Sego is a hypervisor-based system that gives strong privacy and integrity guarantees to trusted applications, even when the guest operating system is compromised or hostile. Sego verifies operating system services, like the file system, instead of replacing them. By associating trusted metadata with user data across all system devices, Sego verifies system services more efficiently than previous systems, especially services that depend on data contents. We extensively evaluate Sego's performance on real workloads and implement a kernel fault injector to validate Sego's file system-agnostic crash consistency and recovery protocol.

InkTag is a virtualization-based architecture that gives strong safety guarantees to high-assurance processes even in the presence of a malicious operating system. InkTag advances the state of the art in untrusted operating systems in both the design of its hypervisor and in the ability to run useful applications without trusting the operating system. We introduce paraverification, a technique that simplifies the InkTag hypervisor by forcing the untrusted operating system to participate in its own verification. Attribute-based access control allows trusted applications to create decentralized access control policies. InkTag is also the first system of its kind to ensure consistency between secure data and metadata, ensuring recoverability in the face of system crashes.

Server applications must process requests as quickly as possible. Because some requests depend on earlier requests, there is often a tension between increasing throughput and maintaining the proper semantics for dependent requests. Operating system transactions make it easier to write reliable, high-throughput server applications because they allow the application to execute non-interfering requests in parallel, even if the requests operate on OS state, such as file data.

Kernel rootkits that modify operating system state to avoid detection are a dangerous threat to system security. This paper presents OSck, a system that discovers kernel rootkits by detecting malicious modifications to operating system data. OSck integrates and extends existing techniques for detecting rootkits, and verifies safety properties for large portions of the kernel heap with minimal overhead. We deduce type information for verification by analyzing unmodified kernel source code and in-memory kernel data structures.High-performance integrity checks that execute concurrently with a running operating system create data races, and we demonstrate a deterministic solution for ensuring kernel memory is in a consistent state. We introduce two new classes of kernel rootkits that are undetectable by current systems, motivating the need for the OSck API that allows kernel developers to conveniently specify arbitrary integrity properties.

Chip multi-processors (CMPs) have become ubiquitous, while tools that ease concurrent programming have not. The promise of increased performance for all applications through ever more parallel hardware requires good tools for concurrent programming, especially for average programmers. Transactional memory (TM) has enjoyed recent interest as a tool that can help programmers program concurrently.

A minimal, bounded hardware transactional memory implementation significantly improves synchronization performance when used in an operating system kernel. We add HTM to Linux 2.4, a kernel with a simple, coarse-grained synchronization structure. The transactional Linux 2.4 kernel can improve performance of user programs by as much as 40% over the non-transactional 2.4 kernel. It closes 68% of the performance gap with the Linux 2.6 kernel, which has had significant engineering effort applied to improve scalability.

Applications must be able to synchronize accesses to operating system resources in order to ensure correctness in the face of concurrency and system failures. System transactions allow the programmer to specify updates to heterogeneous system resources with the OS guaranteeing atomicity, consistency, isolation, and durability (ACID). System transactions efficiently and cleanly solve persistent concurrency problems that are difficult to address with other techniques. For example, system transactions eliminate security vulnerabilities in the file system that are caused by time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTTOU) race conditions. System transactions enable an unsuccessful software installation to roll back without disturbing concurrent, independent updates to the file system.

This paper quantifies the effect of architectural design decisions onthe performance of TxLinux. TxLinux is a Linux kernel modifiedto use transactions in place of locking primitives in several key subsystems.We run TxLinux on MetaTM, which is a new hardwaretransaction memory (HTM) model.MetaTM contains features that enable efficient and correct interrupthandling for an x86-like architecture. Live stack overwrites can corrupt non-transactional stack memory and requires a smallchange to the transaction register checkpoint hardware to ensurecorrect operation of the operating system. We also propose stack based early release to reduce spurious conflicts on stack memorybetween kernel code and interrupt handlers.We use MetaTM to examine the performance sensitivity of individualarchitectural features. For TxLinux we find that Polka and SizeMatters are effective contention management policies, someform of backoff on transaction contention is vital for performance,and stalling on a transaction conflict reduces transaction restartrates, but does not improve performance. Transaction write setsare small, and performance is insensitive to transaction abort costsbut sensitive to commit costs.

TxLinux is a variant of Linux that is the first operating system to use hardware transactional memory (HTM) as a synchronization primitive, and the first to manage HTM in the scheduler. This paper describes and measures TxLinux and discusses two innovations in detail: cooperation between locks and transactions, and theintegration of transactions with the OS scheduler. Mixing locks and transactions requires a new primitive, cooperative transactional spinlocks (cxspinlocks) that allow locks and transactions to protect the same data while maintaining the advantages of both synchronization primitives. Cxspinlocks allow the system to attemptexecution of critical regions with transactions and automatically roll back to use locking if the region performs I/O. Integrating the scheduler with HTM eliminates priority inversion. On a series ofreal-world benchmarks TxLinux has similar performance to Linux, exposing concurrency with as many as 32 concurrent threads on 32 CPUs in the same critical region.