpora.We find that the prevailing assumption, that memorization is highly correlated with training data availability, fails to fully explain memorization patterns in MLLMs.We hypothesize that the conventional focus on monolingual settings, effectively treating languages in isolation, may obscure the true patterns of memorization.To address this, we propose a novel graph-based correlation metric that incorporates language similarity to analyze cross-lingual memorization.Our analysis reveals that among similar languages, those with fewer training tokens tend to exhibit higher memorization, a trend that only emerges when cross-lingual relationships are explicitly modeled.These findings underscore the importance of a languageaware perspective in evaluating and mitigating memorization vulnerabilities in MLLMs.This also constitutes empirical evidence that language similarity both explains Memorization in MLLMs and underpins Cross-lingual Transferability, with broad implications for multilingual NLP 1 . Yiyi Chen 0002, Johannes Bjerva, Qiongxiu Li |
EMNLP | 2 |
| 2025 | NLP Security and Ethics, in the WildabstractAbstract As NLP models are used by a growing number of end-users, an area of increasing importance is NLP Security (NLPSec): assessing the vulnerability of models to malicious attacks and developing comprehensive countermeasures against them. While work at the intersection of NLP and cybersecurity has the potential to create safer NLP for all, accidental oversights can result in tangible harm (e.g., breaches of privacy or proliferation of malicious models). In this emerging field, however, the research ethics of NLP have not yet faced many of the long-standing conundrums pertinent to cybersecurity, until now. We thus examine contemporary works across NLPSec, and explore their engagement with cybersecurity’s ethical norms. We identify trends across the literature, ultimately finding alarming gaps on topics like harm minimization and responsible disclosure. To alleviate these concerns, we provide concrete recommendations to help NLP researchers navigate this space more ethically, bridging the gap between traditional cybersecurity and NLP ethics, which we frame as “white hat NLP”. The goal of this work is to help cultivate an intentional culture of ethical research for those working in NLP Security. Heather C. Lent, Erick Galinkin, Yiyi Chen 0002, Jens Myrup Pedersen, Leon Derczynski, Johannes Bjerva |
Trans. Assoc. Comput. Linguistics | 3 |
| 2024 | Text Embedding Inversion Security for Multilingual Language ModelsabstractTextual data is often represented as realnumbered embeddings in NLP, particularly with the popularity of large language models (LLMs) and Embeddings as a Service (EaaS).However, storing sensitive information as embeddings can be susceptible to security breaches, as research shows that text can be reconstructed from embeddings, even without knowledge of the underlying model.While defence mechanisms have been explored, these are exclusively focused on English, leaving other languages potentially exposed to attacks.This work explores LLM security through multilingual embedding inversion.We define the problem of black-box multilingual and crosslingual inversion attacks, and explore their potential implications.Our findings suggest that multilingual LLMs may be more vulnerable to inversion attacks, in part because English-based defences may be ineffective.To alleviate this, we propose a simple masking defense effective for both monolingual and multilingual models.This study is the first to investigate multilingual inversion attacks, shedding light on the differences in attacks and defenses across monolingual and multilingual settings. Yiyi Chen 0002, Heather C. Lent, Johannes Bjerva |
ACL (1) | 1 |
| 2024 | CreoleVal: Multilingual Multitask Benchmarks for CreolesabstractAbstract Creoles represent an under-explored and marginalized group of languages, with few available resources for NLP research. While the genealogical ties between Creoles and a number of highly resourced languages imply a significant potential for transfer learning, this potential is hampered due to this lack of annotated data. In this work we present CreoleVal, a collection of benchmark datasets spanning 8 different NLP tasks, covering up to 28 Creole languages; it is an aggregate of novel development datasets for reading comprehension relation classification, and machine translation for Creoles, in addition to a practical gateway to a handful of preexisting benchmarks. For each benchmark, we conduct baseline experiments in a zero-shot setting in order to further ascertain the capabilities and limitations of transfer learning for Creoles. Ultimately, we see CreoleVal as an opportunity to empower research on Creoles in NLP and computational linguistics, and in general, a step towards more equitable language technology around the globe. Heather C. Lent, Kushal Tatariya, Raj Dabre, Yiyi Chen 0002, Marcell Fekete, Esther Ploeger, Li Zhou 0010, Ruth-Ann Armstrong, Abee Eijansantos, Catriona Malau, Hans Erik Heje, Ernests Lavrinovics, Diptesh Kanojia, Paul Belony, Marcel Bollmann, Loïc Grobol, Miryam de Lhoneux, Daniel Hershcovich, Michel DeGraff, Anders Søgaard, Johannes Bjerva |
Trans. Assoc. Comput. Linguistics | 4 |