Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Joshua Glatt
dblp:77/9903
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2011
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Privacy and data protection · 100% | |
| Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper |
Information retrieval · 100% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Information retrieval
query log analysis |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | CrowdLogging: distributed, private, and anonymous search logging · SIGIR 2011 |
Privacy and data protection
anonymization |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | CrowdLogging: distributed, private, and anonymous search logging · SIGIR 2011 |
Privacy and data protection
differential privacy |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | CrowdLogging: distributed, private, and anonymous search logging · SIGIR 2011 |
Privacy and data protection › anonymization › log anonymization
search log anonymization |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | CrowdLogging: distributed, private, and anonymous search logging · SIGIR 2011 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
encryption · 0.2differential privacy · 0.2
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | CrowdLogging: distributed, private, and anonymous search loggingabstractWe describe CrowdLogging, an approach for distributed search log collection, storage, and mining, with the dual goals of preserving privacy and making the mined information broadly available. Most search log mining approaches and most privacy enhancing schemes have focused on centralized search logs and methods for disseminating them to third parties. In our approach, a user's search log is encrypted and shared in such a way that (a) the source of a search behavior artifact, such as a query, is unknown and (b) extremely rare artifacts---that is, artifacts more likely to contain private information---are not revealed. The approach works with any search behavior artifact that can be extracted from a search log, including queries, query reformulations, and query-click pairs. In this work, we: (1) present a distributed search log collection, storage, and mining framework; (2) compare several privacy policies, including differential privacy, showing the trade-offs between strong guarantees and the utility of the released data; (3) demonstrate the impact of our approach using two existing research query logs; and (4) describe a pilot study for which we implemented a version of the framework. Henry Allen Feild, James Allan 0001, Joshua Glatt |
SIGIR | 3 |