EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
David A. Schultz
dblp:88/95
· DBLP profile ↗
5ranked-venue papers
3as first author
0since 2021 · last 2013
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Systems, architecture and hardware · 3 · 2 first-authorSecurity and privacy · 2 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
3 papers |
Systems and software security · 59% Authentication and access control · 20% Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 20% | |
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
2 papers |
Distributed systems · 100% | |
| Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper |
Database system architecture and tuning · 100% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Programming languages and type systems · 100% |
Topics — the 14 heaviest of 14, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Systems and software security
information flow control |
0.3 | 2 | 2013 | IFDB: decentralized information flow control for databases · EuroSys 2013 Abstractions for Usable Information Flow Control in Aeolus · USENIX ATC 2012 |
Database system architecture and tuning
database security |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | IFDB: decentralized information flow control for databases · EuroSys 2013 |
Authentication and access control › access control › data access control
database access control |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | IFDB: decentralized information flow control for databases · EuroSys 2013 |
Systems and software security › information flow control
decentralized information flow control |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | IFDB: decentralized information flow control for databases · EuroSys 2013 |
Distributed systems › fault tolerance
byzantine fault tolerance |
0.1 | 1 | 2012 | Automatic Reconfiguration for Large-Scale Reliable Storage Systems · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2012 |
Distributed systems › group communication › group membership
dynamic membership |
0.1 | 1 | 2012 | Automatic Reconfiguration for Large-Scale Reliable Storage Systems · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2012 |
Distributed systems
replication |
0.1 | 1 | 2012 | Automatic Reconfiguration for Large-Scale Reliable Storage Systems · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2012 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › secret sharing
proactive secret sharing |
0.1 | 1 | 2008 | Mobile proactive secret sharing · PODC 2008 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secret sharing |
0.1 | 1 | 2008 | Mobile proactive secret sharing · PODC 2008 |
Programming languages and type systems
language design |
0.0 | 1 | 2012 | Abstractions for Usable Information Flow Control in Aeolus · USENIX ATC 2012 |
Programming languages and type systems › type systems
security type systems |
0.0 | 1 | 2012 | Abstractions for Usable Information Flow Control in Aeolus · USENIX ATC 2012 |
Distributed systems › peer-to-peer systems
distributed hash table |
0.0 | 1 | 2012 | Automatic Reconfiguration for Large-Scale Reliable Storage Systems · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2012 |
Distributed systems › distributed computing theory
asynchronous networks |
0.0 | 1 | 2008 | Mobile proactive secret sharing · PODC 2008 |
Distributed systems
fault tolerance |
0.0 | 1 | 2008 | Mobile proactive secret sharing · PODC 2008 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
decentralized information flow control · 0.3quorum protocol · 0.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | IFDB: decentralized information flow control for databasesabstractNumerous sensitive databases are breached every year due to bugs in applications. These applications typically handle data for many users, and consequently, they have access to large amounts of confidential information. David A. Schultz, Barbara Liskov |
EuroSys | 1 |
| 2012 | Abstractions for Usable Information Flow Control in Aeolus
Winnie Cheng, Dan R. K. Ports, David A. Schultz, Victoria Popic, Aaron Blankstein, James A. Cowling, Dorothy Curtis, Liuba Shrira, Barbara Liskov |
USENIX ATC | 3 |
| 2012 | Automatic Reconfiguration for Large-Scale Reliable Storage SystemsabstractByzantine-fault-tolerant replication enhances the availability and reliability of Internet services that store critical state and preserve it despite attacks or software errors. However, existing Byzantine-fault-tolerant storage systems either assume a static set of replicas, or have limitations in how they handle reconfigurations (e.g., in terms of the scalability of the solutions or the consistency levels they provide). This can be problematic in long-lived, large-scale systems where system membership is likely to change during the system lifetime. In this paper, we present a complete solution for dynamically changing system membership in a large-scale Byzantine-fault-tolerant system. We present a service that tracks system membership and periodically notifies other system nodes of membership changes. The membership service runs mostly automatically, to avoid human configuration errors; is itself Byzantine-fault-tolerant and reconfigurable; and provides applications with a sequence of consistent views of the system membership. We demonstrate the utility of this membership service by using it in a novel distributed hash table called dBQS that provides atomic semantics even across changes in replica sets. dBQS is interesting in its own right because its storage algorithms extend existing Byzantine quorum protocols to handle changes in the replica set, and because it differs from previous DHTs by providing Byzantine fault tolerance and offering strong semantics. We implemented the membership service and dBQS. Our results show that the approach works well, in practice: the membership service is able to manage a large system and the cost to change the system membership is low. Rodrigo Rodrigues 0001, Barbara Liskov, Kathryn Chen, Moses D. Liskov, David A. Schultz |
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. | 5 |
| 2010 | MPSS: Mobile Proactive Secret SharingabstractThis article describes MPSS, a new way to do proactive secret sharing. MPSS provides mobility : The group of nodes holding the shares of the secret can change at each resharing, which is essential in a long-lived system. MPSS additionally allows the number of tolerated faulty shareholders to change when the secret is moved so that the system can tolerate more (or fewer) corruptions; this allows reconfiguration on-the-fly to accommodate changes in the environment. MPSS includes an efficient protocol that is intended to be used in practice. The protocol is optimized for the common case of no or few failures, but degradation when there are more failures is modest. MPSS contains a step in which nodes accuse proposals made by other nodes; we show a novel way to handle these accusations when their verity cannot be known. We also present a way to produce accusations that can be verified without releasing keys of other nodes; verifiable accusations improve the performance of MPSS, and are a useful primitive independent of MPSS. David A. Schultz, Barbara Liskov, Moses D. Liskov |
ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. | 1 |
| 2008 | Mobile proactive secret sharingabstractMPSS is a new way to do proactive secret sharing in asynchronous networks. MPSS provides mobility: The group of nodes holding the shares of the secret can change at each resharing, which is essential in a long-lived system. MPSS additionally allows the number of tolerated faulty shareholders to change when the secret is moved so that the system can tolerate more (or fewer) corruptions; this allows reconfiguration on the fly to accommodate changes in the environment. David A. Schultz, Barbara Liskov, Moses D. Liskov |
PODC | 1 |