Modern system-on-chip (SoC) designs include a wide variety of highly sensitive assets which must be protected from unauthorized access. A significant aspect of SoC design involves exploration, analysis, and evaluation of resiliency mechanisms against attacks to such assets. These attacks may arise from a number of sources, including malicious intellectualproperty blocks (IPs) in the hardware, malicious or vulnerable firmware and software, insecure communication of the system with other devices, and side-channel vulnerabilities through power and performance profiles. Countermeasures for these attacks are equally diverse, which include architecture, design, implementation, and validation-based protection. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive overview of the security infrastructure in modern SoC designs, including both resiliency techniques and their validation paradigms at presilicon and postsilicon stages. We identify gaps in current resiliency and analysis architectures and propose design and validation solutions to address them. Finally, we provide industry perspectives on the role and impact of current practices on SoC security, and discuss some emerging trends in this important area.

At the era of everything is connected, security has become an essential key question when starting a new System-on-chip architecture. With the proliferation of secure systems, it is expected that many design teams will lack the essential knowledge and time to look at the abundant literature. In this paper, we intend to provide a reasonable approach to tackle this problem and try to convey the essential design rules, design elements and threats to any reader. We cover a possible methodology to collect requirements based on a systematic identification of the assets needing protection and threats against these assets: and make sure the design is appropriately sized and adequately secure. Once the requirements have been collected, the architecture can be laid out and we discuss the main elements that can compose it: trusted execution environment, secure boot, secure software update, secure design-for-test (DFT) components, Random Number Generation (RNG).

Since their introduction by Kocher in 1998, power analysis attacks have attracted significant attention within the cryptographic community. While early works in the field mainly threatened the security of smart cards and simple processors, several recent publications have shown the vulnerability of hardware implementations as well. In particular, field programmable gate arrays are attractive options for hardware implementation of encryption algorithms,but their security against power analysis is a serious concern, as we discuss in this paper. For this purpose, we present recent results of attacks attempted against standard encryption algorithms, provide a theoretical estimation of these attacks based on simple statistical parameters and evaluate the cost and security of different possible countermeasures.