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Jing Liu 0009

dblp:72/2590-9 · DBLP profile ↗
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6ranked-venue papers
2as first author
4since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0002-1712-2966ORCID · conflict

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 5 · 2 first-author · 3 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 3 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Privacy and data protection · 55% Security and privacy of machine learning · 45%
Artificial intelligence
2 papers
Efficient and distributed learning · 62% Deep learning architectures and training · 38%

Topics — the 10 heaviest of 10, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning
model compression
1.012026
LatentLLM: Activation-Aware Transform to Multi-Head Latent Attention · AAAI 2026
Security and privacy of machine learning
membership inference
0.912025
Forget to Flourish: Leveraging Machine-Unlearning on Pretrained Language Models for Privacy Leakage · AAAI 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning
poisoning attack
0.912025
Forget to Flourish: Leveraging Machine-Unlearning on Pretrained Language Models for Privacy Leakage · AAAI 2025
Privacy and data protection › information leakage
privacy leakage
0.912025
Forget to Flourish: Leveraging Machine-Unlearning on Pretrained Language Models for Privacy Leakage · AAAI 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning › privacy attack
training data extraction
0.912025
Forget to Flourish: Leveraging Machine-Unlearning on Pretrained Language Models for Privacy Leakage · AAAI 2025
Privacy and data protection › privacy-preserving machine learning › federated learning privacy
gradient inversion attack
0.812024
Analyzing Inference Privacy Risks Through Gradients In Machine Learning · CCS 2024
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy
privacy auditing
0.812024
Analyzing Inference Privacy Risks Through Gradients In Machine Learning · CCS 2024
Privacy and data protection › inference attack
privacy inference
0.812024
Analyzing Inference Privacy Risks Through Gradients In Machine Learning · CCS 2024
Machine learning › Deep learning architectures and training › attention mechanism › multi-head attention
multi-head latent attention
0.312026
LatentLLM: Activation-Aware Transform to Multi-Head Latent Attention · AAAI 2026
Machine learning › Deep learning architectures and training
transformer
0.312026
LatentLLM: Activation-Aware Transform to Multi-Head Latent Attention · AAAI 2026

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

information-theoretic analysis · 1.5game-based privacy framework · 1.5adversarial canary records · 1.5activation-aware transformation · 1.0machine unlearning · 0.9fine-tuning · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 LatentLLM: Activation-Aware Transform to Multi-Head Latent Attention
Toshiaki Koike-Akino, Xiangyu Chen 0008, Jing Liu 0009, Ye Wang 0001, Pu Wang 0004, Matthew Brand
AAAI3
2025 Forget to Flourish: Leveraging Machine-Unlearning on Pretrained Language Models for Privacy Leakage
abstract
Fine-tuning large language models on private data for downstream applications poses significant privacy risks in potentially exposing sensitive information. Several popular community platforms now offer convenient distribution of a large variety of pre-trained models, allowing anyone to publish without rigorous verification. This scenario creates a privacy threat, as pre-trained models can be intentionally crafted to compromise the privacy of fine-tuning datasets. In this study, we introduce a novel poisoning technique that uses model-unlearning as an attack tool. This approach manipulates a pre-trained language model to increase the leakage of private data during the fine-tuning process. Our method enhances both membership inference and data extraction attacks while preserving model utility. Experimental results across different models, datasets, and fine-tuning setups demonstrate that our attacks significantly surpass baseline performance. This work serves as a cautionary note for users who download pretrained models from unverified sources, highlighting the potential risks involved.
Md. Rafi Ur Rashid, Jing Liu 0009, Toshiaki Koike-Akino, Ye Wang 0001, Shagufta Mehnaz
AAAI2
2024 SuperLoRA: Parameter-Efficient Unified Adaptation of Large Foundation Models
Xiangyu Chen 0008, Jing Liu 0009, Ye Wang 0001, Pu Wang 0004, Matthew Brand, Guanghui Wang 0001, Toshiaki Koike-Akino
BMVC2
2024 Analyzing Inference Privacy Risks Through Gradients In Machine Learning
abstract
In distributed learning settings, models are iteratively updated with shared gradients computed from potentially sensitive user data. While previous work has studied various privacy risks of sharing gradients, our paper aims to provide a systematic approach to analyze private information leakage from gradients. We present a unified game-based framework that encompasses a broad range of attacks including attribute, property, distributional, and user disclosures. We investigate how different uncertainties of the adversary affect their inferential power via extensive experiments on five datasets across various data modalities. Our results demonstrate the inefficacy of solely relying on data aggregation to achieve privacy against inference attacks in distributed learning. We further evaluate five types of defenses, namely, gradient pruning, signed gradient descent, adversarial perturbations, variational information bottleneck, and differential privacy, under both static and adaptive adversary settings. We provide an information-theoretic view for analyzing the effectiveness of these defenses against inference from gradients. Finally, we introduce a method for auditing attribute inference privacy, improving the empirical estimation of worst-case privacy through crafting adversarial canary records.
Andrew Lowy, Jing Liu 0009, Toshiaki Koike-Akino, Kieran Parsons, Bradley A. Malin, Ye Wang 0001
CCS3
2019 Sparse Bayesian Learning for Robust PCA
abstract
In this paper, we propose a new Bayesian model to solve the Robust PCA problem - recovering the underlying low-rank matrix and sparse matrix from their noisy compositions. We first derive and analyze a new objective function, which is proven to be equivalent to the fundamental minimizing "rank+sparsity" objective. To solve this objective, we develop a concise Sparse Bayesian Learning (SBL) method that has minimum assumptions and effectively deals with the crux of the problem. The concise modeling allows simple and effective Empirical Bayesian inference via MAP-EM. Simulation studies demonstrate the superiority of the proposed method over the existing state-of-the-art methods. The efficacy of the method is further verified through a text extraction image processing task.
Jing Liu 0009, Yacong Ding, Bhaskar D. Rao
ICASSP1
2017 Sparsity regularized Principal Component Pursuit
abstract
We study the problem of low-rank and sparse decomposition from possibly noisy observations. We propose a novel objective function with nuclear norm on the low-rank term and ℓ0-`norm' on the sparse term, as well as ℓ1-norm on the additive noise term. When there is no dense inlier noise, the proposed method shares the same theoretical guarantee as the Principal Component Pursuit (PCP), i.e., it can recover the low-rank component and sparse component exactly with high probability. Simulations in the noisy case demonstrate that the proposed method outperforms existing state-of-the-art methods. Results on a surveillance video application further verify the effectiveness of the proposed method.
Jing Liu 0009, Pamela C. Cosman, Bhaskar D. Rao
ICASSP1