Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Nick Howgrave-Graham
dblp:79/3974
· DBLP profile ↗
19ranked-venue papers
7as first author
0since 2021 · last 2013
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 17 · 7 first-authorComputer networks · 1Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
12 papers |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 92% Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 5% Hardware security and side channels · 3% | |
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Physical-layer communications · 100% | |
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Coding theory · 100% |
Topics — the 21 heaviest of 24, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › post-quantum cryptography
lattice-based cryptography |
0.2 | 4 | 2007 | A Hybrid Lattice-Reduction and Meet-in-the-Middle Attack Against NTRU · CRYPTO 2007 Symplectic Lattice Reduction and NTRU · EUROCRYPT 2006 Rankin's Constant and Blockwise Lattice Reduction · CRYPTO 2006 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › post-quantum cryptography › lattice-based cryptography
NTRU |
0.2 | 3 | 2007 | A Hybrid Lattice-Reduction and Meet-in-the-Middle Attack Against NTRU · CRYPTO 2007 Symplectic Lattice Reduction and NTRU · EUROCRYPT 2006 The Impact of Decryption Failures on the Security of NTRU Encryption · CRYPTO 2003 |
Physical-layer communications › signal detection › MIMO detection
lattice reduction |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | Reduced and Fixed-Complexity Variants of the LLL Algorithm for Communications · IEEE Trans. Commun. 2013 |
Physical-layer communications › signal detection
MIMO detection |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | Reduced and Fixed-Complexity Variants of the LLL Algorithm for Communications · IEEE Trans. Commun. 2013 |
Coding theory › lattice codes
lattice decoding |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | Reduced and Fixed-Complexity Variants of the LLL Algorithm for Communications · IEEE Trans. Commun. 2013 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › post-quantum cryptography › lattice-based cryptography
lattice reduction |
0.1 | 2 | 2006 | Symplectic Lattice Reduction and NTRU · EUROCRYPT 2006 Rankin's Constant and Blockwise Lattice Reduction · CRYPTO 2006 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › cryptographic hardness
knapsack problem |
0.1 | 1 | 2010 | New Generic Algorithms for Hard Knapsacks · EUROCRYPT 2010 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
lattice attack |
0.1 | 1 | 2007 | A Hybrid Lattice-Reduction and Meet-in-the-Middle Attack Against NTRU · CRYPTO 2007 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › homomorphic encryption
paillier cryptosystem |
0.1 | 2 | 2001 | The Bit Security of Paillier's Encryption Scheme and Its Applications · EUROCRYPT 2001 Paillier's cryptosystem revisited · CCS 2001 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography
public-key encryption |
0.1 | 2 | 2001 | The Bit Security of Paillier's Encryption Scheme and Its Applications · EUROCRYPT 2001 Paillier's cryptosystem revisited · CCS 2001 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography
digital signatures |
0.0 | 1 | 2003 | The Insecurity of Esign in Practical Implementations · ASIACRYPT 2003 |
Hardware security and side channels › hardware attacks
side-channel and fault attacks |
0.0 | 1 | 2003 | The Insecurity of Esign in Practical Implementations · ASIACRYPT 2003 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › one-way functions
hard-core predicates |
0.0 | 1 | 2002 | Paillier's Trapdoor Function Hides up to O(n) Bits · J. Cryptol. 2002 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › one-way functions
trapdoor functions |
0.0 | 1 | 2002 | Paillier's Trapdoor Function Hides up to O(n) Bits · J. Cryptol. 2002 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › provable security
bit security |
0.0 | 1 | 2001 | The Bit Security of Paillier's Encryption Scheme and Its Applications · EUROCRYPT 2001 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
commitment schemes |
0.0 | 1 | 2001 | Paillier's cryptosystem revisited · CCS 2001 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › computational number theory
hidden number problem |
0.0 | 1 | 2001 | The Modular Inversion Hidden Number Problem · ASIACRYPT 2001 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
pseudorandom generators |
0.0 | 1 | 2001 | Pseudo-random Number Generation on the IBM 4758 Secure Crypto Coprocessor · CHES 2001 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
random number generation |
0.0 | 1 | 2001 | Pseudo-random Number Generation on the IBM 4758 Secure Crypto Coprocessor · CHES 2001 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › commitment schemes
trapdoor commitments |
0.0 | 1 | 2001 | Paillier's cryptosystem revisited · CCS 2001 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
integer factorization |
0.0 | 1 | 1999 | Factoring N = prq for Large r · CRYPTO 1999 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
size reduction · 0.3deep insertion · 0.3LLL algorithm · 0.3meet-in-the-middle attack · 0.1modular inversion · 0.0number-theoretic algorithms · 0.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | Reduced and Fixed-Complexity Variants of the LLL Algorithm for CommunicationsabstractThe Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovász (LLL) algorithm is a popular lattice reduction algorithm in communications. In this paper, variants of the LLL algorithm with either reduced or fixed complexity are proposed and analyzed. Specifically, the use of effective LLL reduction for lattice decoding is presented, where size reduction is only performed for pairs of consecutive basis vectors. Its average complexity (measured by the number of floating-point operations and averaged over i.i.d. standard normal lattice bases) is shown to be O(n3log n), where n is the lattice dimension. This average complexity is an order lower than previously thought. To address the issue of variable complexity of the LLL algorithm, two fixed-complexity approximations are proposed. One is fixed-complexity effective LLL, for which the first vector of the basis is proven to be bounded in length; the other is fixed-complexity LLL with deep insertion, which is shown to be closely related to the well known V-BLAST algorithm. Such fixed-complexity structures are much desirable in hardware implementation since they allow straightforward constant-throughput implementation. Cong Ling 0001, Wai Ho Mow, Nick Howgrave-Graham |
IEEE Trans. Commun. | 3 |
| 2010 | New Generic Algorithms for Hard Knapsacks
Nick Howgrave-Graham, Antoine Joux |
EUROCRYPT | 1 |
| 2009 | Choosing NTRUEncrypt Parameters in Light of Combined Lattice Reduction and MITM Approaches
Philip S. Hirschhorn, Jeffrey Hoffstein, Nick Howgrave-Graham, William Whyte |
ACNS | 3 |
| 2007 | A Hybrid Lattice-Reduction and Meet-in-the-Middle Attack Against NTRU
Nick Howgrave-Graham |
CRYPTO | 1 |
| 2007 | Effective LLL Reduction for Lattice DecodingabstractThe use of Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovasz (LLL) lattice reduction significantly improves the performance of zero-forcing (ZF) and successive interference cancellation (SIC) decoders in multi-input multi-output (MIMO) communications. Capitalizing on the observation that the decision region of SIC is determined by the Gram-Schmidt vectors rather than the basis itself, we propose the use of effective LLL reduction in SIC decoding, where size reduction is only performed for pairs of consecutive basis vectors. We establish the theoretic upper bound O(n3log n) on the average complexity of effective LLL reduction for the i.i.d. Gaussian model of MIMO fading channels, which is an order lower than previously thought. Moreover, an effectively LLL-reduced basis can easily be transformed into the standard LLL-reduced basis for the purpose of ZF decoding. Cong Ling 0001, Nick Howgrave-Graham |
ISIT | 2 |
| 2006 | Rankin's Constant and Blockwise Lattice Reduction
Nicolas Gama, Nick Howgrave-Graham, Henrik Koy, Phong Q. Nguyen |
CRYPTO | 2 |
| 2006 | Symplectic Lattice Reduction and NTRU
Nicolas Gama, Nick Howgrave-Graham, Phong Q. Nguyen |
EUROCRYPT | 2 |
| 2005 | Choosing Parameter Sets forwithand
Nick Howgrave-Graham, Joseph H. Silverman, William Whyte |
CT-RSA | 1 |
| 2003 | The Insecurity of Esign in Practical Implementations
Pierre-Alain Fouque, Nick Howgrave-Graham, Gwenaëlle Martinet, Guillaume Poupard |
ASIACRYPT | 2 |
| 2003 | The Impact of Decryption Failures on the Security of NTRU Encryption
Nick Howgrave-Graham, Phong Q. Nguyen, David Pointcheval, John Proos, Joseph H. Silverman, Ari Singer, William Whyte |
CRYPTO | 1 |
| 2003 | NTRUSIGN: Digital Signatures Using the NTRU Lattice
Jeffrey Hoffstein, Nick Howgrave-Graham, Jill Pipher, Joseph H. Silverman, William Whyte |
CT-RSA | 2 |
| 2002 | Paillier's Trapdoor Function Hides up to O(n) Bits
Dario Catalano, Rosario Gennaro, Nick Howgrave-Graham |
J. Cryptol. | 3 |
| 2001 | The Modular Inversion Hidden Number Problem
Dan Boneh, Shai Halevi, Nick Howgrave-Graham |
ASIACRYPT | 3 |
| 2001 | Paillier's cryptosystem revisitedabstractWe re-examine Paillier's cryptosystem, and show that by choosing a particular discrete log base g, and by introducing an alternative decryption procedure, we can extend the scheme to allow an arbitrary exponent e instead of N. The use of low exponents substantially increases the efficiency of the scheme. The semantic security is now based on a new decisional assumption, namely the hardness of deciding whether an element is a "small" e-th residue modulo N2.We also show how to use Paillier's original cryptosystem to build a trapdoor commitment scheme. This new scheme is information-theoretically private, and computationally binding (this property holds under the assumption that the RSA function with exponent N is hard to invert). A novel property of this new commitment scheme is that most of the work can be done offline before knowing the message one wants to commit to. Once the message is known only two multiplications are required. This is the first trapdoor commitment scheme with this online-offline efficiency property which is also length-preserving. Dario Catalano, Rosario Gennaro, Nick Howgrave-Graham, Phong Q. Nguyen |
CCS | 3 |
| 2001 | Pseudo-random Number Generation on the IBM 4758 Secure Crypto Coprocessor
Nick Howgrave-Graham, Joan G. Dyer, Rosario Gennaro |
CHES | 1 |
| 2001 | The Bit Security of Paillier's Encryption Scheme and Its Applications
Dario Catalano, Rosario Gennaro, Nick Howgrave-Graham |
EUROCRYPT | 3 |
| 2001 | Lattice Attacks on Digital Signature Schemes
Nick Howgrave-Graham, Nigel P. Smart |
Des. Codes Cryptogr. | 1 |
| 1999 | Factoring N = prq for Large r
Dan Boneh, Glenn Durfee, Nick Howgrave-Graham |
CRYPTO | 3 |
| 1997 | Finding Small Roots of Univariate Modular Equations Revisited
Nick Howgrave-Graham |
IMACC | 1 |