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Joshua Glatt

dblp:77/9903 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2011
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Privacy and data protection · 100%
Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper
Information retrieval · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Information retrieval
query log analysis
0.112011
CrowdLogging: distributed, private, and anonymous search logging · SIGIR 2011
Privacy and data protection
anonymization
0.112011
CrowdLogging: distributed, private, and anonymous search logging · SIGIR 2011
Privacy and data protection
differential privacy
0.112011
CrowdLogging: distributed, private, and anonymous search logging · SIGIR 2011
Privacy and data protection › anonymization › log anonymization
search log anonymization
0.112011
CrowdLogging: distributed, private, and anonymous search logging · SIGIR 2011

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

encryption · 0.2differential privacy · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2011 CrowdLogging: distributed, private, and anonymous search logging
abstract
We describe CrowdLogging, an approach for distributed search log collection, storage, and mining, with the dual goals of preserving privacy and making the mined information broadly available. Most search log mining approaches and most privacy enhancing schemes have focused on centralized search logs and methods for disseminating them to third parties. In our approach, a user's search log is encrypted and shared in such a way that (a) the source of a search behavior artifact, such as a query, is unknown and (b) extremely rare artifacts---that is, artifacts more likely to contain private information---are not revealed. The approach works with any search behavior artifact that can be extracted from a search log, including queries, query reformulations, and query-click pairs. In this work, we: (1) present a distributed search log collection, storage, and mining framework; (2) compare several privacy policies, including differential privacy, showing the trade-offs between strong guarantees and the utility of the released data; (3) demonstrate the impact of our approach using two existing research query logs; and (4) describe a pilot study for which we implemented a version of the framework.
Henry Allen Feild, James Allan 0001, Joshua Glatt
SIGIR3