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David McAdams

dblp:84/6736 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2020
—ORCID · unresolved

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1Theory of computation · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
2 papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%
Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
1 paper
Computational social science and digital humanities · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Computational social science and digital humanities › social network analysis
information diffusion
0.412020
Learning through the Grapevine: The Impact of Message Mutation, Transmission Failure, and Deliberate Bias · EC 2020
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
information design
0.412020
Learning through the Grapevine: The Impact of Message Mutation, Transmission Failure, and Deliberate Bias · EC 2020
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory
ascending auction
0.011999
Speeding Up Ascending-Bid Auctions · IJCAI 1999
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design
0.011999
Speeding Up Ascending-Bid Auctions · IJCAI 1999

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

threshold analysis · 0.9bayesian learning · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2020 Learning through the Grapevine: The Impact of Message Mutation, Transmission Failure, and Deliberate Bias
abstract
We examine how well people learn when information is noisily relayed from person to person, subject to: dropping, mutation, and deliberate manipulation. This allows us to explore how communication platforms can improve learning without censoring or even examining messages, but purely by limiting the number of times a message can be relayed or the number of people to whom someone can forward a message. In particular, we analyze learning as a function of the network depth (length of relay chains) and breadth (how many chains a person has access to). Noise builds up as depth increases and so learning requires greater breadth, which we show to be characterized via a sharp threshold above which the receiver learns fully and below which the receiver learns nothing. Moreover, we show that small uncertainty about the rates of mis- and dis-information make learning from long chains of messages impossible. Optimizing learning requires either limiting depth (by controlling how many times a message can be forwarded), or if that is not possible then limiting breadth (by capping the number of people to whom someone can forward a message). Although limiting breadth decreases the overall amount of information a learner has access to, it increases the relative fraction of messages that are coming from nearby compared to far away in the network, and thus increases the signal to noise ratio. Such policies do not require the ability to fact-check, respect privacy, increase the fraction of true to false messages, and have been implemented by communication platforms. Finally, we extend our model to study learning from dropping rates (e.g., people are more likely to pass messages with one conclusion than another). We find that as the distance to primary sources grows, all learning comes from either the total number of messages received or from the content of received messages, but the learner does not need to pay attention to both.
Matthew O. Jackson, Suraj Malladi, David McAdams
EC3
1999 Speeding Up Ascending-Bid Auctions
Yuzo Fujishima, David McAdams, Yoav Shoham
IJCAI2