We consider data confidentiality in a distributed detection scenario with a type-based multiple-access (TBMA) protocol where a large set of sensors sends local measurements to an ally fusion center (FC) over an insecure wireless medium called the main channel. Then, the ally FC makes a final decision to the physical environment. Although many wireless sensor networks are mission-specific and need data confidentiality due to the broadcast nature of wireless transmission, it can be easily wiretapped by unauthorized enemy FCs through eavesdropping channels. We propose a novel TBMA protocol called secure TBMA which provides data confidentiality by taking advantage of inherent properties of wireless channels, namely randomness and independence of the main and eavesdropping channels. In particular, the secure TBMA activates sensors having strong and weak main channel gains and makes the sensors follow different reporting rules based on the magnitudes of their channel gains. The reporting rules are carefully designed to confuse the enemy FC. The proposed secure TBMA delivers unconditional/perfect secrecy and does not assume any superiority of the ally FC over the enemy FC in terms of computational capability, secret key, and so on. For Rayleigh fading channels, we analyze the performance of the secure TBMA at both enemy and ally FCs by investigating conditions for perfect secrecy and an error exponent of detection error probability, respectively. On the one hand, the analysis at the enemy FC provides a design criterion of the reporting rules to achieve perfect secrecy. On the other hand, the analysis of the error exponent carried out with a Gaussian approximation shows that perfect secrecy is achievable at a marginal cost in detection error performance. All our claims are also verified with simulation results which have good matches with the analysis.

Since wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are vulnerable to threats and attacks due to the nature of wireless communications between sensors and fusion center (FC), it is often necessary to secure transmissions from any possible eavesdropping. In this paper, we study the eavesdropping issue when sensors are over-deployed and the channels between sensors and the ally FC are modeled as time-varying Rayleigh fading channels. We propose a transmission scheme in which only the sensors of strong and weak channel gains report their decisions in a predetermined way based on type-based multiple access protocol. By taking advantage of random behaviors of wireless channels in the form of the multiuser diversity and carefully design different roles of sensors of strong and weak channel gains to the ally FC, the proposed scheme can confuse the enemy FC in making a decision. Eventually, it guarantees the perfect secrecy promised by an information theoretic measure. We also analyze detection error probability and equivocation at the ally and enemy FCs, respectively.

We consider efficiently encodable rate-compatible (E2RC) punctured low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes and show that punctured LDPC codes of the E2RC structure have high error floors at their base code rates. Efficient type-II hybrid Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ) protocols are possible with punctured LDPC codes since punctured LDPC codes can support a wide range of code rates with incremental redundancy transmissions. However, such high error floors may result in excessive number of retransmission requests and end up with poor efficiency of hybrid ARQ protocols. We find that the problem of the E2RC structure stems from dispersive right degree distribution and high maximum right degree which is an indispensable element in the E2RC structure. In this paper, we propose a modification to E2RC structure which eliminates the error-floor problem without compromising any of important advantages of the E2RC structure such as linear-time encodability and good bit-error rate (BER) performance over a wide range of code rates. Our claims will be verified with BER and frame error rate (FER) simulation results.