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Sean Murphy

dblp:91/5242 · DBLP profile ↗
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24ranked-venue papers
12as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · conflict

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 17 · 10 first-author · 1 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 2 · 1 first-authorDatabases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 2 · 2 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 first-authorApplied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Reinforcement learning · 100%
Network and information security
8 papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 100%
Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%

Topics — the 13 heaviest of 14, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning
off-policy reinforcement learning
0.712023
Off-Policy Learning-to-Bid with AuctionGym · KDD 2023
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
auction theory
0.212023
Off-Policy Learning-to-Bid with AuctionGym · KDD 2023
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
block cipher cryptanalysis
0.242011
The Return of the Cryptographic Boomerang · IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 2011
An Analysis of SAFER · J. Cryptol. 1998
Pairs and Triplets of DES S-Boxes · J. Cryptol. 1995
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › differential cryptanalysis
boomerang attack
0.112011
The Return of the Cryptographic Boomerang · IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 2011
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › block cipher
AES
0.012002
Essential Algebraic Structure within the AES · CRYPTO 2002
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › symmetric cryptography › cipher design
cellular automata based cipher
0.011997
Comments on "Theory and Applications of Cellular Automata in Cryptography" · IEEE Trans. Computers 1997
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
stream cipher cryptanalysis
0.011997
Comments on "Theory and Applications of Cellular Automata in Cryptography" · IEEE Trans. Computers 1997
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › block cipher
DES
0.011995
Pairs and Triplets of DES S-Boxes · J. Cryptol. 1995
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography
public-key cryptanalysis
0.011995
The Cryptanalysis of a Public-Key Implementation of Finite Group Mappings · J. Cryptol. 1995
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › boolean functions
s-box analysis
0.011995
Pairs and Triplets of DES S-Boxes · J. Cryptol. 1995
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › symmetric cryptography
cipher design
0.011994
A Weak Cipher that Generates the Symmetric Group · J. Cryptol. 1994
Electronic design automation
design methodology
0.011994
Partnering with EDA Vendors: Tips, Techniques, and the Role of Standards · DAC 1994
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › block cipher cryptanalysis
FEAL
0.011990
The Cryptanalysis of FEAL-4 with 20 Chosen Plaintexts · J. Cryptol. 1990

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

reinforcement learning · 1.3off-policy learning · 1.3probability estimation · 0.1affine cryptanalysis · 0.0statistical analysis · 0.0chosen-plaintext attack · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 CountNet: Utilising Repetition Counts in Sequential Recommendation
Aleksandr V. Petrov, Efi Karra Taniskidou, Sean Murphy
ECIR (3)3
2023 Off-Policy Learning-to-Bid with AuctionGym
abstract
Online advertising opportunities are sold through auctions, billions of times every day across the web. Advertisers who participate in those auctions need to decide on a bidding strategy: how much they are willing to bid for a given impression opportunity. Deciding on such a strategy is not a straightforward task, because of the interactive and reactive nature of the repeated auction mechanism. Indeed, an advertiser does not observe counterfactual outcomes of bid amounts that were not submitted, and successful advertisers will adapt their own strategies based on bids placed by competitors. These characteristics complicate effective learning and evaluation of bidding strategies based on logged data alone.
Olivier Jeunen, Sean Murphy, Ben Allison
KDD2
2023 On the Precision Loss in Approximate Homomorphic Encryption
Anamaria Costache, Benjamin R. Curtis, Erin Hales, Sean Murphy, Tabitha Ogilvie, Rachel Player
SAC4
2020 Boolean Ring Cryptographic Equation Solving
Sean Murphy, Maura B. Paterson, Christine Swart
SAC1
2019 \delta -subgaussian Random Variables in Cryptography
Sean Murphy, Rachel Player
ACISP1
2019 HPC, Cloud and Big-Data Convergent Architectures: The LEXIS Approach
Alberto Scionti, Jan Martinovic, Olivier Terzo, Etienne Walter, Marc Levrier, Stephan Hachinger, Donato Magarielli, Thierry Goubier, Stéphane Louise, Antonio Parodi, Sean Murphy, Carmine D'Amico, Simone Ciccia, Emanuele Danovaro, Martina Lagasio, Frédéric Donnat, Martin Golasowski, Tiago Quintino, James Nicholas Hawkes, Tomás Martinovic, Lubomir Riha, Katerina Slaninová, Stefano Serra-Capizzano, Roberto Peveri
CISIS11
2018 Analysing and exploiting the Mantin biases in RC4
abstract
We explore the use of the Mantin biases (Mantin, Eurocrypt 2005) to recover plaintexts from RC4-encrypted traffic. We provide a more fine-grained analysis of these biases than in Mantin’s original work. We show that, in fact, the original analysis was incorrect in certain cases: the Mantin biases are sometimes non-existent, and sometimes stronger than originally predicted. We then show how to use these biases in a plaintext recovery attack. Our attack targets two unknown bytes of plaintext that are located close to sequences of known plaintext bytes, a situation that arises in practice when RC4 is used in, for example, TLS. We provide a statistical framework that enables us to make predictions about the performance of this attack and its variants. We then extend the attack using standard dynamic programming techniques to tackle the problem of recovering longer plaintexts, a setting of practical interest in recovering HTTP session cookies and user passwords that are protected by RC4 in TLS. We perform experiments showing that we can successfully recover 16-byte plaintexts with 80% success rate using $$2^{31}$$ ciphertexts, an improvement over previous attacks.
Rémi Bricout, Sean Murphy, Kenneth G. Paterson, Thyla van der Merwe
Des. Codes Cryptogr.2
2011 The Return of the Cryptographic Boomerang
abstract
The boomerang analysis, together with its offspring the amplified boomerang analysis and the rectangle analysis, are techniques that are widely used in the analysis of block ciphers. Realistic examples are given which demonstrate that the boomerang analysis can commonly give probability values that are highly inaccurate. Thus, any complexity estimates for the security of a block cipher based on the boomerang or rectangle analysis must be viewed extremely sceptically.
Sean Murphy
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory1
2009 Geometric Ideas for Cryptographic Equation Solving in Even Characteristic
Sean Murphy, Maura B. Paterson
IMACC1
2008 Novel computational methods for increasing PCR primer design effectiveness in directed sequencing
abstract
BACKGROUND: Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) is used in directed sequencing for the discovery of novel polymorphisms. As the first step in PCR directed sequencing, effective PCR primer design is crucial for obtaining high-quality sequence data for target regions. Since current computational primer design tools are not fully tuned with stable underlying laboratory protocols, researchers may still be forced to iteratively optimize protocols for failed amplifications after the primers have been ordered. Furthermore, potentially identifiable factors which contribute to PCR failures have yet to be elucidated. This inefficient approach to primer design is further intensified in a high-throughput laboratory, where hundreds of genes may be targeted in one experiment. RESULTS: We have developed a fully integrated computational PCR primer design pipeline that plays a key role in our high-throughput directed sequencing pipeline. Investigators may specify target regions defined through a rich set of descriptors, such as Ensembl accessions and arbitrary genomic coordinates. Primer pairs are then selected computationally to produce a minimal amplicon set capable of tiling across the specified target regions. As part of the tiling process, primer pairs are computationally screened to meet the criteria for success with one of two PCR amplification protocols. In the process of improving our sequencing success rate, which currently exceeds 95% for exons, we have discovered novel and accurate computational methods capable of identifying primers that may lead to PCR failures. We reveal the laboratory protocols and their associated, empirically determined computational parameters, as well as describe the novel computational methods which may benefit others in future primer design research. CONCLUSION: The high-throughput PCR primer design pipeline has been very successful in providing the basis for high-quality directed sequencing results and for minimizing costs associated with labor and reprocessing. The modular architecture of the primer design software has made it possible to readily integrate additional primer critique tests based on iterative feedback from the laboratory. As a result, the primer design software, coupled with the laboratory protocols, serves as a powerful tool for low and high-throughput primer design to enable successful directed sequencing.
Kelvin Li, Anushka Brownley, Timothy B. Stockwell, Karen Beeson, Tina C. McIntosh, Dana Busam, Steve Ferriera, Sean Murphy, Samuel Levy
BMC Bioinform.8
2005 Small Scale Variants of the AES
Carlos Cid, Sean Murphy, Matthew J. B. Robshaw
FSE2
2005 An Algebraic Framework for Cipher Embeddings
Carlos Cid, Sean Murphy, Matthew J. B. Robshaw
IMACC2
2002 Essential Algebraic Structure within the AES
Sean Murphy, Matthew J. B. Robshaw
CRYPTO1
2002 Key-Dependent S-Boxes and Differential Cryptanalysis
Sean Murphy, Matthew J. B. Robshaw
Des. Codes Cryptogr.1
1999 The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Sean Murphy
Inf. Secur. Tech. Rep.1
1998 An Analysis of SAFER
Sean Murphy
J. Cryptol.1
1997 An Approximate Distribution for the Maximum Order Complexity
Diane Erdmann, Sean Murphy
Des. Codes Cryptogr.2
1997 The difficulty of attacking cryptosystems
Sean Murphy
Inf. Secur. Tech. Rep.1
1997 Comments on "Theory and Applications of Cellular Automata in Cryptography"
abstract
This paper argues that the cipher systems based on cellular automata (CA) proposed by S. Nandi et al. (1994) are affine and are insecure. A reply by S. Nandi and P. Pal Chaudhuri is given. The reply emphasizes the point that the regular, modular, cascadable structure of local neighborhood CA can be employed for building low cost cipher system hardware. This cost effective engineering solution can achieve desired level of security with larger size CA.
Simon R. Blackburn, Sean Murphy, Kenneth G. Paterson
IEEE Trans. Computers2
1995 The Cryptanalysis of a Public-Key Implementation of Finite Group Mappings
Simon R. Blackburn, Sean Murphy, Jacques Stern
J. Cryptol.2
1995 Pairs and Triplets of DES S-Boxes
Donald W. Davies, Sean Murphy
J. Cryptol.2
1994 Partnering with EDA Vendors: Tips, Techniques, and the Role of Standards
abstract
Tips and techniques for EDA users partnering with commercial EDA vendors, including an examination of the critical role that standards play in a successful partnership.With an explicit buy-if-available bias assumed for the commercial EDA user, partnering strategies are compared with contract development, in-house development and wait-and-see/do-without strategies for functionality not commercially available.requirements and pays the full cost of development, retaining ownership.In-house development implies the development of a solution, using in-house staff and equipment or incrementally added permanent headcount.Wait-and-see/do-without (probably the most common strategic alternative to buy-if-available) implies that the problem is not addressed directly with resources or initiatives.This is commonly the result of other problems/functionality receiving higher priority, low or narrow benefits accruing from a solution, or triage.
Sean Murphy
DAC1
1994 A Weak Cipher that Generates the Symmetric Group
Sean Murphy, Kenneth G. Paterson, Peter R. Wild
J. Cryptol.1
1990 The Cryptanalysis of FEAL-4 with 20 Chosen Plaintexts
Sean Murphy
J. Cryptol.1