Guerney D. H. Hunt

dblp:72/1246 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
2as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Computer networks · 1 · 1 first-authorSecurity and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Hardware security and side channels · 54% Systems and software security · 46%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Operating systems · 100%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Processor architecture and microarchitecture · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels › trusted execution environments
confidential computing
0.512021
Confidential computing for OpenPOWER · EuroSys 2021
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments
0.512021
Confidential computing for OpenPOWER · EuroSys 2021
Operating systems › resource management › process management
context switching
0.312025
Save what must be saved: Secure context switching with Sailor · USENIX Security Symposium 2025
Processor architecture and microarchitecture
instruction set architecture
0.112021
Confidential computing for OpenPOWER · EuroSys 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

trusted boot · 1.0secure boot · 1.0cryptography · 1.0access control · 1.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Save what must be saved: Secure context switching with Sailor
Neelu S. Kalani, Thomas Bourgeat, Guerney D. H. Hunt, Wojciech Ozga
USENIX Security Symposium3
2021 Confidential computing for OpenPOWER
abstract
This paper presents Protected Execution Facility (PEF), a virtual machine-based Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) for confidential computing on Power ISA. PEF enables protected secure virtual machines (SVMs). Like other TEEs, PEF verifies the SVM prior to execution. PEF utilizes a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), secure boot, and trusted boot as well as newly introduced architectural changes for Power ISA systems. Exploiting these architectural changes requires new firmware, the Protected Execution Ultravisor. PEF is supported in the latest version of the POWER9 chip. PEF demonstrates that access control for isolation and cryptography for confidentiality is an effective approach to confidential computing. We particularly focus on how our design (i) balances between access control and cryptography, (ii) maximizes the use of existing security components, and (iii) simplifies the management of the SVM life cycle. Finally, we evaluate the performance of SVMs in comparison to normal virtual machines on OpenPOWER systems.
Guerney D. H. Hunt, Ramachandra Pai, Michael V. Le, Hani Jamjoom, Sukadev Bhattiprolu, Rick Boivie, Laurent Dufour, Brad Frey, Mohit Kapur, Kenneth A. Goldman, Ryan Grimm, Janani Janakirman, John M. Ludden, Paul Mackerras, Cathy May, Elaine R. Palmer, Bharata Bhasker Rao, Lawrence Roy, William A. Starke, Jeffrey Stuecheli, Enriquillo Valdez, Wendel Voigt
EuroSys1
1998 Network Dispatcher: A Connection Router for Scalable Internet Services
Guerney D. H. Hunt, Germán S. Goldszmidt, Richard P. King, Rajat Mukherjee
Comput. Networks1