EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
David M. Rahman
dblp:88/7161
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2009
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-authorTheory of computation · 1 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100% |
Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
mechanism design |
0.1 | 1 | 2009 | But who will monitor the monitor? · EC 2009 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › contract theory
moral hazard |
0.1 | 1 | 2009 | But who will monitor the monitor? · EC 2009 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
contract theory · 0.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | But who will monitor the monitor?abstractConsider a group of individuals whose behavior is subject to moral hazard, and suppose that providing them with incentives requires a monitor to detect deviations. What about the monitor's deviations? I study mediated contracts and find that the monitor's deviations are effectively irrelevant. Hence, nobody needs to monitor the monitor. I also characterize exactly when such contracts can provide the right incentives for everyone. In doing so, several new characterizations of virtual implementation are derived. David M. Rahman |
EC | 1 |