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Nick Howgrave-Graham

dblp:79/3974 · DBLP profile ↗
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19ranked-venue papers
7as first author
0since 2021 · last 2013
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 17 · 7 first-authorComputer networks · 1Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
12 papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 92% Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 5% Hardware security and side channels · 3%
Computer networks
1 paper
Physical-layer communications · 100%
Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Coding theory · 100%

Topics — the 21 heaviest of 24, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › post-quantum cryptography
lattice-based cryptography
0.242007
A Hybrid Lattice-Reduction and Meet-in-the-Middle Attack Against NTRU · CRYPTO 2007
Symplectic Lattice Reduction and NTRU · EUROCRYPT 2006
Rankin's Constant and Blockwise Lattice Reduction · CRYPTO 2006
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › post-quantum cryptography › lattice-based cryptography
NTRU
0.232007
A Hybrid Lattice-Reduction and Meet-in-the-Middle Attack Against NTRU · CRYPTO 2007
Symplectic Lattice Reduction and NTRU · EUROCRYPT 2006
The Impact of Decryption Failures on the Security of NTRU Encryption · CRYPTO 2003
Physical-layer communications › signal detection › MIMO detection
lattice reduction
0.212013
Reduced and Fixed-Complexity Variants of the LLL Algorithm for Communications · IEEE Trans. Commun. 2013
Physical-layer communications › signal detection
MIMO detection
0.212013
Reduced and Fixed-Complexity Variants of the LLL Algorithm for Communications · IEEE Trans. Commun. 2013
Coding theory › lattice codes
lattice decoding
0.212013
Reduced and Fixed-Complexity Variants of the LLL Algorithm for Communications · IEEE Trans. Commun. 2013
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › post-quantum cryptography › lattice-based cryptography
lattice reduction
0.122006
Symplectic Lattice Reduction and NTRU · EUROCRYPT 2006
Rankin's Constant and Blockwise Lattice Reduction · CRYPTO 2006
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › cryptographic hardness
knapsack problem
0.112010
New Generic Algorithms for Hard Knapsacks · EUROCRYPT 2010
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
lattice attack
0.112007
A Hybrid Lattice-Reduction and Meet-in-the-Middle Attack Against NTRU · CRYPTO 2007
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › homomorphic encryption
paillier cryptosystem
0.122001
The Bit Security of Paillier's Encryption Scheme and Its Applications · EUROCRYPT 2001
Paillier's cryptosystem revisited · CCS 2001
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography
public-key encryption
0.122001
The Bit Security of Paillier's Encryption Scheme and Its Applications · EUROCRYPT 2001
Paillier's cryptosystem revisited · CCS 2001
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography
digital signatures
0.012003
The Insecurity of Esign in Practical Implementations · ASIACRYPT 2003
Hardware security and side channels › hardware attacks
side-channel and fault attacks
0.012003
The Insecurity of Esign in Practical Implementations · ASIACRYPT 2003
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › one-way functions
hard-core predicates
0.012002
Paillier's Trapdoor Function Hides up to O(n) Bits · J. Cryptol. 2002
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › one-way functions
trapdoor functions
0.012002
Paillier's Trapdoor Function Hides up to O(n) Bits · J. Cryptol. 2002
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › provable security
bit security
0.012001
The Bit Security of Paillier's Encryption Scheme and Its Applications · EUROCRYPT 2001
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
commitment schemes
0.012001
Paillier's cryptosystem revisited · CCS 2001
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › computational number theory
hidden number problem
0.012001
The Modular Inversion Hidden Number Problem · ASIACRYPT 2001
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
pseudorandom generators
0.012001
Pseudo-random Number Generation on the IBM 4758 Secure Crypto Coprocessor · CHES 2001
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
random number generation
0.012001
Pseudo-random Number Generation on the IBM 4758 Secure Crypto Coprocessor · CHES 2001
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › commitment schemes
trapdoor commitments
0.012001
Paillier's cryptosystem revisited · CCS 2001
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
integer factorization
0.011999
Factoring N = prq for Large r · CRYPTO 1999

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

size reduction · 0.3deep insertion · 0.3LLL algorithm · 0.3meet-in-the-middle attack · 0.1modular inversion · 0.0number-theoretic algorithms · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2013 Reduced and Fixed-Complexity Variants of the LLL Algorithm for Communications
abstract
The Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovász (LLL) algorithm is a popular lattice reduction algorithm in communications. In this paper, variants of the LLL algorithm with either reduced or fixed complexity are proposed and analyzed. Specifically, the use of effective LLL reduction for lattice decoding is presented, where size reduction is only performed for pairs of consecutive basis vectors. Its average complexity (measured by the number of floating-point operations and averaged over i.i.d. standard normal lattice bases) is shown to be O(n3log n), where n is the lattice dimension. This average complexity is an order lower than previously thought. To address the issue of variable complexity of the LLL algorithm, two fixed-complexity approximations are proposed. One is fixed-complexity effective LLL, for which the first vector of the basis is proven to be bounded in length; the other is fixed-complexity LLL with deep insertion, which is shown to be closely related to the well known V-BLAST algorithm. Such fixed-complexity structures are much desirable in hardware implementation since they allow straightforward constant-throughput implementation.
Cong Ling 0001, Wai Ho Mow, Nick Howgrave-Graham
IEEE Trans. Commun.3
2010 New Generic Algorithms for Hard Knapsacks
Nick Howgrave-Graham, Antoine Joux
EUROCRYPT1
2009 Choosing NTRUEncrypt Parameters in Light of Combined Lattice Reduction and MITM Approaches
Philip S. Hirschhorn, Jeffrey Hoffstein, Nick Howgrave-Graham, William Whyte
ACNS3
2007 A Hybrid Lattice-Reduction and Meet-in-the-Middle Attack Against NTRU
Nick Howgrave-Graham
CRYPTO1
2007 Effective LLL Reduction for Lattice Decoding
abstract
The use of Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovasz (LLL) lattice reduction significantly improves the performance of zero-forcing (ZF) and successive interference cancellation (SIC) decoders in multi-input multi-output (MIMO) communications. Capitalizing on the observation that the decision region of SIC is determined by the Gram-Schmidt vectors rather than the basis itself, we propose the use of effective LLL reduction in SIC decoding, where size reduction is only performed for pairs of consecutive basis vectors. We establish the theoretic upper bound O(n3log n) on the average complexity of effective LLL reduction for the i.i.d. Gaussian model of MIMO fading channels, which is an order lower than previously thought. Moreover, an effectively LLL-reduced basis can easily be transformed into the standard LLL-reduced basis for the purpose of ZF decoding.
Cong Ling 0001, Nick Howgrave-Graham
ISIT2
2006 Rankin's Constant and Blockwise Lattice Reduction
Nicolas Gama, Nick Howgrave-Graham, Henrik Koy, Phong Q. Nguyen
CRYPTO2
2006 Symplectic Lattice Reduction and NTRU
Nicolas Gama, Nick Howgrave-Graham, Phong Q. Nguyen
EUROCRYPT2
2005 Choosing Parameter Sets forwithand
Nick Howgrave-Graham, Joseph H. Silverman, William Whyte
CT-RSA1
2003 The Insecurity of Esign in Practical Implementations
Pierre-Alain Fouque, Nick Howgrave-Graham, Gwenaëlle Martinet, Guillaume Poupard
ASIACRYPT2
2003 The Impact of Decryption Failures on the Security of NTRU Encryption
Nick Howgrave-Graham, Phong Q. Nguyen, David Pointcheval, John Proos, Joseph H. Silverman, Ari Singer, William Whyte
CRYPTO1
2003 NTRUSIGN: Digital Signatures Using the NTRU Lattice
Jeffrey Hoffstein, Nick Howgrave-Graham, Jill Pipher, Joseph H. Silverman, William Whyte
CT-RSA2
2002 Paillier's Trapdoor Function Hides up to O(n) Bits
Dario Catalano, Rosario Gennaro, Nick Howgrave-Graham
J. Cryptol.3
2001 The Modular Inversion Hidden Number Problem
Dan Boneh, Shai Halevi, Nick Howgrave-Graham
ASIACRYPT3
2001 Paillier's cryptosystem revisited
abstract
We re-examine Paillier's cryptosystem, and show that by choosing a particular discrete log base g, and by introducing an alternative decryption procedure, we can extend the scheme to allow an arbitrary exponent e instead of N. The use of low exponents substantially increases the efficiency of the scheme. The semantic security is now based on a new decisional assumption, namely the hardness of deciding whether an element is a "small" e-th residue modulo N2.We also show how to use Paillier's original cryptosystem to build a trapdoor commitment scheme. This new scheme is information-theoretically private, and computationally binding (this property holds under the assumption that the RSA function with exponent N is hard to invert). A novel property of this new commitment scheme is that most of the work can be done offline before knowing the message one wants to commit to. Once the message is known only two multiplications are required. This is the first trapdoor commitment scheme with this online-offline efficiency property which is also length-preserving.
Dario Catalano, Rosario Gennaro, Nick Howgrave-Graham, Phong Q. Nguyen
CCS3
2001 Pseudo-random Number Generation on the IBM 4758 Secure Crypto Coprocessor
Nick Howgrave-Graham, Joan G. Dyer, Rosario Gennaro
CHES1
2001 The Bit Security of Paillier's Encryption Scheme and Its Applications
Dario Catalano, Rosario Gennaro, Nick Howgrave-Graham
EUROCRYPT3
2001 Lattice Attacks on Digital Signature Schemes
Nick Howgrave-Graham, Nigel P. Smart
Des. Codes Cryptogr.1
1999 Factoring N = prq for Large r
Dan Boneh, Glenn Durfee, Nick Howgrave-Graham
CRYPTO3
1997 Finding Small Roots of Univariate Modular Equations Revisited
Nick Howgrave-Graham
IMACC1