EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Robert W. Irving
dblp:78/6375
· DBLP profile ↗
42ranked-venue papers
19as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Theory of computation · 33 · 14 first-authorDatabases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 6 · 2 first-author · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 3 · 3 first-authorApplied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 3 · 2 first-authorArtificial intelligence and machine learning · 2Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
9 papers |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 71% Computational complexity · 15% Graph algorithms and graph theory · 10% | |
| Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
3 papers |
Indexing and storage engines · 85% Data mining · 15% |
Topics — the 19 heaviest of 20, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
matching |
0.4 | 5 | 2014 | Reasoning about optimal stable matchings under partial information · EC 2014 Popular Matchings · SIAM J. Comput. 2007 Popular matchings · SODA 2005 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › matching
stable matching |
0.3 | 2 | 2014 | Reasoning about optimal stable matchings under partial information · EC 2014 Popular Matchings · SIAM J. Comput. 2007 |
Computational complexity › complexity classes › coNP
coNP-completeness |
0.2 | 1 | 2014 | Reasoning about optimal stable matchings under partial information · EC 2014 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › matching › matching under preferences
popular matching |
0.1 | 2 | 2007 | Popular Matchings · SIAM J. Comput. 2007 Popular matchings · SODA 2005 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › market design
matching markets |
0.1 | 2 | 2006 | Rank-maximal matchings · ACM Trans. Algorithms 2006 Rank-maximal matchings · SODA 2004 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › matching › matching under preferences
rank-maximal matchings |
0.1 | 2 | 2006 | Rank-maximal matchings · ACM Trans. Algorithms 2006 Rank-maximal matchings · SODA 2004 |
Graph algorithms and graph theory › graph matching › matching algorithms
stable marriage |
0.1 | 3 | 2006 | Rank-maximal matchings · ACM Trans. Algorithms 2006 An efficient algorithm for the "optimal" stable marriage · J. ACM 1987 The Complexity of Counting Stable Marriages · SIAM J. Comput. 1986 |
Indexing and storage engines
sequence indexing |
0.1 | 2 | 2002 | Database indexing for large DNA and protein sequence collections · VLDB J. 2002 A Database Index to Large Biological Sequences · VLDB 2001 |
Graph algorithms and graph theory › graph matching
matching algorithms |
0.1 | 1 | 2006 | Rank-maximal matchings · ACM Trans. Algorithms 2006 |
Algorithms and data structures › sequence algorithms › string algorithms
longest common subsequence |
0.0 | 1 | 1996 | Maximal Common Subsequences and Minimal Common Supersequences · Inf. Comput. 1996 |
Approximation and online algorithms
shortest common supersequence |
0.0 | 1 | 1996 | Maximal Common Subsequences and Minimal Common Supersequences · Inf. Comput. 1996 |
Algorithms and data structures › sequence algorithms
string algorithms |
0.0 | 1 | 1996 | Maximal Common Subsequences and Minimal Common Supersequences · Inf. Comput. 1996 |
Data mining
tabular data |
0.0 | 1 | 1994 | Three-Dimensional Statistical Data Security Problems · SIAM J. Comput. 1994 |
Bioinformatics and computational biology › biological database
sequence database |
0.0 | 1 | 2002 | Database indexing for large DNA and protein sequence collections · VLDB J. 2002 |
Bioinformatics and computational biology
sequence analysis |
0.0 | 1 | 2001 | A Database Index to Large Biological Sequences · VLDB 2001 |
Combinatorics and discrete mathematics
extremal combinatorics |
0.0 | 1 | 1996 | Maximal Common Subsequences and Minimal Common Supersequences · Inf. Comput. 1996 |
Graph algorithms and graph theory
graph matching |
0.0 | 1 | 1987 | An efficient algorithm for the "optimal" stable marriage · J. ACM 1987 |
Computational complexity › counting complexity
#p-completeness |
0.0 | 1 | 1986 | The Complexity of Counting Stable Marriages · SIAM J. Comput. 1986 |
Computational complexity
counting complexity |
0.0 | 1 | 1986 | The Complexity of Counting Stable Marriages · SIAM J. Comput. 1986 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
partial order refinement · 0.2combinatorial optimization · 0.1preference lists · 0.1stable matching · 0.1preference aggregation · 0.0combinatorial algorithms · 0.0reduction · 0.0latin square construction · 0.0graph-theoretic methods · 0.0gale-shapley algorithm · 0.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Extracting the Sparse Longest Common Prefix Array from the Suffix Binary Search Tree
Tomohiro I, Robert W. Irving, Dominik Köppl, Lorna Love |
SPIRE | 2 |
| 2019 | The Stable Roommates Problem with Short ListsabstractWe consider two variants of the classical Stable Roommates problem with Incomplete (but strictly ordered) preference lists (sri) that are degree constrained, i.e., preference lists are of bounded length. The first variant, egald-sri, involves finding an egalitarian stable matching in solvable instances of sri with preference lists of length at most d. We show that this problem is NP-hard even if d = 3. On the positive side we give a $\frac {2d+3}{7}$ -approximation algorithm for d ∈{3,4,5} which improves on the known bound of 2 for the unbounded preference list case. In the second variant of sri, called d-srti, preference lists can include ties and are of length at most d. We show that the problem of deciding whether an instance of d-srti admits a stable matching is NP-complete even if d = 3. We also consider the “most stable” version of this problem and prove a strong inapproximability bound for the d = 3 case. However for d = 2 we show that the latter problem can be solved in polynomial time. Ágnes Cseh, Robert W. Irving, David F. Manlove |
Theory Comput. Syst. | 2 |
| 2016 | The Stable Roommates Problem with Short Lists
Ágnes Cseh, Robert W. Irving, David F. Manlove |
SAGT | 2 |
| 2014 | Profile-Based Optimal Matchings in the Student/Project Allocation Problem
Augustine Kwanashie, Robert W. Irving, David F. Manlove, Colin T. S. Sng |
IWOCA | 2 |
| 2014 | Reasoning about optimal stable matchings under partial informationabstractWe study two-sided matching markets in which participants are initially endowed with partial preference orderings, lacking precise information about their true, strictly ordered list of preferences. We wish to reason about matchings that are stable with respect to agents' true preferences, and which are furthermore optimal for one given side of the market. We present three main results. First, one can decide in polynomial time whether there exists a matching that is stable and optimal under all strict preference orders that refine the given partial orders, and can construct this matching in polynomial time if it does exist. We show, however, that deciding whether a given pair of agents are matched in all or no such optimal stable matchings is co-NP-complete, even under quite severe restrictions on preferences. Finally, we describe a polynomial-time algorithm that decides, given a matching that is stable under the partial preference orderings, whether that matching is stable and optimal for one side of the market under some refinement of the partial orders. Baharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Nicole Immorlica, Robert W. Irving, Kevin Leyton-Brown |
EC | 4 |
| 2014 | Sex-Equal Stable Matchings: Complexity and Exact Algorithms
Eric McDermid, Robert W. Irving |
Algorithmica | 2 |
| 2011 | An algorithm for a super-stable roommates problem
Tamás Fleiner, Robert W. Irving, David F. Manlove |
Theor. Comput. Sci. | 2 |
| 2010 | Popular Matchings in the Marriage and Roommates Problems
Péter Biró 0001, Robert W. Irving, David F. Manlove |
CIAC | 2 |
| 2010 | Guest Editorial: Special Issue on Matching Under Preferences
David F. Manlove, Robert W. Irving, Kazuo Iwama |
Algorithmica | 2 |
| 2010 | The College Admissions problem with lower and common quotas
Péter Biró 0001, Tamás Fleiner, Robert W. Irving, David F. Manlove |
Theor. Comput. Sci. | 3 |
| 2009 | Popular Matchings: Structure and Algorithms
Eric McDermid, Robert W. Irving |
COCOON | 2 |
| 2008 | The stable marriage problem with master preference lists
Robert W. Irving, David F. Manlove, Sandy Scott |
Discret. Appl. Math. | 1 |
| 2007 | An 8/5-Approximation Algorithm for a Hard Variant of Stable Marriage
Robert W. Irving, David F. Manlove |
COCOON | 1 |
| 2007 | The stable fixtures problem - A many-to-many extension of stable roommates
Robert W. Irving, Sandy Scott |
Discret. Appl. Math. | 1 |
| 2007 | The cycle roommates problem: a hard case of kidney exchange
Robert W. Irving |
Inf. Process. Lett. | 1 |
| 2007 | Popular MatchingsabstractWe consider the problem of matching a set of applicants to a set of posts, where each applicant has a preference list, ranking a nonempty subset of posts in order of preference, possibly involving ties. We say that a matching M is popular if there is no matching $M'$ such that the number of applicants preferring $M'$ to M exceeds the number of applicants preferring M to $M'$. In this paper, we give the first polynomial-time algorithms to determine if an instance admits a popular matching and to find a largest such matching, if one exists. For the special case in which every preference list is strictly ordered (i.e., contains no ties), we give an $O(n + m)$ time algorithm, where n is the total number of applicants and posts and m is the total length of all of the preference lists. For the general case in which preference lists may contain ties, we give an $O(\sqrt{n}m)$ time algorithm. David J. Abraham, Robert W. Irving, Telikepalli Kavitha, Kurt Mehlhorn |
SIAM J. Comput. | 2 |
| 2007 | Efficient algorithms for generalized Stable Marriage and Roommates problems
Tamás Fleiner, Robert W. Irving, David F. Manlove |
Theor. Comput. Sci. | 2 |
| 2006 | Rank-maximal matchingsabstractSuppose that each member of a set A of applicants ranks a subset of a set P of posts in an order of preference, possibly involving ties. A matching is a set of (applicant, post) pairs such that each applicant and each post appears in at most one pair. A rank-maximal matching is one in which the maximum possible number of applicants are matched to their first choice post, and subject to that condition, the maximum possible number are matched to their second choice post, and so on. This is a relevant concept in any practical matching situation and it was first studied by Irving [2003].We give an algorithm to compute a rank-maximal matching with running time O (min( n + C , C √ n ) m ), where C is the maximal rank of an edge used in a rank-maximal matching, n is the number of applicants and posts and m is the total size of the preference lists. Robert W. Irving, Telikepalli Kavitha, Kurt Mehlhorn, Dimitrios Michail 0001, Katarzyna E. Paluch 0001 |
ACM Trans. Algorithms | 1 |
| 2005 | Popular matchings
David J. Abraham, Robert W. Irving, Telikepalli Kavitha, Kurt Mehlhorn |
SODA | 2 |
| 2004 | Rank-maximal matchings
Robert W. Irving, Telikepalli Kavitha, Kurt Mehlhorn, Dimitrios Michail 0001, Katarzyna E. Paluch 0001 |
SODA | 1 |
| 2003 | The Student-Project Allocation Problem
David J. Abraham, Robert W. Irving, David F. Manlove |
ISAAC | 2 |
| 2003 | Strong Stability in the Hospitals/Residents Problem
Robert W. Irving, David F. Manlove, Sandy Scott |
STACS | 1 |
| 2003 | Approximability results for stable marriage problems with ties
Magnús M. Halldórsson, Robert W. Irving, Kazuo Iwama, David F. Manlove, Shuichi Miyazaki, Yasufumi Morita, Sandy Scott |
Theor. Comput. Sci. | 2 |
| 2002 | Hard variants of stable marriage
David F. Manlove, Robert W. Irving, Kazuo Iwama, Shuichi Miyazaki, Yasufumi Morita |
Theor. Comput. Sci. | 2 |
| 2002 | Database indexing for large DNA and protein sequence collections
Elzbieta Pustulka, Malcolm P. Atkinson 0001, Robert W. Irving |
VLDB J. | 3 |
| 2001 | A Constraint Programming Approach to the Stable Marriage Problem
Ian P. Gent, Robert W. Irving, David F. Manlove, Patrick Prosser, Barbara M. Smith |
CP | 2 |
| 2001 | A Database Index to Large Biological Sequences
Elzbieta Pustulka, Malcolm P. Atkinson 0001, Robert W. Irving |
VLDB | 3 |
| 2001 | Sorting Strings by Reversals and by TranspositionsabstractThe problems of sorting by reversals and sorting by transpositions have been studied because of their applications to genome comparison. Prior studies of both problems have assumed that the sequences to be compared (or sorted) contain no duplicates, but there is a natural generalization in which the sequences are allowed to contain repeated characters. In this paper we study primarily the versions of these problems in which the strings to be compared are drawn from a binary alphabet. We obtain upper and lower bounds for reversal and transposition distance and show that the problem of finding reversal distance between binary strings, and therefore between strings over an arbitrary fixed-size alphabet, is NP-hard. David A. Christie, Robert W. Irving |
SIAM J. Discret. Math. | 2 |
| 1999 | The b-chromatic Number of a Graph
Robert W. Irving, David F. Manlove |
Discret. Appl. Math. | 1 |
| 1998 | Matching Medical Students to Pairs of Hospitals: A New Variation on a Well-Known Theme
Robert W. Irving |
ESA | 1 |
| 1996 | Maximal Common Subsequences and Minimal Common Supersequences
Campbell Fraser, Robert W. Irving, Martin Middendorf |
Inf. Comput. | 2 |
| 1994 | Maximal Common Subsequences and Minimal Common Supersequences
Robert W. Irving, Campbell Fraser |
CPM | 1 |
| 1994 | Stable Marriage and Indifference
Robert W. Irving |
Discret. Appl. Math. | 1 |
| 1994 | Three-Dimensional Statistical Data Security ProblemsabstractSuppose there is a three-dimensional table of cross-tabulated nonnegative integer statistics, and suppose that all of the row, column, and “file” sums are revealed together with the values in some of the individual cells in the table. The question arises as to whether, as a consequence, the values contained in some of the other (suppressed) cells can be deduced from the information revealed. The corresponding problem in two dimensions has been comprehensively studied by Gusfield [SIAM J. Comput., 17 (1988), pp. 552–571], who derived elegant polynomial-time algorithms for the identification of any such “compromised” cells, and for calculating the tightest bounds on the values contained in all cells that follow from the information revealed. In this note it is shown, by contrast, that the three-dimensional version of the problem is NP-complete. It is also shown that if the suggested row, column, and file sums for an unknown three-dimensional table are given, with or without the values in some of the cells, the problem of determining whether there exists any table with the given sums is NP-complete. In the course of proving these results, the NP-completeness of some constrained Latin square construction problems, which are of some interest in their own right, is established. Robert W. Irving, Mark Jerrum |
SIAM J. Comput. | 1 |
| 1993 | On the Worst-Case Behaviour of Some Approximation Algorithms for the Shortest Common Supersequence of k Strings
Robert W. Irving, Campbell Fraser |
CPM | 1 |
| 1992 | Two Algorithms for the Longest Common Subsequence of Three (or More) Strings
Robert W. Irving, Campbell Fraser |
CPM | 1 |
| 1991 | On Approximating the Minimum Independent Dominating Set
Robert W. Irving |
Inf. Process. Lett. | 1 |
| 1989 | Parametric Stable Marriage and Minimum Cuts
Dan Gusfield, Robert W. Irving |
Inf. Process. Lett. | 2 |
| 1987 | An efficient algorithm for the "optimal" stable marriageabstractIn an instance of size n of the stable marriage problem, each of n men and n women ranks the members of the opposite sex in order of preference. A stable matching is a complete matching of men and women such that no man and woman who are not partners both prefer each other to their actual partners under the matching. It is well known [2] that at least one stable matching exists for every stable marriage instance. However, the classical Gale-Shapley algorithm produces a marriage that greatly favors the men at the expense of the women, or vice versa. The problem arises of finding a stable matching that is optimal under some more equitable or egalitarian criterion of optimality. This problem was posed by Knuth [6] and has remained unsolved for some time. Here, the objective of maximizing the average (or, equivalently, the total) “satisfaction” of all people is used. This objective is achieved when a person's satisfaction is measured by the position of his/her partner in his/her preference list. By exploiting the structure of the set of all stable matchings, and using graph-theoretic methods, an O ( n 4 ) algorithm for this problem is derived. Robert W. Irving, Paul Leather, Dan Gusfield |
J. ACM | 1 |
| 1986 | The Complexity of Counting Stable MarriagesabstractIn an instance of size n of the stable marriage problem, each of n men and n women ranks the members of the opposite sex in order of preference. A stable matching is a complete matching of men and women such that no man and woman who are not partners both prefer each other to their actual partners under the matching. It is well known that at least one stable matching exists for every stable marriage instance, so that the decision version of the problem always has a “yes” answer. Furthermore, efficient algorithms are known for the determination of such a stable matching, so that the search version of the problem is polynomially solvable. However, by exploring the structure of the set of stable matchings for any particular instance of the problem, and exploiting its relationship with the set of antichains of an associated partially ordered set, we prove that the enumeration version of the problem—determining the number of stable matchings—is # P-complete, and therefore cannot be solved in polynomial time if ${\bf P} \ne {\bf NP}$. Robert W. Irving, Paul Leather |
SIAM J. Comput. | 1 |
| 1984 | Permutation Backtracking in Lexicographic OrderabstractAn algorithm is presented for the lexicographic generation of permutations, which readily lends itself to the conduction of a backtrack search in the space of permutations of a set of items. The method is similar to that employed in an algorithm of Rohl, but achieves lexicographic order at no extra cost by storing unused items throughout in a linked linear list. Following the specification of the permutation generation algorithm itself, its application to backtracking is illustrated with reference to the n-queens problem, and some figures are given to compare its efficiency with that of related algorithms. Robert W. Irving |
Comput. J. | 1 |
| 1983 | NP-completeness of a family of graph-colouring problems
Robert W. Irving |
Discret. Appl. Math. | 1 |