In this article, we consider a variant of Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) routing that accounts for Random Early Detection (RED), an Active Queue Management method for backbone networks. In the version of OSPF we consider in this article we only require a single network path be available between each origin and destination, a simplification of the OSPF protocol. We formulate a mixed integer non‐linear program to determine the data paths, referred to as a routing policy. We prove that determining an optimal OSPF routing policy that accounts for RED is NP‐Hard. Furthermore, in order for the generated routing policies to be real‐world implementable, referred to as realizable, we must determine weights for all arcs in the network such that solving the all‐pairs shortest path problem using these weights reproduces the routing policies. We show that determining if a set of all‐pairs routes is realizable is also NP‐Hard. Fortunately, using traffic data from three real‐world backbone networks, we are able to find realizable routing policies for these networks that account for RED, using an off‐the‐shelf solver, and policies found perform better than those used in each network at the time the data was collected.

We study information revelation in scoring rule and prediction market mechanisms in settings in which traders have conflicting incentives due to opportunities to profit from the market operator's subsequent actions. In our canonical model, an agent Alice is offered an incentive-compatible scoring rule to reveal her beliefs about a future event, but can also profit from misleading another trader Bob about her information and then making money off Bob's error in a subsequent market. We show that, in any weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this sequence of two markets, Alice and Bob earn payoffs that are consistent with a minimax strategy of a related game. We can then characterize the equilibria in terms of an information channel: the outcome of the first scoring rule is as if Alice had only observed a noisy version of her initial signal, with the degree of noise indicating the adverse effect of the second market on the first. We provide a partial constructive characterization of when this channel will be noiseless. We show that our results on the canonical model yield insights into other settings of information extraction with conflicting incentives.

One attractive feature of market scoring rules [Hanson, Information Systems Frontiers, 2003] is that they are myopically strategyproof: It is optimal for a trader to report her true belief about the likelihood of an event provided that we ignore the impact of her report on the profit she might garner from future trades. This does not rule out the possibility that traders may profit by first misleading other traders through dishonest trades and then correcting the errors made by other traders. In this paper, we describe a new approach to analyzing non-myopic strategies and the existence of myopic equilibria. We first use a simple model with two partially informed traders in a single information market to gain insight into the conditions under which different equilibrium behavior emerges. We prove that, under generic conditions, the myopically optimal strategy profile is not a weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) strategy for the logarithmic market scoring rule. We show that our results extend to multiple traders and signals. We propose a simple discounted market scoring rule that reduces the opportunity for bluffing strategies. We show that in any weak PBE, myopic or otherwise, the market price converges to the optimal price, and the rate of convergence can be bounded in terms of the discounting parameter.