Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Yanbo Wang 0004
dblp:80/6085-4
· DBLP profile ↗
5ranked-venue papers
2as first author
5since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0002-9098-5071ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 5 · 2 first-author · 5 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
5 papers |
Trustworthy machine learning · 25% Face, body and person analysis · 24% Reinforcement learning · 18% | |
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 82% Privacy and data protection · 18% |
Topics — the 13 heaviest of 15, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model reasoning |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | What If Consensus Lies? Selective-Complementary Reinforcement Learning at Test Time · ACL (1) 2026 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › learning with noisy labels
robustness to label noise |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | What If Consensus Lies? Selective-Complementary Reinforcement Learning at Test Time · ACL (1) 2026 |
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning › online decision making › online reinforcement learning
test-time reinforcement learning |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | What If Consensus Lies? Selective-Complementary Reinforcement Learning at Test Time · ACL (1) 2026 |
Computer vision › Face, body and person analysis › face recognition
deep face recognition |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Sample Correlation for Fingerprinting Deep Face Recognition · Int. J. Comput. Vis. 2025 |
Computer vision › Face, body and person analysis
face recognition |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Sample Correlation for Fingerprinting Deep Face Recognition · Int. J. Comput. Vis. 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › model security
model fingerprinting |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Sample Correlation for Fingerprinting Deep Face Recognition · Int. J. Comput. Vis. 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial robustness |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Do We Really Need Curated Malicious Data for Safety Alignment in Multi-modal Large Language Models? · CVPR 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
poisoning attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Do We Really Need Curated Malicious Data for Safety Alignment in Multi-modal Large Language Models? · CVPR 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › poisoning attack
unlearnable examples |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Do We Really Need Curated Malicious Data for Safety Alignment in Multi-modal Large Language Models? · CVPR 2025 |
Privacy and data protection › privacy-preserving machine learning › federated learning privacy
gradient inversion attack |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Towards Eliminating Hard Label Constraints in Gradient Inversion Attacks · ICLR 2024 |
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning
policy optimization |
0.3 | 1 | 2026 | Breaking the Impasse: Dual-Scale Evolutionary Policy Training for Social Language Agents · ACL (1) 2026 |
Computer vision › Vision and language › vision-language model
multimodal large language model |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Do We Really Need Curated Malicious Data for Safety Alignment in Multi-modal Large Language Models? · CVPR 2025 |
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning
federated learning |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Towards Eliminating Hard Label Constraints in Gradient Inversion Attacks · ICLR 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
supervised fine-tuning · 1.7rejection sampling · 1.7mixup · 1.5label smoothing · 1.5reinforcement learning · 1.0pseudo-labeling · 1.0majority voting · 1.0evolutionary policy training · 1.0dual-scale training · 1.0sample correlation · 0.9
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Breaking the Impasse: Dual-Scale Evolutionary Policy Training for Social Language AgentsabstractMinzheng Wang, Run Luo, Yanbo Wang, Zichen Liu, Yuqiao Tan, Tao Tan, Nan Xu, Lu Wang, Wenji Mao. Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers). 2026. Minzheng Wang 0001, Run Luo, Yanbo Wang 0004, Yuqiao Tan, Nan Xu 0004, Wenji Mao |
ACL (1) | 3 |
| 2026 | What If Consensus Lies? Selective-Complementary Reinforcement Learning at Test TimeabstractTest-Time Reinforcement Learning (TTRL) enables Large Language Models (LLMs) to enhance reasoning capabilities on unlabeled test streams by deriving pseudo-rewards from majority voting consensus.However, existing TTRL methods rely exclusively on positive pseudo-labeling strategies.Such reliance becomes vulnerable under challenging scenarios where answer distributions are highly dispersed, resulting in weak consensus that inadvertently reinforces incorrect trajectories as supervision signals.In this paper, we propose SCRL (Selective-Complementary Reinforcement Learning), a robust test-time reinforcement learning framework that effectively mitigates label noise amplification.SCRL develops Selective Positive Pseudo-Labeling, which enforces strict consensus criteria to filter unreliable majorities.Complementarily, SCRL introduces Entropy-Gated Negative Pseudo-Labeling, the first negative supervision mechanism in TTRL, to reliably prune incorrect trajectories based on generation uncertainty.Extensive experiments on multiple reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that SCRL achieves substantial improvements over baselines, while maintaining robust generalization and training stability under constrained rollout budgets.Our code is available at https://github.com/Jasper Jian Liang 0001, Yanbo Wang 0004, Shuo Lu, Ran He 0001, Tieniu Tan |
ACL (1) | 3 |
| 2025 | Do We Really Need Curated Malicious Data for Safety Alignment in Multi-modal Large Language Models?abstractMulti-modal large language models (MLLMs) have made significant progress, yet their safety alignment remains limited. Typically, current open-source MLLMs rely on the alignment inherited from their language module to avoid harmful generations. However, the lack of safety measures specifically designed for multi-modal inputs creates an alignment gap, leaving MLLMs vulnerable to vision-domain attacks such as typographic manipulation. Current methods utilize a carefully designed safety dataset to enhance model defense capability, while the specific knowledge or patterns acquired from the high-quality dataset remain unclear. Through comparison experiments, we find that the alignment gap primarily arises from data distribution biases, while image content, response quality, or the contrastive behavior of the dataset makes little contribution to boosting multi-modal safety. To further investigate this and identify the key factors in improving MLLM safety, we propose finetuning MLLMs on a small set of benign instruct-following data with responses replaced by simple, clear rejection sentences. Experiments show that, without the need for labor-intensive collection of high-quality malicious data, model safety can still be significantly improved, as long as a specific fraction of rejection data exists in the finetuning set, indicating the security alignment is not lost but rather obscured during multi-modal pretraining or instruction finetuning. Simply correcting the underlying data bias could narrow the safety gap in the vision domain. Warning: This paper contains harmful images and AI-generated contents which may be offensive. Yanbo Wang 0004, Jiyang Guan, Jian Liang 0001, Ran He 0001 |
CVPR | 1 |
| 2025 | Sample Correlation for Fingerprinting Deep Face Recognition
Jiyang Guan, Jian Liang 0001, Yanbo Wang 0004, Ran He 0001 |
Int. J. Comput. Vis. | 3 |
| 2024 | Towards Eliminating Hard Label Constraints in Gradient Inversion AttacksabstractGradient inversion attacks aim to reconstruct local training data from intermediate gradients exposed in the federated learning framework. Despite successful attacks, all previous methods, starting from reconstructing a single data point and then relaxing the single-image limit to batch level, are only tested under hard label constraints. Even for single-image reconstruction, we still lack an analysis-based algorithm to recover augmented soft labels. In this work, we change the focus from enlarging batchsize to investigating the hard label constraints, considering a more realistic circumstance where label smoothing and mixup techniques are used in the training process. In particular, we are the first to initiate a novel algorithm to simultaneously recover the ground-truth augmented label and the input feature of the last fully-connected layer from single-input gradients, and provide a necessary condition for any analytical-based label recovery methods. Extensive experiments testify to the label recovery accuracy, as well as the benefits to the following image reconstruction. We believe soft labels in classification tasks are worth further attention in gradient inversion attacks. Yanbo Wang 0004, Jian Liang 0001, Ran He 0001 |
ICLR | 1 |