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Wilfred Plouffe

dblp:71/7563 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2009
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Processor architecture and microarchitecture · 50% Hardware accelerators and domain-specific architectures · 50%
Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments
0.112009
Effective implementation of the cell broadband engineTM isolation loader · CCS 2009
Hardware accelerators and domain-specific architectures › many-core accelerator
cell broadband engine
0.112009
Effective implementation of the cell broadband engineTM isolation loader · CCS 2009
Processor architecture and microarchitecture › multicore design
heterogeneous multicore
0.112009
Effective implementation of the cell broadband engineTM isolation loader · CCS 2009

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

substituted-ciphertext attack countermeasure · 0.2SHA-1 · 0.2RSA-2048 · 0.2AES · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2009 Effective implementation of the cell broadband engineTM isolation loader
abstract
This paper presents the design and implementation of the Cell Broadband Engine TM(Cell/B.E.) isolation loader which is a part of the IBM Software Development Kit for Multicore Acceleration [14]. Our isolation loader is a key component in realizing secure application boot and encrypted application execution. During the application load process, the isolation loader fetches, validates, and decrypts a Synergistic Processor Element (SPE) executable, establishing a chain of trust from the hardware to the application. Since not all applications are SPE executables, we also introduce a general solution. This is a verification service framework in which all applications including system functions can be verified by the isolation loader immediately before execution.We have applied several novel implementation techniques to the isolation loader. The countermeasure implemented in our isolation loader against the substituted-ciphertext attack is given and our staging technique to allocate contiguous working areas for applications is also introduced. The load overhead of this loader including application fetch, validation (RSA-2048/SHA-1), and decryption (RSA-2048 and AES) is less than 50 milliseconds on the 2.8 GHz IBM PowerXCell 8i processor. This overhead is reasonable compared with the 500-millisecond 2048-bit RSA signing needed by the Trusted Platform Module chips [3].
Masana Murase, Kanna Shimizu, Wilfred Plouffe, Masaharu Sakamoto
CCS3