Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Kenneth M. Walker
dblp:72/6383
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 1996
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 3 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
3 papers |
Authentication and access control · 47% Systems and software security · 36% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 17% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
3 papers |
Operating systems · 100% |
Topics — the 9 heaviest of 10, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Operating systems › system security › operating system security › access control
mandatory access control |
0.0 | 2 | 1995 | A Domain and Type Enforcement UNIX Prototype · USENIX Security Symposium 1995 Practical Domain and Type Enforcement for UNIX · S&P 1995 |
Authentication and access control › access control models
domain and type enforcement |
0.0 | 1 | 1996 | Confining Root Programs with Domain and Type Enforcement · USENIX Security Symposium 1996 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
message authentication codes |
0.0 | 1 | 1996 | Confining Root Programs with Domain and Type Enforcement · USENIX Security Symposium 1996 |
Systems and software security
operating system security |
0.0 | 1 | 1996 | Confining Root Programs with Domain and Type Enforcement · USENIX Security Symposium 1996 |
Authentication and access control
access control |
0.0 | 1 | 1995 | A Domain and Type Enforcement UNIX Prototype · USENIX Security Symposium 1995 |
Authentication and access control › access control › access control mechanisms
type enforcement |
0.0 | 1 | 1995 | Practical Domain and Type Enforcement for UNIX · S&P 1995 |
Systems and software security › operating system security
UNIX security |
0.0 | 1 | 1995 | Practical Domain and Type Enforcement for UNIX · S&P 1995 |
Operating systems › system security
operating system security |
0.0 | 1 | 1995 | A Domain and Type Enforcement UNIX Prototype · USENIX Security Symposium 1995 |
Operating systems › system security › operating system security
access control |
0.0 | 1 | 1996 | Confining Root Programs with Domain and Type Enforcement · USENIX Security Symposium 1996 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
domain and type enforcement · 0.0runtime policy database · 0.0policy language design · 0.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1996 | Confining Root Programs with Domain and Type Enforcement
Kenneth M. Walker, Daniel F. Sterne, Lee Badger, Michael J. Petkac, David L. Sherman, Karen A. Oostendorp |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |
| 1995 | Practical Domain and Type Enforcement for UNIXabstractType enforcement is a table-oriented mandatory access control mechanism well-suited for confining applications and restricting information flows. Although both flexible and strong, type enforcement alone imposes significant administrative costs and has not been widely adopted. Domain and Type Enforcement (DTE) is an enhanced version of type enforcement designed to provide needed simplicity and compatibility. Two primary techniques distinguish DTE from simple type enforcement: DTE policies are expressed in a high-level language that includes file security attribute associations as well as other access control information; and during system execution, DTE file security attributes are maintained using a concise human-readable format in a runtime DTE policy database, thus removing the need for security-specific low-level data formats. Such formats are a major source of incompatibility for security-enhanced systems. A DTE UNIX prototype system has been implemented to evaluate these primary DTE concepts. This paper presents experiences gained and preliminary results indicating that DTE can provide cost effective security increases to UNIX systems while maintaining a high degree of compatibility with existing programs and media.> Lee Badger, Daniel F. Sterne, David L. Sherman, Kenneth M. Walker, Sheila A. Haghighat |
S&P | 4 |
| 1995 | A Domain and Type Enforcement UNIX Prototype
Lee Badger, Daniel F. Sterne, David L. Sherman, Kenneth M. Walker, Sheila A. Haghighat |
USENIX Security Symposium | 4 |