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Jiong Sun 0001

dblp:73/1316-1 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2003
0000-0002-9835-9075ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-authorTheory of computation · 1 · 1 first-authorApplied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design
0.012003
Dynamic supply chain formation: integrating multi-attribute auctions and finite capacity scheduling · EC 2003
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › auction design
multi-attribute auction
0.012003
Dynamic supply chain formation: integrating multi-attribute auctions and finite capacity scheduling · EC 2003
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory › auction mechanism
reverse auction
0.012003
Dynamic supply chain formation: integrating multi-attribute auctions and finite capacity scheduling · EC 2003
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › market design
supply chain formation
0.012003
Dynamic supply chain formation: integrating multi-attribute auctions and finite capacity scheduling · EC 2003

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

optimization · 0.0multi-attribute auction · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2003 Multi-attribute supply chain negotiation: coordinating reverse auctions subject to finite capacity considerations
abstract
Over the past few years, reverse auctions have attracted a lot of attention in the AI community. They offer the prospect of more efficiently matching suppliers and producers in the face of changing market conditions. Prior research has generally ignored the temporal and finite capacity constraints under which reverse auctioneers typically operate. In this paper, we consider the problem faced by a reverse auctioneer (e.g. a manufacturer) that can procure key components or services from a number of possible suppliers through multi-attribute reverse auctions. Bids submitted by prospective suppliers include a price and a delivery date. The reverse auctioneer has to select a combination of supplier bids that will maximize its overall profit, taking into account its own finite capacity and the prices and delivery dates offered by different suppliers for the same components/services. The auctioneer's profit is determined by the revenue generated by the products it sells, the costs of the components/services it purchases as well as late delivery penalties it incurs if it fails to deliver products/services in time to its own customers. We provide a formal model of this important class of problems, discuss its complexity and introduce rules that can be used to efficiently prune the resulting search space. We also introduce a branch-and-bound algorithm and an efficient heuristic search procedure for this class of problems. Empirical results show that our heuristic procedure typically yields solutions that are within 10 percent of the optimum. They also indicate that taking into account finite capacity considerations can significantly improve the reverse auctioneer's bottom line.
Norman M. Sadeh, Jiong Sun 0001
ICEC2
2003 Dynamic supply chain formation: integrating multi-attribute auctions and finite capacity scheduling
abstract
Dynamic supply chain practices offer the prospect of more efficiently matching suppliers and producers in the face of changing market conditions. Prior research aimed at studying dynamic supply chain formation problems has generally ignored constraints imposed by the finite capacity of manufacturers. In this paper, we consider the problem faced by a manufacturer who can procure key components from a number of possible suppliers through multi-attribute reverse auction mechanisms. Bids submitted by prospective suppliers include a price and a delivery date. The manufacturer has to select a combination of supplier bids that will maximize its overall profit, taking into account the revenue generated by each product it has to deliver, the costs of the components it has to procure as well as late delivery penalties (incurred for missing promised delivery dates to its own customers).
Jiong Sun 0001, Norman M. Sadeh
EC1