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Cosmin Barsan

dblp:82/8733 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2010
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security › trusted computing
trusted computing base
0.112010
Retaining sandbox containment despite bugs in privileged memory-safe code · CCS 2010
Systems and software security
memory safety
0.012010
Retaining sandbox containment despite bugs in privileged memory-safe code · CCS 2010

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

sandbox design · 0.1privilege separation · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2010 Retaining sandbox containment despite bugs in privileged memory-safe code
abstract
Flaws in the standard libraries of secure sandboxes represent a major security threat to billions of devices worldwide. The standard libraries are hard to secure because they frequently need to perform low-level operations that are forbidden in untrusted application code. Existing designs have a single, large trusted computing base that contains security checks at the boundaries between trusted and untrusted code. Unfortunately, flaws in the standard library often allow an attacker to escape the security protections of the sandbox.
Justin Cappos, Armon Dadgar, Jeff Rasley, Justin Samuel, Ivan Beschastnikh, Cosmin Barsan, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Thomas E. Anderson
CCS6