As time passes words can acquire meanings they did not previously have, such as the ‘twitter post’ usage of ‘tweet’. We address how this can be detected from time-stamped raw text. We propose a generative model with senses dependent on times and context words dependent on senses but otherwise eternal, and a Gibbs sampler for estimation. We obtain promising parameter estimates for positive (resp. negative) cases of known sense emergence (resp non-emergence) and adapt the ‘pseudo-word’ technique (Schutze, 1992) to give a novel further evaluation via ‘pseudo-neologisms’. The question of ground-truth is also addressed and a technique proposed to locate an emergence date for evaluation purposes.

In this paper we present an attack, which allows fraudulent transactions to be collected from EMV contactless credit and debit cards without the knowledge of the cardholder. The attack exploits a previously unreported vulnerability in EMV protocol, which allows EMV contactless cards to approve unlimited value transactions without the cardholder's PIN when the transaction is carried out in a foreign currency. For example, we have found that Visa credit cards will approve foreign currency transactions for any amount up to ∈999,999.99 without the cardholder's PIN, this side-steps the £20 contactless transaction limit in the UK. This paper outlines our analysis methodology that identified the flaw in the EMV protocol, and presents a scenario in which fraudulent transaction details are transmitted over the Internet to a "rogue merchant" who then uses the transaction data to take money from the victim's account. In reality, the criminals would choose a value between ∈100 and ∈200, which is low enough to be within the victim's balance and not to raise suspicion, but high enough to make each attack worthwhile. The attack is novel in that it could be operated on a large scale with multiple attackers collecting fraudulent transactions for a central rogue merchant which can be located anywhere in the world where EMV payments are accepted.