Password authentication is the dominant form of access control for the Web and mobile devices, and its practicality and ubiquity is unlikely to be replaced by other authentication approaches in the foreseeable future. To guarantee the security of data communication and mitigate the problem of password-cracking, aPassword Authenticated Key Exchange($\mathsf {PAKE}$) system can be deployed between two peer participants. The main drawback of traditional$\mathsf {PAKE}$is that passwords are exposed in plaintext when the remote server is compromised. To overcome this limitation, it is recommended by industry standards (such as SRP family RFC 5054, RFC6628, RFC7914, OPAQUE,etc) to useasymmetric-$\mathsf {PAKE}$protocols, which enable the server to store a hash of the user's password with a random salt, providing guarantees that the user's password is never transmitted in plain-text to the server when login. However, most of the existingasymmetric-$\mathsf {PAKE}$protocols either are based on traditional hash functions under random oracles, or depend on non-quantum-secure hardness assumptions and become insecure in the quantum era. To bridge the gap betweenasymmetric-$\mathsf {PAKE}$and quantum-security, in this article, we resort tosmooth projective hash functions($\mathsf {SPHF}$) andcommitment-basedpassword-hashing schemes($\mathsf {PHS}$) over lattice-based cryptography, and construct an asymmetric$\mathsf {PAKE}$protocol secure against quantum attacks. Our construction eliminates the costly non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) method, bypasses assumptions of the random oracle model, and achieves quantum resistance. We also show that our asymmetric-$\mathsf {PAKE}$protocol can achieve security and efficiency under the Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway (BPR) model. Finally, we develop a prototype implementation of our instantiation and use it to evaluate its performance in realistic settings.

After a few years of intense research, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) still demand new secure and cryptographic schemes. On the other hand, the advent of cryptography from pairings has enabled a wide range of novel cryptosystems. In this work we present TinyTate, the first known implementation of pairings for sensor nodes based on the 8-bit/7.3828-MHz ATmega128L microcontroller (e.g., MICA2 and MICAz motes). We then conclude that cryptography from pairings is indeed viable in resource-constrained nodes.