In this paper, we propose a novel integrated API service system as well as a Web API script to enable mobile mashup application developers to invoke Web APIs in a consistent way, and provide a consistent format for the responses of Web APIs, thereby relieving developers of striving to study the usage of various Web APIs.

Security issues become more and more significant in RFID development. Recently, Chien proposed an ultralightweight RFID authentication protocol in order to achieve privacy and authenticity with limited computation and transmission resources. However, we find two desynchronization attacks to break the protocol. In order to repair the protocol, two patches that slightly modify the protocol are presented in the paper.

In 2007, Kim et al. proposed a secure compression code called the secure arithmetic code (SAC). The code was claimed to be secure against chosen plaintext attacks. However, we find that the SAC is not as secure as the authors have claimed. In this paper, we show the code is prone to two attacks. The first attack completely breaks the code using an adaptive chosen plaintext attack with a polynomial number of queries. The second attack is a ciphertext-only attack, which removes a part of the output permutation.

EPCglobal Class-1 Generation-2 specification (Gen2 in brief) has been approved as ISO18000-6C for global use, but the identity of tag (TID) is transmitted in plaintext which makes the tag traceable and clonable. Several solutions have been proposed based on traditional encryption methods, such as symmetric or asymmetric ciphers, but they are not suitable for low-cost RFID tags. Recently, some lightweight authentication protocols conforming to Gen2 have been proposed. However, the message flow of these protocols is different from Gen2. Existing readers may fail to read new tags. In this paper, we propose a novel authentication protocol based on Gen2, called Gen2+, for low-cost RFID tags. Our protocol follows every message flow in Gen2 to provide backward compatibility. Gen2+is a multiple round protocol using shared pseudonyms and Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) to achieve reader-to-tag authentication. Conversely, Gen2+uses the memory read command defined in Gen2 to achieve tag-to-reader authentication. We show that Gen2+is more secure under tracing and cloning attacks.

We present new variants of an RSA whose key generation algorithms output two distinct RSA key pairs having the same public and private exponents. This family of variants, called dual RSA, can be used in scenarios that require two instances of RSA with the advantage of reducing the storage requirements for the keys. Two applications for dual RSA, blind signatures and authentication/secrecy, are proposed. In addition, we also provide the security analysis of dual RSA. Compared to normal RSA, the security boundary should be raised when applying dual RSA to the types of small-d, small-e, and rebalanced-RSA.