EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Jens Heider
dblp:85/6191
· DBLP profile ↗
7ranked-venue papers
0as first author
7since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0001-8343-6608ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 7 · 7 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Scaling Android Hooking: Usability and Performance of Frida and Xposed for Mass API Interceptionabstract210 Kris Heid, Dávid Zsolt Balatoni, Jens Heider |
ICISSP (2) | 3 |
| 2025 | Revisiting Permission Piggybacking of Third-Party Libraries in Android Appsabstract39 Kris Heid, Elena Julia Sonntag, Jens Heider |
ICISSP (1) | 3 |
| 2024 | Device Fingerprinting Remediation in Android and iOS Apps
Kris Heid, Jens Heider |
CRiSIS | 2 |
| 2023 | Tracing Cryptographic Agility in Android and iOS Appsabstract38 Kris Heid, Jens Heider, Matthias Ritscher, Jan-Peter Stotz |
ICISSP | 2 |
| 2022 | Context Correlation for Automated Dynamic Android App Analysis to Improve Impact Rating of Privacy and Security Flaws
Kris Heid, Jens Heider |
CRiSIS | 2 |
| 2022 | Android Data Storage Locations and What App Developers Do with It from a Security and Privacy PerspectiveabstractMany Android apps handle and store sensible data on the smartphone, such as for example passwords, API keys or messages. This information must of course be protected and thus more and more protected storage options and storage isolation techniques were implemented in recent Android version. This results in good security and privacy mechanisms provided to Android developers. However, the question is how well these measures are implemented in todays apps. In this publication, we are presenting an automated dynamic analysis environment which we use to analyze the top 1000 Android apps. Filesystem API accesses of these apps are evaluated and judged how well Androids protected storage locations are leveraged or abused. Kris Heid, Tobias Tefke, Jens Heider, Ralf C. Staudemeyer |
ICISSP | 3 |
| 2021 | Remote WebAuthn: FIDO2 Authentication for Less Accessible DevicesabstractNowadays, passwords are the prevalent authentication mechanism, even though it is proven to offer insufficient protection against cyber crime. Thus, FIDO2 was released with a more secure authentication mechanism. FIDO2 enables authentification with cryptographic hardware, such as USB sticks, NFC cards or in the smartphone integrated chips. A device with FIDO2 support is required to implement the whole FIDO2 stack and offer the required interfaces for the security hardware. However, many systems like for example Smart TVs can not make use of FIDO2 due to the lack of HW interfaces or the usage of outdated software. To overcome this, we present Remote WebAuthn, which enables secure authentification on such restricted devices through a remote authentication from a secondary, FIDO2 compatible device, such as a smartphone. We evaluate our approach to have better usability compared to FIDO2 while maintaining most security advantages. Paul Wagner, Kris Heid, Jens Heider |
ICISSP | 3 |