In this paper, we present a preliminary ontology of bias based on the DOLCE foundational ontology. The main reason for devising such an endeavour is to make explicit the ontological assumptions behind the use of terms indicating the elements composing a biased outcome. Firstly, we discuss what the object of a bias is —namely, the entity that might be deemed biased, which we identify with situated inferences, i.e. propositional contents that can be asserted by some (human or artificial) agent from other propositional contents. We will thus categorise in DOLCE various types of biases as concepts that classify situated inferences. The content of such inferences is then associated with the following elements: i) the agent responsible for drawing the conclusion, ii) the objects and iii) the concepts used in the premises and in the conclusion of the inference, iv) the time when the inference takes place. These ingredients will serve to trace the origin of what we shall call a biased inference back to any of the above elements, relating some of the biases present in the literature to these ontologically founded elements.

Research in Digital Humanities calls for computational systems to document, compare, and analyze interpretations of cultural artifacts such as literary texts. These systems are intended to support scholars, critics, and students by facilitating access to existing analyses of texts, identifying similarities and divergences between interpretations, and more. We propose an approach for documenting interpretations of literary characters, grounded in the empirical practices of literary interpretation to align closely with experts’ methods. To achieve this, we remain neutral regarding the ontological status of characters, instead relying on formal approaches based on linguistics. We demonstrate how our approach can analyze relations between names of fictional characters across texts and authors, bridging discussions in analytic philosophy about identity with the interests of literary scholars.

The notion of trust has been traditionally investigated within many disciplines, ranging from sociology to economy, as well as politics, psychology, and philosophy. More recently, it is especially in the fields of AI, ICT, and Engineering (e.g., Critical systems), that the need for a discussion on the concept of trust, problematized in relation to the massive employment of technical artefacts in modern society, is becoming urgent. Yet, being a characteristic trait of human relationships, it is not clear whether the attitude of trust can also be directed towards artefacts. Moreover, with respect to the study of systems’ failures, the engineering sciences provide cognate notions to that of trust, e.g. reliability or dependability, which highlight our dependence on complex systems to fulfil certain tasks in a context of risk, uncertainty and vulnerability. In order to understand how far we can rely on technology, we should be able to understand, first of all, which kinds of dependencies are at stake. To this aim, in this paper, we will briefly review and discuss the main theoretical points related to trust and the technical notions mentioned, looking at both humanities and engineering literature. Then, we shall propose a preliminary ontological analysis aiming at comparing the specificities of the concepts concerned, all sharing a form of instrumental dependence.

In many application domains, it is common to talk not only about the entities populating that domain, but also about statements (aka claims) that are expressed about those very entities. This is particularly the case in the Humanities, e.g., when scholars express their critical statements about paintings, literary texts, musical works, etc. The ontological modeling of such claims is challenging for various reasons, e.g., because one needs to capture their subjective but also public dimension, because scholars may express contrasting statements about the same phenomena, or because the argumentative logic of scholarly reasoning does not squarely fit into the methods of mathematical logic. Building on previous work on the treatment of observations and being driven by concrete case studies, we propose the first steps for an ontology to document scholarly statements and to trace critical debates in literary studies.

A thorough understanding of what needs are is fundamental for designing well-behaved information systems for many social applications and in particular for public services. Talking about needs pervades indeed the jargon of Public Administrations when motivating their service offering. In this paper, we propose an ontological analysis of needs, aiming at a principled disentangling of the different uses of the term. We leverage philosophical tradition on intentionality, for its rich understanding of mental entities, we compare it with the well-established BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention) tradition in knowledge representation, and we propose a formalisation of needs within the foundational ontology DOLCE. Throughout the paper, we motivate our analysis focusing on needs in public services.

Forests, cars and orchestras are very different ontological entities, and yet very similar in some aspects. The relationships they have with the elements they are composed of is often assumed to be reducible to standard ontological relations, like parthood and constitution, but how this could be done is still debated. This paper sheds light on the issue starting from a linguistic and philosophical analysis aimed at understanding notions like plurality, collective and composite, and proposing a formal approach to characterise them. We conclude the presentation with a discussion and analysis of social groups within this framework.

How can organisations survive not only the substitution of members, but also other dramatic changes, like that of the norms regulating their activities, the goals they plan to achieve, or the system of roles that compose them? This paper is as first step towards a well-founded ontological analysis of the persistence of organisations through changes. Our analysis leverages Kit Fine's notions of rigid and variable embodiment and proposes to view the (history of the) decisions made by the members of the organisation as the criterion to re-identify the organisation through change.

We present an ontological analysis of the notion of group agency developed by Christian List and Philip Pettit. We focus on this notion as it allows us to neatly distinguish groups, organizations, corporations – to which we may ascribe agency – from mere aggregates of individuals. We develop a module for group agency within a foundational ontology and we apply it to organizations.

Interacting via text chats can be considered as a hybrid type of communication, in which textual information delivery follows turn-taking dynamics, resembling spoken interactions. An interesting research question is whether personality can be observed in chats, similarly as happening in face-to-face exchanges. After an encouraging preliminary work on Skype, in this study we have set up our own chat service in which key-logging functionalities have been activated, so that the timings of each key pressing can be measured. Using this framework, we organized semi-structured chats between 50 subjects, whose personality traits have been analyzed through psychometric tests, and a single operator, for a total of 16 hours of conversation. On this data, we have observed that some personality traits are linked with the way we are chatting (measured by stylometric cues), by means of statistically significant correlations and regression studies. Finally, we have assessed that some of the stylometric cues are very discriminative for the recognition of a user in a identification scenario. These facts taken together could underlie that some personality traits drive us in chatting in a particular fashion, which turns out to be very recognizable.

We present an unsupervised approach for the automatic detection of static interactive groups. The approach builds upon a novel multi-scale Hough voting policy, which incorporates in a flexible way the sociological notion of group as F-formation; the goal is to model at the same time small arrangements of close friends and aggregations of many individuals spread over a large area. Our technique is based on a competition of different voting sessions, each one specialized for a particular group cardinality; all the votes are then evaluated using information theoretic criteria, producing the final set of groups. The proposed technique has been applied on public benchmark sequences and a novel cocktail party dataset, evaluating new group detection metrics and obtaining state-of-the-art performances.

Moving from some reflections on the empirical practice of measurement and on the nature of visual perception, we present a constructivist approach to objects. At the basis of such approach there is the idea that all we may know about what is out there is always mediated by some sort of apparatus, being it a measurement instrument or our perceptual system. Given this perspective, some questions are in order: how are objects identified and re-identified through time from the outcomes of apparatuses? How can we distinguish different (kinds of) objects? Our first goal will be to make explicit the mechanism used to build objects from the apparatuses' outcomes, emphasizing what are the ontological and representational problems this construction faces. A second contribution will be a preliminary discussion of some possible ways to distinguish social objects, the constructed objects par excellence, from physical ones. A third contribution will be an attempt to make a bridge between two scientific communities that rarely seek contact or mutual recognition: that of formal ontologies and that of formal concept analysis.