Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Thomas A. Berson
dblp:90/3289
· DBLP profile ↗
12ranked-venue papers
8as first author
0since 2021 · last 2003
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 10 · 7 first-authorSystems, architecture and hardware · 1Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
9 papers |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 67% Authentication and access control · 14% Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 11% | |
| Artificial intelligence
1 paper |
Knowledge representation and reasoning · 100% |
Topics — the 16 heaviest of 22, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › post-quantum cryptography
code-based cryptography |
0.0 | 1 | 1997 | Failure of the McEliece Public-Key Cryptosystem Under Message-Resend and Related-Message Attack · CRYPTO 1997 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › post-quantum cryptography › code-based cryptography
mceliece cryptosystem |
0.0 | 1 | 1997 | Failure of the McEliece Public-Key Cryptosystem Under Message-Resend and Related-Message Attack · CRYPTO 1997 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems
zero-knowledge proofs |
0.0 | 1 | 1989 | How to Explain Zero-Knowledge Protocols to Your Children · CRYPTO 1989 |
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Knowledge representation and reasoning
knowledge-based systems |
0.0 | 1 | 1987 | Multilevel Security for Knowledge-Based Systems · S&P 1987 |
Systems and software security
multilevel security |
0.0 | 1 | 1987 | Multilevel Security for Knowledge-Based Systems · S&P 1987 |
Authentication and access control › authentication
authentication protocols |
0.0 | 1 | 1985 | Polonium: An Identity Authentication System · S&P 1985 |
Authentication and access control › password authentication
one-time password |
0.0 | 1 | 1985 | Polonium: An Identity Authentication System · S&P 1985 |
Authentication and access control
user authentication |
0.0 | 1 | 1985 | Polonium: An Identity Authentication System · S&P 1985 |
Systems and software security › isolation
compartmentalization |
0.0 | 1 | 1983 | Processor-per-Domain Guard Architecture · S&P 1983 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key management
key distribution |
0.0 | 1 | 1983 | A Key Distribution Protocol Using Event Markers · ACM Trans. Comput. Syst. 1983 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
key exchange |
0.0 | 1 | 1983 | A Key Distribution Protocol Using Event Markers · ACM Trans. Comput. Syst. 1983 |
Authentication and access control
access control |
0.0 | 1 | 1982 | Local Network Cryptosystem Architecture: Access Control · CRYPTO 1982 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
block cipher |
0.0 | 1 | 1982 | Long Key Variants of DES · CRYPTO 1982 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › block cipher
DES |
0.0 | 1 | 1982 | Long Key Variants of DES · CRYPTO 1982 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
symmetric cryptography |
0.0 | 1 | 1982 | Long Key Variants of DES · CRYPTO 1982 |
Network security
local area network security |
0.0 | 1 | 1982 | Local Network Cryptosystem Architecture: Access Control · CRYPTO 1982 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
noninterference · 0.0one-time pad · 0.0event markers · 0.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2003 | Cryptography after the Bubble: How to Make an Impact on the World
Thomas A. Berson |
CT-RSA | 1 |
| 2000 | Cryptography Everywhere
Thomas A. Berson |
ASIACRYPT | 1 |
| 1997 | Failure of the McEliece Public-Key Cryptosystem Under Message-Resend and Related-Message Attack
Thomas A. Berson |
CRYPTO | 1 |
| 1996 | Truncated Differentials of SAFER
Lars R. Knudsen, Thomas A. Berson |
FSE | 2 |
| 1990 | Guest Editors' Introduction Security and Privacy
Thomas A. Berson, Steven B. Lipner |
IEEE Trans. Software Eng. | 1 |
| 1989 | How to Explain Zero-Knowledge Protocols to Your Children
Jean-Jacques Quisquater, Myriam Quisquater, Muriel Quisquater, Michaël Quisquater, Louis C. Guillou, Marie Annick Guillou, Gaïd Guillou, Anna Guillou, Gwenolé Guillou, Soazig Guillou, Thomas A. Berson |
CRYPTO | 11 |
| 1987 | Multilevel Security for Knowledge-Based SystemsabstractThe paper presents results of an initial investigation of multilevel security for knowledge-based systems. Knowledge-based systems are computer programs that give advice using techniques developed in artificial intelligence research. Although many apparently multilevel knowledge-based systems are now being developed, security requirements have not yet been articulated for them. We adopt the production system model as a generalization of knowledge-based systems. We apply noninterference concepts of multilevel security to the production model, and from this we suggest an approach for achieving multilevel secure production systems. Our approach puts control structures at system low, assigns a single classification to entries in the knowledge base, and provide different views both of the database and of the rule base depending upon the clearance of the user. We conclude that it will be possible to achieve multilevel security for many knowledge-based systems. We present a research agenda for further study, Thomas A. Berson, Teresa F. Lunt |
S&P | 1 |
| 1985 | Polonium: An Identity Authentication SystemabstractPasswords have long been used as the most common method for providing user authentication when accessing remote computer systems. However, there are many security problems associated with passwords including their susceptibility to the attacks of eavesdropping, playback, and exhaustive search. This paper describes a system which offers an innovative solution to the problem of establishing identities over insecure communications channels. The system embodies the security concept of a one-time pad because it requires that a different password be used for each access. Through the possession of a personal authentication device (the PassPort) and knowledge of a unique PIN number, an authorized user is able to generate the correct password to be used for each access. Raymond M. Wong, Thomas A. Berson, Richard J. Feiertag |
S&P | 2 |
| 1983 | Processor-per-Domain Guard Architecture
Thomas A. Berson, Richard J. Feiertag, R. Kenneth Bauer |
S&P | 1 |
| 1983 | A Key Distribution Protocol Using Event MarkersabstractThe distribution of cryptographic keys in a computer network is discussed.The need for current authentication of communicants to prevent playback attacks is demonstrated, and an earlier protocol is found to be subject to such attacks.A protocol which employs a simple means of obtaining current authentication of communicants and does not require communicants to maintain an absolute sense of time is presented.The protocol is expanded to accommodate key distribution between multiple security communities, where each community is administered by a different authentication server.Another form of the protocol which is appropriate for datagram applications is developed. R. Kenneth Bauer, Thomas A. Berson, Richard J. Feiertag |
ACM Trans. Comput. Syst. | 2 |
| 1982 | Local Network Cryptosystem Architecture: Access Control
Thomas A. Berson |
CRYPTO | 1 |
| 1982 | Long Key Variants of DES
Thomas A. Berson |
CRYPTO | 1 |