Jens Heider

dblp:85/6191 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
7ranked-venue papers
0as first author
7since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0001-8343-6608ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 7 · 7 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Scaling Android Hooking: Usability and Performance of Frida and Xposed for Mass API Interception
abstract
210
Kris Heid, Dávid Zsolt Balatoni, Jens Heider
ICISSP (2)3
2025 Revisiting Permission Piggybacking of Third-Party Libraries in Android Apps
abstract
39
Kris Heid, Elena Julia Sonntag, Jens Heider
ICISSP (1)3
2024 Device Fingerprinting Remediation in Android and iOS Apps
Kris Heid, Jens Heider
CRiSIS2
2023 Tracing Cryptographic Agility in Android and iOS Apps
abstract
38
Kris Heid, Jens Heider, Matthias Ritscher, Jan-Peter Stotz
ICISSP2
2022 Context Correlation for Automated Dynamic Android App Analysis to Improve Impact Rating of Privacy and Security Flaws
Kris Heid, Jens Heider
CRiSIS2
2022 Android Data Storage Locations and What App Developers Do with It from a Security and Privacy Perspective
abstract
Many Android apps handle and store sensible data on the smartphone, such as for example passwords, API keys or messages. This information must of course be protected and thus more and more protected storage options and storage isolation techniques were implemented in recent Android version. This results in good security and privacy mechanisms provided to Android developers. However, the question is how well these measures are implemented in todays apps. In this publication, we are presenting an automated dynamic analysis environment which we use to analyze the top 1000 Android apps. Filesystem API accesses of these apps are evaluated and judged how well Androids protected storage locations are leveraged or abused.
Kris Heid, Tobias Tefke, Jens Heider, Ralf C. Staudemeyer
ICISSP3
2021 Remote WebAuthn: FIDO2 Authentication for Less Accessible Devices
abstract
Nowadays, passwords are the prevalent authentication mechanism, even though it is proven to offer insufficient protection against cyber crime. Thus, FIDO2 was released with a more secure authentication mechanism. FIDO2 enables authentification with cryptographic hardware, such as USB sticks, NFC cards or in the smartphone integrated chips. A device with FIDO2 support is required to implement the whole FIDO2 stack and offer the required interfaces for the security hardware. However, many systems like for example Smart TVs can not make use of FIDO2 due to the lack of HW interfaces or the usage of outdated software. To overcome this, we present Remote WebAuthn, which enables secure authentification on such restricted devices through a remote authentication from a secondary, FIDO2 compatible device, such as a smartphone. We evaluate our approach to have better usability compared to FIDO2 while maintaining most security advantages.
Paul Wagner, Kris Heid, Jens Heider
ICISSP3