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David M. Rahman

dblp:88/7161 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2009
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-authorTheory of computation · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
mechanism design
0.112009
But who will monitor the monitor? · EC 2009
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › contract theory
moral hazard
0.112009
But who will monitor the monitor? · EC 2009

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

contract theory · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2009 But who will monitor the monitor?
abstract
Consider a group of individuals whose behavior is subject to moral hazard, and suppose that providing them with incentives requires a monitor to detect deviations. What about the monitor's deviations? I study mediated contracts and find that the monitor's deviations are effectively irrelevant. Hence, nobody needs to monitor the monitor. I also characterize exactly when such contracts can provide the right incentives for everyone. In doing so, several new characterizations of virtual implementation are derived.
David M. Rahman
EC1