Query optimization that involves expensive predicates has received considerable attention in the database community. Typically, the output to a database query is a set of tuples that satisfy certain conditions, and, with expensive predicates, these conditions may be computationally costly to verify. In the simplest case, when the query looks for the set of tuples that simultaneously satisfy k expensive predicates, the problem reduces to ordering the evaluation of the predicates so as to minimize the time to output the set of tuples comprising the answer to the query. We study different cases of the problem: the sequential case, in which a single processor is available to evaluate the predicates, and the distributed case, in which there are k processors available, each dedicated to a different attribute (column) of the database, and there is no communication cost between the processors.

The sliding window model is useful for discounting stale data in data stream applications. In this model, data elements arrive continually and only the most recent N elements are used when answering queries. We present a novel technique for solving two important and related problems in the sliding window model --- maintaining variance and maintaining a k-- median clustering. Our solution to the problem of maintaining variance provides a continually updated estimate of the variance of the last N values in a data stream with relative error of at most # using O( # 2 log N) memory. We present a constant-factor approximation algorithm which maintains an approximate k--median solution for the last N data points using O( N) memory, where # < 1/2 is a parameter which trades o# the space bound with the approximation factor of O(2 ).

We study clustering problems in the streaming model, where the goal is to cluster a set of points by making one pass (or a few passes) over the data using a small amount of storage space. Our main result is a randomized algorithm for the k--Median problem which produces a constant factor approximation in one pass using storage space O(k poly log n). This is a significant improvement of the previous best algorithm which yielded a 2O(1/ε) approximation using O(nε) space. Next we give a streaming algorithm for the k--Median problem with an arbitrary distance function. We also study algorithms for clustering problems with outliers in the streaming model. Here, we give bicriterion guarantees, producing constant factor approximations by increasing the allowed fraction of outliers slightly.

The data stream model has recently attracted attention for its applicability to numerous types of data, including telephone records, Web documents, and clickstreams. For analysis of such data, the ability to process the data in a single pass, or a small number of passes, while using little memory, is crucial. We describe such a streaming algorithm that effectively clusters large data streams. We also provide empirical evidence of the algorithm's performance on synthetic and real data streams.

Streaming data analysis has recently attracted attention in numerous applications including telephone records, Web documents and click streams. For such analysis, single-pass algorithms that consume a small amount of memory are critical. We describe such a streaming algorithm that effectively clusters large data streams. We also provide empirical evidence of the algorithm's performance on synthetic and real data streams.

Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require the solution of a difficult optimization problem. This is true of mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, which have in recent years assumed practical importance, and in particular of the gold standard for combinatorial auctions, the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA). Traditional analysis of these mechanisms---in particular, their truth revelation properties---assumes that the optimization problems are solved precisely. In reality, these optimization problems can usually be solved only in an approximate fashion. We investigate the impact on such mechanisms of replacing exact solutions by approximate ones. Specifically, we look at a particular greedy optimization method. We show that the GVA payment scheme does not provide for a truth revealing mechanism. We introduce another scheme that does guarantee truthfulness for a restricted class of players. We demonstrate the latter property by identifying natural properties for combinatorial auctions and showing that, for our restricted class of players, they imply that truthful strategies are dominant. Those properties have applicability beyond the specific auction studied.

We study clustering under the data stream model of computation where: given a sequence of points, the objective is to maintain a consistently good clustering of the sequence observed so far, using a small amount of memory and time. The data stream model is relevant to new classes of applications involving massive data sets, such as Web click stream analysis and multimedia data analysis. We give constant-factor approximation algorithms for the k-median problem in the data stream model of computation in a single pass. We also show negative results implying that our algorithms cannot be improved in a certain sense.

Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require the solution of a difficult optimization problem.This is true of mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, which have in recent years assumed practical importance, and in particular of the gold standard for combinatorial auctions, the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA).Traditional analysis of these mechanisms -in particular, their truth revelation properties -assumes that the optimization problems are solved precisely.In reality, these optimization problems can usually be solved only in an approximate fashion.We investigate the impact on such mechanisms of replacing exact solutions by approximate ones.Specifically, we look at a particular greedy optimization method, which has empirically been shown to perform well.We show that the GVA payment scheme does not provide for a truth revealing mechanism.We introduce another scheme that does guarantee truthfulness for a restricted class of players.We demonstrate the latter property by identifying sufficient conditions for a combinatorial auction to be truth-revealing, conditions which have applicability beyond the specific auction studied here.