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Abhai Johri

dblp:87/4340 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 1987
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 2Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
3 papers
Software testing · 55% Operating systems · 45%
Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%

Topics — the 7 heaviest of 9, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Software testing › non-functional testing
security testing
0.021987
A New Security Testing Method and Its Application to the Secure Xenix Kernel · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987
A New Security Testing Method and Its Application to the Secure Xenix Kernel · S&P 1986
Software testing › system software testing
kernel testing
0.021987
A New Security Testing Method and Its Application to the Secure Xenix Kernel · S&P 1986
A New Security Testing Method and Its Application to the Secure Xenix Kernel · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987
Operating systems › system security › operating system security
secure operating system
0.011987
Design and Implementation of Secure Xenix · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987
Operating systems › system security
operating system security
0.011986
A New Security Testing Method and Its Application to the Secure Xenix Kernel · S&P 1986
Operating systems › system security › operating system security › secure operating system
security kernel
0.011986
A New Security Testing Method and Its Application to the Secure Xenix Kernel · S&P 1986
Systems and software security › operating system security
UNIX security
0.011987
Design and Implementation of Secure Xenix · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987
Software testing
test coverage
0.011986
A New Security Testing Method and Its Application to the Secure Xenix Kernel · S&P 1986

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

control synthesis graphs · 0.0white-box testing · 0.0black-box testing · 0.0access check separability · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
1987 Design and Implementation of Secure Xenix
abstract
Secure Xenix™ is an experimental system designed to run on IBM PC/AT workstations. Like Xenix, it is a Unix™ System V implementation on the PC/AT workstation; unlike Xenix, it eliminates the Unix security deficiencies and it enhances security policies. In this paper, we present the design features of Secure Xenix, their integration within Xenix, and some of the lessons learned from this experiment to date.
Virgil D. Gligor, C. Sekar Chandersekaran, Robert S. Chapman, Leslie J. Dotterer, Matthew S. Hecht, Wen-Der Jiang, Abhai Johri, Gary L. Luckenbaugh, N. Vasudevan
IEEE Trans. Software Eng.7
1987 A New Security Testing Method and Its Application to the Secure Xenix Kernel
abstract
A new security testing method is proposed that combines the advantages of both traditional "black box" (monolithic functional) testing and "white box" (functional-synthesis-based) testing. The new method allows significant coverage both for security model-based tests and for individual kernel-call tests. It eliminates redundant kernel test cases 1) by using a variant of control synthesis graphs, 2) by analyzing dependencies between descriptive kernel-call specifications, and 3) by exploiting access check separability. A higher degree of test assurance is achieved than that of other security testing methods because the new method helps eliminate cyclic dependencies among test programs for different kernel calls. The application of this method to the testing of the Secure Xenix™ kernel is illustrated.
Virgil D. Gligor, C. Sekar Chandersekaran, Wen-Der Jiang, Abhai Johri, Gary L. Luckenbaugh, L. Edward Reich
IEEE Trans. Software Eng.4
1986 A New Security Testing Method and Its Application to the Secure Xenix Kernel
abstract
A new security testing method is proposed that combines the advantages of both traditional "black box" (monolithic functional) testing and "white box" (functional-synthesis- based) testing. The new method allows significant coverage both for security model-based tests and for individual kernel-call tests. It eliminates redundant kernel test cases (1) by using a variant of control synthesis graphs, (2) by analyzing dependencies between descriptive kernel-call specifications, and (3) by exploiting access check separability. A higher degree of test assurance is achieved than that of other security testing methods because the new method helps eliminate cyclic dependencies among test programs for different kernel calls. The application of this method to the testing of the Secure Xenix* kernel is illustrated. The design and the implementation of Secure Xenix are presented in a companion paper.
Virgil D. Gligor, C. Sekar Chandersekaran, W. Cheng, Wen-Der Jiang, Abhai Johri, Gary L. Luckenbaugh, L. Edward Reich
S&P5