Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Matthew Chu
dblp:74/3803
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
2as first author
0since 2021 · last 2010
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-authorHuman-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1 · 1 first-authorTheory of computation · 1 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Computational complexity · 67% Algorithms and data structures · 33% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Algorithms and data structures
priority queues |
0.1 | 1 | 2007 | Checking and Spot-Checking the Correctness of Priority Queues · ICALP 2007 |
Computational complexity › verification complexity
program checking |
0.1 | 1 | 2007 | Checking and Spot-Checking the Correctness of Priority Queues · ICALP 2007 |
Computational complexity
property testing |
0.1 | 1 | 2007 | Checking and Spot-Checking the Correctness of Priority Queues · ICALP 2007 |
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 | Visualizing attack graphs, reachability, and trust relationships with NAVIGATORabstractA new tool named NAVIGATOR (Network Asset VIsualization: Graphs, ATtacks, Operational Recommendations) adds significant capabilities to earlier work in attack graph visualization. Using NAVIGATOR, users can visualize the effect of server-side, client-side, credential-based, and trustbased attacks. By varying the attacker model, NAVIGA-TOR can show the current state of the network as well as hypothetical future situations, allowing for advance planning. Furthermore, NAVIGATOR explicitly shows network topology, infrastructure devices, and host-level data while still conveying situational awareness of the network as a whole. This tool is implemented in Java and uses an existing C++ engine for reachability and attack graph calculations. Matthew Chu, Kyle Ingols, Richard Lippmann, Seth E. Webster, Stephen W. Boyer |
VizSEC | 1 |
| 2009 | Modeling Modern Network Attacks and Countermeasures Using Attack GraphsabstractBy accurately measuring risk for enterprise networks, attack graphs allow network defenders to understand the most critical threats and select the most effective countermeasures. This paper describes substantial enhancements to the NetSPA attack graph system required to model additional present-day threats (zero-day exploits and client-side attacks) and countermeasures (intrusion prevention systems, proxy firewalls, personal firewalls, and host-based vulnerability scans). Point-to-point reachability algorithms and structures were extensively redesigned to support "reverse" reachability computations and personal firewalls. Host-based vulnerability scans are imported and analyzed. Analysis of an operational network with 84 hosts demonstrates that client-side attacks pose a serious threat. Experiments on larger simulated networks demonstrated that NetSPA's previous excellent scaling is maintained. Less than two minutes are required to completely analyze a four-enclave simulated network with more than 40,000 hosts protected by personal firewalls. Kyle Ingols, Matthew Chu, Richard Lippmann, Seth E. Webster, Stephen W. Boyer |
ACSAC | 2 |
| 2007 | Checking and Spot-Checking the Correctness of Priority Queues
Matthew Chu, Sampath Kannan, Andrew McGregor 0001 |
ICALP | 1 |