Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Xinyuan Wang 0009
dblp:81/3778-9
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · conflict
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 2 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% | |
| Artificial intelligence
2 papers |
Generative modeling · 67% Vision and language · 33% |
Topics — the 7 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
jailbreak attack |
1.7 | 2 | 2025 | DiffusionAttacker: Diffusion-Driven Prompt Manipulation for LLM Jailbreak · EMNLP 2025 Medical MLLM Is Vulnerable: Cross-Modality Jailbreak and Mismatched Attacks on Medical Multimodal Large Language Models · AAAI 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Medical MLLM Is Vulnerable: Cross-Modality Jailbreak and Mismatched Attacks on Medical Multimodal Large Language Models · AAAI 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › large language model security
adversarial attacks on language models |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | DiffusionAttacker: Diffusion-Driven Prompt Manipulation for LLM Jailbreak · EMNLP 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › large language model security
multimodal large language model security |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Medical MLLM Is Vulnerable: Cross-Modality Jailbreak and Mismatched Attacks on Medical Multimodal Large Language Models · AAAI 2025 |
Machine learning › Generative modeling › diffusion model › discrete diffusion model
diffusion language model |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | DiffusionAttacker: Diffusion-Driven Prompt Manipulation for LLM Jailbreak · EMNLP 2025 |
Machine learning › Generative modeling
diffusion model |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | DiffusionAttacker: Diffusion-Driven Prompt Manipulation for LLM Jailbreak · EMNLP 2025 |
Computer vision › Vision and language › vision-language model › multimodal large language model
medical multimodal large language models |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Medical MLLM Is Vulnerable: Cross-Modality Jailbreak and Mismatched Attacks on Medical Multimodal Large Language Models · AAAI 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
white-box attack · 1.7transfer attack · 1.7sequence-to-sequence diffusion · 1.7gumbel-softmax · 1.7cross-modality attack optimization · 1.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Medical MLLM Is Vulnerable: Cross-Modality Jailbreak and Mismatched Attacks on Medical Multimodal Large Language ModelsabstractSecurity concerns related to Large Language Models (LLMs) have been extensively explored; however, the safety implications for Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), particularly in medical contexts (MedMLLMs), remain inadequately addressed. This paper investigates the security vulnerabilities of MedMLLMs, focusing on their deployment in clinical environments where the accuracy and relevance of question-and-answer interactions are crucial for addressing complex medical challenges. We introduce and redefine two attack types: mismatched malicious attack (2M-attack) and optimized mismatched malicious attack (O2M-attack), by integrating existing clinical data with atypical natural phenomena. Using the comprehensive 3MAD dataset that we developed, which spans a diverse range of medical imaging modalities and adverse medical scenarios, we performed an in-depth analysis and proposed the MCM optimization method. This approach significantly improves the attack success rate against MedMLLMs. Our evaluations, which include white-box attacks on LLaVA-Med and transfer (black-box) attacks on four other SOTA models, reveal that even MedMLLMs designed with advanced security mechanisms remain vulnerable to breaches. This study highlights the critical need for robust security measures to enhance the safety and reliability of open-source MedMLLMs, especially in light of the potential impact of jailbreak attacks and other malicious exploits in clinical applications. Warning: Medical jailbreaking may generate content that includes unverified diagnoses and treatment recommendations. Always consult professional medical advice. Xijie Huang, Xinyuan Wang 0009, Yinghao Zhu, Jiawen Xi, Jingkun An, Hao Wang 0003, Chengwei Pan |
AAAI | 2 |
| 2025 | DiffusionAttacker: Diffusion-Driven Prompt Manipulation for LLM JailbreakabstractLarge Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to generating harmful content when prompted with carefully crafted inputs, a vulnerability known as LLM jailbreaking.As LLMs become more powerful, studying jailbreak methods is critical to enhancing security and aligning models with human values.Traditionally, jailbreak techniques have relied on suffix addition or prompt templates, but these methods suffer from limited attack diversity.This paper introduces DiffusionAttacker, an end-to-end generative approach for jailbreak rewriting inspired by diffusion models.Our method employs a sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq) text diffusion model as a generator, conditioning on the original prompt and guiding the denoising process with a novel attack loss.Unlike previous approaches that use autoregressive LLMs to generate jailbreak prompts, which limit the modification of already generated tokens and restrict the rewriting space, DiffusionAttacker utilizes a seq2seq diffusion model, allowing more flexible token modifications.This approach preserves the semantic content of the original prompt while producing harmful content.Additionally, we leverage the Gumbel-Softmax technique to make the sampling process from the diffusion model's output distribution differentiable, eliminating the need for iterative token search.Extensive experiments on Advbench and Harmbench demonstrate that DiffusionAttacker outperforms previous methods across various evaluation metrics, including attack success rate (ASR), fluency, and diversity.How to make a bomb?Gaussian Noise Gradually Denoising DiffuSeq Model Embedding Map LM_head Gumbel softmax Jailbreaking Prompt LM_head Gumbel softmax Jailbreaking Hao Wang 0003, Hao Li 0031, Junda Zhu 0003, Xinyuan Wang 0009, Chengwei Pan, Minlie Huang, Lei Sha |
EMNLP | 4 |
| 2023 | Leveraging Frequency Domain Learning in 3D Vessel SegmentationabstractCoronary microvascular disease constitutes a substantial risk to human health. Employing computer-aided analysis and diagnostic systems, medical professionals can intervene early in disease progression, with 3D vessel segmentation serving as a crucial component. Nevertheless, conventional U-Net architectures tend to yield incoherent and imprecise segmentation outcomes, particularly for small vessel structures. While models with attention mechanisms, such as Transformers and large convolutional kernels, demonstrate superior performance, their extensive computational demands during training and inference lead to increased time complexity. In this study, we leverage Fourier domain learning as a substitute for multi-scale convo-lutional kernels in 3D hierarchical segmentation models, which can reduce computational expenses while preserving global receptive fields within the network. Furthermore, a zero-parameter frequency domain fusion method is designed to improve the skip connections in U-Net architecture. Experimental results on a public dataset and an in-house dataset indicate that our novel Fourier transformation-based network achieves remarkable dice performance (84.37% on ASACA500 and 80.32% on ImageCAS) in tubular vessel segmentation tasks and substantially reduces computational requirements without compromising global receptive fields. Xinyuan Wang 0009, Chengwei Pan, Hongming Dai, Gangming Zhao, Yizhou Yu |
BIBM | 1 |