Given the ubiquity of negative campaigning in recent political elections, we find it important to study its properties from a theoretical computational perspective. To this end, we present a model where elections can be manipulated by convincing voters to demote specific non-favored candidates, and study its properties in the classic setting of scoring rules. When the goal is constructive (making a preferred candidate win), we prove that finding such a demotion strategy is easy for Plurality and Veto, while generally hard for t-approval and Borda. We also provide a min(t, m - t)-factor approximation for t-approval for every t ∈ {1,..., m - 1} (where m is the number of candidates), and a 3-factor approximation algorithm for Borda. Interestingly enough---following recent trends in political science that show that the effectiveness of negative campaigning depends on the type of candidate and demographic---when assigning varying prices to different possible demotion operations, we are able to provide inapproximability results. When the goal is destructive (making the leading opponent lose), we show that the problem is easy for a broad class of scoring rules and provide an FPTAS for the general case.

Recommender systems are widely used and are present in various applications, including movie recommendations, product sales, and content providers. However, current recommender systems are usually black-box and lack the ability to explain their decisions or allow users to question them. In this paper, we develop an automatic method that, given a contrastive query from the user, generates contrastive explanations based on items' features and users' preferences (provided as ratings). That is, once receiving a recommendation, the users have the option to ask the system why it did not recommend a specific different item. Our method enables a recommender system to reply with a meaningful and convincing personalized explanation. For example, the recommender system may recommend the user to buy a Samsung S22 phone. The user may ask the system why it did not recommend the Xiaomi 12. Based on the user's preferences, all other users' preferences, and the specific phones in question, our method might infer that a good camera is particularly important to the user, and thus, say that the Samsung S22 includes a better camera than the Xiaomi 12. We compose a new dataset based on user ratings of the most popular cell phones in the US in 2022. Based on this dataset, we run an experiment with 100 human participants who are recommended an item and shown contrastive explanations generated by our method, as well as two additional baseline methods. We show that humans are more convinced that the recommended item is better than the contrastive item when using our contrastive explanations.

Nash equilibrium is a well-established concept for predicting the outcome of a strategic game when the players are fully rational agents. While it is widely accepted that humans do not always behave as fully rational agents, our understanding of humans' prediction of the outcome of strategic games remains limited. This study attempts to bridge this gap by examining human subjects' prediction of the outcome of Public Goods in Networks (PGN) games. In this study, we explore participants' ability to predict PGN games' outcomes without prior knowledge of game theory or graph theory concepts. Therefore, we conduct a survey involving 96 participants, in which we request their predictions for PGN games' outcomes. Surprisingly, our findings indicate that participants, even in the absence of explicit knowledge regarding stability or equilibrium, tend to predict outcomes that align with a Nash equilibrium. This suggests that, in certain scenarios, the Nash equilibrium is in correspondence with human intuition and reasoning in strategic games. Finally, we examined two LLMs as “participants”, to test how often they propose outcomes that align with a Nash equilibrium. To much of our surprise, unlike humans, these models very rarely offered such predictions.

In many settings, there is an organizer who would like to divide a set of agents into k coalitions, and cares about the friendships within each coalition. Specifically, the organizer might want to maximize utilitarian social welfare, maximize egalitarian social welfare, or simply guarantee that every agent will have at least one friend within his coalition. However, in many situations, the organizer is not familiar with the friendship connections, and he needs to obtain them from the agents. In this setting, a manipulative agent may falsely report friendship connections in order to increase his utility. In this paper, we analyze the complexity of finding manipulation in such k-coalitional games on graphs. We also introduce a new type of manipulation, socially-aware manipulation, in which the manipulator would like to increase his utility without decreasing the social welfare. We then study the complexity of finding socially-aware manipulation in our setting. Finally, we examine the frequency of socially-aware manipulation and the running time of our algorithms via simulation results.

In many situations, several agents need to make a sequence of decisions. For example, a group of workers that needs to decide where their weekly meeting should take place. In such situations, a decision-making mechanism must consider fairness notions. In this paper, we analyze the fairness of three known mechanisms: round-robin, maximum Nash welfare, and leximin. We consider both offline and online settings, and concentrate on the fairness notion of proportionality and its relaxations. Specifically, in the offline setting, we show that the three mechanisms fail to find a proportional or approximate-proportional outcome, even if such an outcome exists. We thus introduce a new fairness property that captures this requirement, and show that a variant of the leximin mechanism satisfies the new fairness property. In the online setting, we show that it is impossible to guarantee proportionality or its relaxations. We thus consider a natural restriction on the agents’ preferences, and show that the leximin mechanism guarantees the best possible additive approximation to proportionality and satisfies all the relaxations of proportionality.

We analyze the assignment of passengers in a shared ride, which considers the social relationship among the passengers. Namely, there is a fixed number of passengers in each vehicle, and the goal is to recommend an assignment of the passengers such that the number of friendship relations is maximized. We show that the problem is computationally hard, and we provide an approximation algorithm.

The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division scheme in cooperative game theory, satisfying basic axioms. However, some allocation according to the Shapley value may seem unfair to humans. In this paper, we develop an automatic method that generates intuitive explanations for a Shapley-based payoff allocation, which utilizes the basic axioms. Given a coalitional game, our method decomposes it to sub-games, for which it is easy to generate verbal explanations, and shows that the given game is composed of the sub-games. Since the payoff allocation for each sub-game is perceived as fair, the Shapley-based payoff allocation for the given game should seem fair as well. We run an experiment with 210 human participants and show that when applying our method, humans perceive Shapley-based payoff allocation as significantly more fair than when using a general standard explanation.

In many coalition formation games the utility of the agents depends on a social network. In such scenarios there might be a manipulative agent that would like to manipulate his connections in the social network in order to increase his utility. We study a model of coalition formation in which a central organizer, who needs to form k coalitions, obtains information about the social network from the agents. The central organizer has her own objective: she might want to maximize the utilitarian social welfare, maximize the egalitarian social welfare, or only guarantee that every agent will have at least one connection within her coalition. In this paper we study the susceptibility for manipulation of these objectives, given the abilities and information that the manipulator has. Specifically, we show that if the manipulator has very limited information, namely he is only familiar with his immediate neighbours in the network, then a manipulation is almost always impossible. Moreover, if the manipulator is only able to add connections to the social network, then a manipulation is still impossible for some objectives, even if the manipulator has full information on the structure of the network. On the other hand, if the manipulator is able to hide some of his connections, then all objectives are susceptible to manipulation, even if the manipulator has limited information, i.e., when he is familiar with his immediate neighbours and with their neighbours.

Explanation is necessary for humans to understand and accept decisions made by an AI system when the system's goal is known. It is even more important when the AI system makes decisions in multi-agent environments where the human does not know the systems' goals since they may depend on other agents' preferences. In such situations, explanations should aim to increase user satisfaction, taking into account the system's decision, the user's and the other agents' preferences, the environment settings and properties such as fairness, envy and privacy. Generating explanations that will increase user satisfaction is very challenging; to this end, we propose a new research direction: Explainable decisions in Multi-Agent Environments (xMASE). We then review the state of the art and discuss research directions towards efficient methodologies and algorithms for generating explanations that will increase users' satisfaction from AI systems' decisions in multi-agent environments.

We study the problem of coalitional manipulation---where k manipulators try to manipulate an election on m candidates---for any scoring rule, with focus on the Borda protocol. We do so in both the weighted and unweighted settings. For these problems, recent approximation approaches have tried to minimize k, the number of manipulators needed to make some preferred candidate p win (thus assuming that the number of manipulators is not limited in advance). In contrast, we focus on minimizing the score margin of p which is the difference between the maximum score of a candidate and the score of p. We provide algorithms that approximate the optimum score margin, which are applicable to any scoring rule. For the specific case of the Borda protocol in the unweighted setting, our algorithm provides a superior approximation factor for lower values of k.Our methods are novel and adapt techniques from multiprocessor scheduling by carefully rounding an exponentially-large configuration linear program that is solved by using the ellipsoid method with an efficient separation oracle. We believe that such methods could be beneficial in other social choice settings as well.

The classic Bribery problem is to find a minimal subset of voters who need to change their vote to make some preferred candidate win. Its important generalizations consider voters who are weighted and also have different prices. We provide an approximate solution for these problems for a broad family of scoring rules (which includes Borda and t-approval), in the following sense: for constant weights and prices, if there exists a strategy which costs k, we efficiently find a strategy which costs at most k+\widetilde{O}(sqrt(k)). An extension for non-constant weights and prices is also given. Our algorithm is based on a randomized reduction from these Bribery generalizations to weighted coalitional manipulation (WCM). To solve this WCM instance, we apply the Birkhoff-von Neumann (BvN) decomposition to a fractional manipulation matrix. This allows us to limit the size of the possible ballot search space reducing it from exponential to polynomial, while still obtaining good approximation guarantees. Finding a solution in the truncated search space yields a new algorithm for WCM, which is of independent interest.

The classic bribery problem is to find a minimal subset of voters who need to change their vote to make some preferred candidate win.We find an approximate solution for this problem for a broad family of scoring rules (which includes Borda and t-approval), in the following sense: if there is a strategy which requires bribing k voters, we efficiently find a strategy which requires bribing at most k + Õ(√k) voters. Our algorithm is based on a randomized reduction from bribery to coalitional manipulation (UCM). To solve the UCM problem, we apply the Birkhoff-von Neumann (BvN) decomposition to a fractional manipulation matrix. This allows us to limit the size of the possible ballot search space reducing it from exponential to polynomial, while still obtaining good approximation guarantees. Finding the optimal solution in the truncated search space yields a new algorithm for UCM, which is of independent interest.

Negotiation is a very common interaction between automated agents. Many common negotiation protocols work with cardinal utilities, even though ordinal preferences, which only rank the outcomes, are easier to elicit from humans. In this work we concentrate on negotiation with ordinal preferences over a finite set of outcomes. We study an intuitive protocol for bilateral negotiation, where the two parties make offers alternately. We analyze the negotiation protocol under different settings. First, we assume that each party has full information about the other party's preference order. We provide elegant strategies that specify a sub-game perfect equilibrium for the agents. We further show how the studied negotiation protocol almost completely implements a known bargaining rule. Finally, we analyze the no information setting. We study several solution concepts that are distribution-free, and analyze both the case where neither party knows the preference order of the other party, and the case where only one party is uninformed.

The popularity of online shopping has contributed to the development of comparison shopping agents (CSAs) aiming to facilitate buyers' ability to compare prices of online stores for any desired product. Furthermore, the plethora of CSAs in today's markets enables buyers to query more than a single CSA when shopping, thus expanding even further the list of sellers whose prices they obtain. This potentially decreases the chance of a purchase based on the prices outputted as a result of any single query, and consequently decreases each CSAs' expected revenue per-query. Obviously, a CSA can improve its competence in such settings by acquiring more sellers' prices, potentially resulting in a more attractive ``best price''. In this paper we suggest a complementary approach that improves the attractiveness of a CSA by presenting the prices to the user in a specific intelligent manner, which is based on known cognitive-biases.The advantage of this approach is its ability to affect the buyer's tendency to terminate her search for a better price, hence avoid querying further CSAs, without having the CSA spend any of its resources on finding better prices to present.The effectiveness of our method is demonstrated using real data, collected from four CSAs for five products. Our experiments with people confirm that the suggested method effectively influence people in a way that is highly advantageous to the CSA.

Past research has investigated a number of methods for coordinating teams of agents, but with the growing number of sources of agents, it is likely that agents will encounter teammates that do not share their coordination methods. Therefore, it is desirable for agents to adapt to these teammates, forming an effective ad hoc team. Past ad hoc teamwork research has focused on cases where the agents do not directly communicate. However when teammates do communicate, it can provide a valuable channel for coordination. Therefore, this paper tackles the problem of communication in ad hoc teams, introducing a minimal version of the multiagent, multiarmed bandit problem with limited communication between the agents. The theoretical results in this paper prove that this problem setting can be solved in polynomial time when the agent knows the set of possible teammates. Furthermore, the empirical results show that an agent can cooperate with a variety of teammates following unknown behaviors even when its models of these teammates are imperfect.

The blooming of comparison shopping agents (CSAs) in recent years enables buyers in today's markets to query more than a single CSA while shopping, thus substantially expanding the list of sellers whose prices they obtain. From the individual CSA point of view, however, the multi-CSAs querying is definitely non-favorable as most of today's CSAs benefit depends on payments they receive from sellers upon transferring buyers to their websites (and making a purchase). The most straightforward way for the CSA to improve its competence is through spending more resources on getting more sellers' prices, potentially resulting in a more attractive ``best price''. In this paper we suggest a complementary approach that improves the attractiveness of the best price returned to the buyer without having to extend the CSAs' price database. This approach, which we term ``selective price disclosure'' relies on removing some of the prices known to the CSA from the list of results returned to the buyer. The advantage of this approach is in the ability to affect the buyer's beliefs regarding the probability of obtaining more attractive prices if querying additional CSAs. The paper presents two methods for choosing the subset of prices to be presented to a fully-rational buyer, attempting to overcome the computational complexity associated with evaluating all possible subsets. The effectiveness and efficiency of the methods are demonstrated using real data, collected from five CSAs for four products. Furthermore, since people are known to have an inherently bounded rationality, the two methods are also evaluated with human buyers, demonstrating that selective price-disclosing can be highly effective with people, however the subset of prices that needs to be used should be extracted in a different (and more simplistic) manner.

In their groundbreaking paper, Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick [1989] argued that many well-known voting rules, such as Plurality, Borda, Copeland and Maximin are easy to manipulate. An important assumption made in that paper is that the manipulator's goal is to ensure that his preferred candidate is among the candidates with the maximum score, or, equivalently, that ties are broken in favor of the manipulator's preferred candidate. In this paper, we examine the role of this assumption in the easiness results of [Bartholdi et al., 1989]. We observe that the algorithm presented in [Bartholdi et al., 1989] extends to all rules that break ties according to a fixed ordering over the candidates. We then show that all scoring rules are easy to manipulate if the winner is selected from all tied candidates uniformly at random. This result extends to Maximin under an additional assumption on the manipulator's utility function that is inspired by the original model of [Bartholdi et al., 1989]. In contrast, we show that manipulation becomes hard when arbitrary polynomial-time tie-breaking rules are allowed, both for the rules considered in [Bartholdi et al., 1989], and for a large class of scoring rules.

This paper discusses the problem of building efficient coverage paths for a team of robots. An efficient multirobot coverage algorithm should result in a coverage path for every robot, such that the union of all paths generates a full coverage of the terrain and the total coverage time is minimized. A method, underlying several coverage algorithms, suggests the use of spanning trees as base for creating coverage paths. Current studies assume that the spanning tree is given, and try to make the most out of the given configuration. However, overall performance of the coverage is heavily dependent on the given spanning tree. This paper tackles the open challenge of constructing a coverage spanning tree that minimizes the time to complete coverage. We argue that the choice of the initial spanning tree has far reaching consequences concerning the coverage time, and if the tree is constructed appropriately, it could considerably reduce the coverage time of the terrain. Therefore the problem studied here is finding spanning trees that would decrease the coverage time of the terrain when used as base for multi-robot coverage algorithms. The main contributions of this paper are twofold. First, it provides initial sound discussion and results concerning the construction of the tree as a crucial base for any efficient coverage algorithm. Second, it describes a polynomial-time tree construction algorithm that, as shown in extensive simulations, dramatically improves the coverage time even when used as a basis for a simple, inefficient, coverage algorithm

Area coverage is an important task for mobile robots, with many real-world applications. In many cases, the coverage has to be completed without the use of a map or any a priori knowledge about the area, a process referred-to as on-line coverage. Previous investigations of multi-robot on-line coverage focused on the improved efficiency gained from the use of multiple robots, but did not formally addressed the potential for greater robustness. We present a novel multi-robot on-line coverage algorithm, based on approximate cell decomposition. We analytically show that the algorithm is complete and robust, in that as long as a single robot is able to move, the coverage would be completed. We analyze the assumptions underlying the algorithm requirements and present a number of techniques for executing it in real robots. We show empirical coverage-time results of running the algorithm in two different environments and several group sizes

Area coverage is an important task for mobile robots, with many real-world applications. Motivated by potential efficiency and robustness improvements, there is growing interest in the use of multiple robots in coverage. Previous investigations of multi-robot coverage focuses on completeness and eliminating redundancy, but does not formally address robustness, nor examine the impact of the initial positions of robots on the coverage time. Indeed, a common assumption is that non-redundancy leads to improved coverage time. We address robustness and efficiency in a family of multi-robot coverage algorithms, based on spanning-tree coverage of approximate cell decomposition. We analytically show that the algorithms are robust, in that as long as a single robot is able to move, the coverage will be completed. We also show that non-redundant (non-back tracking) versions of the algorithms have a worst-case coverage time virtually identical to that of a single robot—thus no performance gain is guaranteed in non-redundant coverage. Moreover, this worst-case is in fact common in real-world applications. Surprisingly, however, redundant coverage algorithms lead to guaranteed performance which halves the coverage time even in the worst case.